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ABSTRACT 
 This dissertation consists of three separate but interrelated studies examining the 
antecedents and consequences of sales and use tax (SUT) policy. The first study investigates 
whether elements of the SUT system influence elements of economic development, and tests 
whether SUT rates and/or bases influence state-aggregated levels of capital expenditures and 
employment within the manufacturing sector from 1983-2006. Results indicate that elements of 
the tax base (i.e., SUT exemptions) affect these indicators of economic development, but the 
same relationship was not seen for SUT rates. The second study examines individual taxpayer 
compliance across different tax settings (i.e., the state use tax compared to the federal income 
tax) and tests whether differences in detection mechanisms, social norms, or ignorance explain 
these differences in compliance. Based on a final sample of 148 taxpayers, results show that 
social norms had an important influence on tax compliance differences across tax settings. The 
third study investigates the antecedents of states‟ adoption of the Streamlined Sales & Use Tax 
Agreement (SSUTA) using both a cross-sectional empirical model and an in-depth qualitative 
case study of three states. Both the model and case study suggest that governmental interest 
groups, rather than businesses, play an important role in the adoption of inter-jurisdictional tax 
policy changes. Overall, the three studies within this dissertation all advance the SUT literature 
by using various theoretical perspectives and methodological approaches to demonstrate that 
governmental interest groups influence the adoption of SUT policy (antecedents), and that SUT 
provisions in turn influence business and individual decisions alike (consequences).  
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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
Empirical taxation research in accounting has exploded over the past few decades. Most 
taxation researchers seek to explore the consequences of tax policy via the examination of 
“…three questions of scholarly and policy interest: Do taxes matter? If not, why not? If so, how 
much?” (Shackelford and Shevlin, 2001, p. 321). Other researchers have investigated the 
antecedents of tax policy (e.g., Roberts and Bobek, 2004). The majority of prior taxation 
research has examined federal income tax issues, but understanding taxation issues in other 
settings is also important, including at the state and/or local level (Shackelford and Shevlin, 
2001). However, prior accounting studies of state taxation have primarily focused on the state 
income tax (e.g., Moore et al., 1987; Klassen and Shackelford, 1998; Lightner, 1999; Gupta and 
Hofmann, 2003; Omer and Shelley, 2004).  
Sales and use taxation (SUT) is one other important state- and local-level tax; it is 
administered on transactions, rather than on income. The SUT is the largest source of state 
governmental revenue (U.S. Census Bureau, 2008); some studies estimate that the SUT paid on 
business inputs dwarfs any other type of state-level taxation, and lags only the property tax on 
the local level (e.g., Phillips et al., 2009). While most prior studies of the SUT are rooted in the 
field of economics, accounting researchers have also begun to address the implications of this tax 
(e.g., Petroni and Shackelford, 1999; Luna, 2004; Luna et al., 2007).  
This dissertation seeks to investigate the antecedents and consequences of SUT policy, 
which offers important implications for academics and policymakers alike. The dissertation first 
sets the stage to investigate questions within this field through a comprehensive literature review 
of the SUT field for accountants. This is followed by the development and execution of three 
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separate but related studies, each of which examine a different element of the antecedents and 
consequences of SUT policy. The subsections below briefly discuss the literature review and the 
resulting three studies.   
Literature Review: A 21st Century Literature Review of Sales and Use Taxes for 
Accountants 
 
This section reviews the recent SUT literature, with a focus on SUT studies published in 
traditional accounting outlets from 2000 until the end of 2007. While some economists reviewed 
the SUT literature during the 1990s (e.g., Murray and Fox, 1997), no such comprehensive review 
has been conducted for the current decade. Moreover, this review extends prior accounting 
literature reviews on state taxation (e.g., Hofmann, 2002) to the SUT element of state and local 
taxation. The review demonstrates that recent SUT research has addressed an array of analytical, 
theoretical, and empirical issues. Analytical or theoretical studies have focused on evaluating 
elements of the existing SUT structure (e.g., McClure, 2005) and on evaluating elements of 
proposed SUT structures (e.g., Slemrod, 2006). Empirical studies have focused on the 
antecedents of SUT policy (e.g., Luna et al., 2007) and on the consequences of SUT policy (e.g., 
Goolsbee, 2000).  
Future accounting researchers have many opportunities to contribute to the SUT 
literature, particularly in the area of empirical work.  One particularly fertile area concerns the 
consequences of general SUT policy. While gross premium taxes (which function like a type of 
SUT on the insurance industry) have been shown to affect organizational decisions, fewer studies 
have investigated whether general SUT influences business decisions in other industries. The 
effect of the SUT on individual consumer behavior is another under-explored area. Prior studies 
within this field have used economic theory to explore these relationships (e.g., Goolsbee, 2000; 
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Ke et al., 2000), but have not examined the influence of non-economic variables. Finally, future 
accounting researchers may also wish to use different research methodologies to explore some of 
the common research questions within this field. The use of experimental methods could enable 
the investigation of the influence of non-economic factors on the SUT (e.g., Shadish et al., 
2002), while the use of qualitative methods could enable a stronger investigation of context (e.g., 
Merchant and Van der Stede, 2006). The studies within this dissertation therefore seek to extend 
the accounting SUT literature within these underexplored areas.  
Study One: The Influence of State Sales and Use Taxes on Capital Expenditures and 
Manufacturing Employment  
 
The first study investigates the extent to which elements of the state-level SUT influence 
business activity. Specifically, this study examines whether sales and use tax (SUT) exemptions 
and/or rates influence employment and capital investment for manufacturing firms when 
controlling for other tax system and economic factors. Given the dramatic contraction in 
manufacturing activity during the current 2008-2009 recession, understanding the extent to 
which taxation factors influence the manufacturing industry is of vital importance (Schneider and 
Shin, 2009).  Recent reports have estimated that the SUT paid on business inputs vastly exceeds 
the amount paid for the state corporate income tax, and is one of the primary taxes paid by 
businesses at the state and local level (Phillips et al., 2009). The SUT may therefore be an 
important influence on economic development (see also Bruce et al., 2003). 
This study uses state-aggregated panel data on capital expenditures and employment 
within the manufacturing industry from 1983-2006. Specifically, this study predicts that states 
with higher SUT rates will have lower levels of capital expenditures and manufacturing 
employment, whereas states with increased exemptions for machinery and materials will have 
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increased levels of these economic development measures. The models developed to test these 
relationships also control for other tax system and non-tax system factors that could influence 
these variables. Furthermore, analysis also considers the influence of state-specific and year-
specific effects to control for potential omitted variables.   
Overall, the first study contributes to the taxation literature in several important ways. 
First, this study addresses the influence of SUT on state-level employment and investment 
growth, and considers whether corporate income tax factors are still important when also 
considering the SUT (Gupta and Hofmann, 2003). Second, this study is one of the few to 
examine the influence of tax factors on employment and capital expenditures in tandem. Third, 
the sample period extends the study of tax incentives into a more recent period and updates prior 
studies (e.g., Goolsbee and Maydew, 2000; Gupta and Hofmann, 2003; Harden and Hoyt, 2003; 
Kunce, 2006). Finally, this study extends the SUT literature into the effect of SUT on businesses, 
and therefore furthers the literature on the consequences of the SUT.  
Study Two: Use Tax versus Individual Income Tax Compliance 
 
 The second study investigates the consequences of SUT policy as they affect individuals. 
Specifically, this study examines individual tax compliance across two different tax settings: 
federal income tax and state use tax. Both of these types of taxes require taxpayers to fully self-
report and pay the assessed taxes, but compliance of unreported items at the federal income tax 
level remains much higher than in the state use tax area (e.g., Huefner and Hibschweiler, 2004; 
National Tax Advocate, 2005). Thus, this study investigates how the tax setting influences 
individual tax compliance decisions, and examines whether economic factors (e.g., Allingham 
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and Sandmo, 1972), social norms (e.g., Cialdini and Trost, 1998) and/or ignorance (e.g., Manly 
et al., 2005) explain the gap in compliance between the taxes.    
 These questions are investigated using an experimental design, which enables the 
investigation of the influence of non-economic factors on tax compliance (e.g., Alm and 
Jacobson, 2007). Specifically, this study uses a three-by-two between-subjects experimental 
design in which the tax setting (income tax on a gain, income tax on cash receipts, or use tax on 
out-of-state purchases) and the presence of a detection mechanism (present or absent) are both 
manipulated in a hypothetical scenario. Experienced taxpayers respond to these hypothetical tax 
compliance scenarios and report their tax compliance intentions, social norms of compliance, 
perceptions of detection, and reported levels of ignorance regarding compliance.  
 This second study makes advances to both the SUT and tax compliance literature. First, 
this study extends investigation of the effect of the SUT on individual behavior (e.g., Goolsbee, 
2000) and is one of the first SUT studies to employ an experimental method. Second, this study 
extends taxpayer compliance research to a non-income tax (state use tax) and investigates 
whether explanatory factors have a varying level of influence across different types of taxes. 
Finally, this study offers practical findings to policymakers interested in improving use tax 
compliance rates.  
Study Three: Antecedents of the Adoption of the Streamlined Sales & Use Tax Agreement 
 
The purpose of the third study is to investigate the antecedents of states‟ adoption of the 
Streamlined Sales & Use Tax Agreement (SSUTA). The current sales and use tax (SUT) system 
in the U.S. is riddled with complexity, in part because of the lack of coordination between 
jurisdictions. One vehicle of cooperative state action is the Streamlined Sales & Use Tax 
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Agreement (SSUTA). The SSUTA is touted as a precursor to enticing Congressional action on 
permitting states to require remote vendors to collect sales taxes on purchases, an issue that has 
become increasingly salient with the economic downturn (e.g., McCullagh, 2009).  
This study empirically examines the factors, including interest group strength (e.g., 
Peltzman, 1976) that influence a state‟s decision to adopt legislation conforming to the 
provisions of the SSUTA. This is investigated through a cross-sectional empirical model. A 
secondary purpose is to examine the political strategies and tactics (e.g., Hillman and Hitt, 1999) 
used by various interest groups in states that either have or have not conformed to the SSUTA. 
Examination of strategies and tactics is conducted through a case study analysis of primary and 
secondary archived documents of a conforming state (Kansas), a non-conforming state (Texas), 
and an associate member state (Tennessee), all of which have faced substantial controversy in 
their move toward SSUTA conformance.  
The results of this study contribute to the literature in several important ways. First, this 
study extends work on political strategies (Hillman and Hitt, 1999) to the field of SUT, in which 
the investigation of the intricacies of intrastate interest groups and strategies is relatively rare. 
Second, this study triangulates an empirical model with a qualitative case study, which extends 
this type of methodology to the SUT realm. Third, in contrast to much prior literature that 
focuses on the importance of businesses in influencing tax policy changes (e.g., Suarez, 1998), 
this study focuses on the role of governmental interest groups in state policy adoption. This study 
therefore offers important implications in helping to understand potential changes in 
consumption taxes (e.g., Deloitte, 2008).  
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Overall Contribution 
 
 Taken together, the literature review and three empirical studies in this dissertation offer 
a significant contribution to the taxation literature. First, this dissertation helps to organize the 
SUT literature and demonstrates that accounting researchers have the potential to make a 
significant contribution in explaining the consequences of SUT policy on businesses and 
individuals alike. Second, this dissertation provides empirical evidence on the influence of SUT 
on business decisions through an examination of the influence of elements of the SUT system on 
state-level investment and employment decisions. The results demonstrate which SUT factors 
influence economic development and offer important implications to state policymakers 
attempting to balance tax incentives with state revenue needs in difficult economic times (e.g., 
Brunell, 2008). Third, this dissertation extends the study of SUT compliance to individual 
taxpayers (as opposed to the firms; see Alm et al., 2004). In the study of individual taxpayers, 
this dissertation also introduces the construct of social norms (Cialdini and Trost, 1998) to the 
SUT field.  
Finally, this dissertation contributes to the SUT literature via the use of alternative 
methodologies. The use of experimental and qualitative methods is a relatively unchartered 
endeavor within the SUT literature. The use of these research methods within this dissertation 
helps to broaden research involving the SUT to include the influence of non-economic factors 
(through an experiment) and an in-depth examination of the role of interest groups in influencing 
tax policy (through a qualitative case study). In particular, results from the qualitative case study 
of the SSUTA offer important implications to policymakers regarding how opposing and 
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supporting interest groups ultimately shape tax policy. In all, this dissertation advances the SUT 
literature by providing additional evidence in understanding the antecedents and consequences of 
SUT policy. The remainder of this dissertation presents the literature review and each of these 
three studies in detail.  
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LITERATURE REVIEW: A 21ST CENTURY LITERATURE REVIEW OF SALES AND 
USE TAXES FOR ACCOUNTANTS 
Introduction 
 
Within the United States, sales and use taxation (SUT) is a transaction-level tax on 
consumer expenditures administered at the state and/or local level. This type of tax originally 
arose in the 1930s as a way for states to combat revenue loss from other types of taxes during the 
Depression, but remained a permanent part of most state and local revenue systems after World 
War II as a non-income based method of raising tax revenue (Due and Mikesell, 1994). Today, 
nearly all states impose the SUT and the tax is an important component of most state revenue 
systems.
1
 Nationwide, collections from sales taxes are the largest source of revenue for state 
governments and constitute nearly one-half of total state government tax collections. General 
sales tax collections comprise nearly one-third of total state tax collections and selective sales tax 
collections (specific SUTs levied on transactions in specific industries such as alcohol, insurance, 
tobacco, and so forth) represent the remainder of state sales tax collections (U.S. Census Bureau, 
2008). At the city and county level, SUTs are the second-largest source of revenue, lagging only 
collections from property taxes (Luna et al., 2007). Given the significance of SUT to state and 
local governments, understanding the implications, antecedents and consequences of SUT policy 
is critical.  
 In addition to being significant to policymakers, studies on SUT are also important for 
businesses and consumers alike. Businesses incur a larger burden from payments of SUT on 
purchases than they do from the imposition of state corporate income taxes, and pay more in 
                                                 
1
 Five states – Oregon, Delaware, Alaska, Montana, and New Hampshire – do not impose a general statewide SUT. 
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state and local SUT than for any other state tax with the exception of the local property tax 
(Cline et al., 2007; Phillips et al., 2009). Thus, understanding SUT is important in ascertaining 
business decisions and can be useful in helping to guide state and local policymakers in 
formulating SUT policies that are attractive to businesses.  
 A review of the interdisciplinary National Tax Journal indicates that traditionally, most 
SUT research has been conducted by economists. Most economics research on SUT has focused 
on “its administration, its incidence, and, especially in recent years, its vulnerability to erosion 
with the growth of Internet commerce” (Alm et al., 2004, p. 209). Economics researchers have 
also evaluated current and proposed SUT structures in matters such as economic efficiency, 
equity, and/or simplicity (see Due and Mikesell, 1994). 
 SUT is also an important topic of study for accountants. One of the critical research 
questions within empirical tax research in accounting is whether taxes matter and to explain why 
or why not taxes make a difference in a particular context (Shackelford and Shevlin, 2001). 
Thus, accountants can examine whether SUT affects organizational and/or individual behavior. 
On the organizational level, accountants have unique institutional knowledge regarding the 
intersection of businesses and taxation, particularly since state and local taxation issues such as 
SUT have become areas “of specialty for practicing accountants” (Hofmann, 2002, p. 76). On the 
individual level, accountants have studied taxpayer responses to tax variables (see Cuccia, 1994), 
and are in a unique position to integrate this knowledge with SUT issues. Accountants‟ 
knowledge of the environment of state and local governments, such as inter-jurisdictional tax 
competition (Luna, 2004; Omer and Shelley, 2004), also gives accountants an advantage in 
furthering knowledge of SUT policy.  
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 The purpose of this chapter is to review the recent SUT literature. This review will focus 
on studies of SUT within traditional accounting outlets (such as the Journal of the American 
Taxation Association and the National Tax Journal), along with studies of SUT in other venues 
that have been cited within these traditional accounting outlets. There have been several reviews 
of the SUT literature during the 1990s (e.g., Due and Mikesell, 1994; Murray and Fox, 1997), 
but few comprehensive examinations on research within the past decade. Thus, the primary focus 
on this review is on articles published within the past decade, especially on articles published 
from 2000 to the end of 2007. Moreover, state and local taxes are an important component of 
accounting research, but the SUT element of state and local taxation has not been reviewed from 
an accounting perspective (Hofmann, 2002). This review will provide a comprehensive overview 
of recent SUT research and will help to foster interest of SUT within accounting research.  
 The remainder of this review is structured as follows. The second section presents a brief 
summary of the features of SUT. The third section contains the detailed literature review on 
recent SUT research. The fourth section summarizes common data sources and measurement 
issues when conducting SUT research. The fifth section concludes with suggested directions for 
future research and a conclusion.  
Background on Sales and Use Taxes 
Overview of Sales and Use Taxes 
 
At a basic level, SUT is a consumption tax on consumer expenditures administered at the 
state and/or local level. Whereas the income tax is imposed on an individual‟s or firm‟s year-end 
taxable income, SUTs are imposed on transactions. Furthermore, whereas taxpayers are 
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responsible for filing and remitting income taxes, retailers with nexus in a jurisdiction (i.e., some 
minimal level of presence) are often responsible for collecting and remitting SUT taxes. 
The SUT generally consists of two related components: the retail sales tax (sales tax) and 
the compensating use tax (use tax). Sales taxes are typically imposed on the final retail selling-
price of taxable goods or services; state and local laws require retailers to collect and remit the 
sales tax to the appropriate taxing authority (Due and Mikesell, 1994). Thus, in-state retailers 
that collect the tax at the time of the sale and forward the tax on to the state taxation authorities 
(Cornia et al., 2000) are charging sales taxes. 
Use taxes are “attempts to make out-of-state vendors equally responsible for the 
collection and remittance of sales tax revenue as in-state vendor” (Cornia et al., 2000, p. 1327), 
and are imposed on items consumed within a jurisdiction that were purchased outside of the 
jurisdiction (Tower et al., 2006). States provide credit for sales taxes paid in other states, such 
that consumers are typically responsible for paying use tax on property purchased out-of-state 
only when these transactions were not originally subject to sales tax, or were originally subject to 
a differential (lower) tax rate (Due and Mikesell, 1994).  
SUT Rates 
 
 One component of a jurisdiction‟s SUT policy is the rate of tax imposed. This identifies 
the rate of SUT that must be paid on the transaction. Since the inception of the SUT, the trend 
has been toward higher rates (Due and Mikesell, 1994). All states that impose the SUT impose a 
statewide rate, which identifies the tax collected by state governments. Most taxable transactions 
are subject to a single statewide rate, but some states provide lower rates on specific transactions 
involving items such as motor vehicles, goods used in production, or manufactured homes (Due 
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and Mikesell, 1994). In 2007, of the states imposing SUT, the median state SUT rate was 5.5%, 
ranging from 2.9% (Colorado) to 7.25% (California) (Federation of Tax Administrators, 2007).  
 Beyond the statewide rate, many local governments (particularly cities and counties) 
impose a separate SUT rate in addition to the statewide rate. This practice began near the time of 
origination of the statewide SUT, but its use by local municipalities has grown over the past 
several decades (Due and Mikesell, 1994; Luna et al., 2007). Under some conditions, local 
governments may enact a SUT in the absence of a statewide SUT, as is the case in Alaska. As of 
2004, 35 states imposed rules on the maximum local SUT rate (Federation of Tax 
Administrators, 2004). Considering both the state and local SUT, the median total state and local 
maximum SUT rate was 7%, ranging from 4% (Hawaii) to 11.5% (Arkansas).  
SUT Bases 
 
 The SUT taxable base refers to the amount on which SUT rates are applied. Many local 
jurisdictions that impose SUT will “piggy-back” onto the state‟s specification of the SUT base. 
Theoretically, the SUT is a consumption-based tax applied to consumption expenditures (Due 
and Mikesell, 1994). However, most states do not subject all consumption to the SUT, as there 
are a number of exemptions that effectively decrease a state‟s total SUT base.  
States may implement several types of SUT exemptions. First, states may not include 
certain types of consumption expenditures in their taxable base. For instance, SUT originally 
focused on taxing tangible personal property, which implicitly excluded the taxation of services. 
Many states still exclude the taxation of services or only tax specifically enumerated services 
(Due and Mikesell, 1994).  
17 
 
Second, states may specifically exempt certain normally taxable transactions. States may 
choose to offer targeted incentives, in which certain businesses or groups are specifically granted 
SUT exemptions on normally taxable purchases. For example, a state may choose to offer SUT 
exemptions for qualifying purchases by businesses in distressed areas (Buss, 2001), or may grant 
SUT exemptions to a new business for a certain period of time in an effort to encourage business 
location decisions. Likewise, states may offer general tax system incentives, which pertain to 
general exemptions specifically built into the tax code (Fox and Luna, 2002).  
General tax systems exemptions may also be offered for social or equity concerns, such 
as the exemption of food or prescription medicines. Other general exemptions are for production 
inputs (business purchases), which are commonly offered for economic development purposes. 
No states completely exempt all business purchases from SUT, but states may offer a range of 
SUT incentives for different types of production inputs such as SUT exemptions on purchases of 
materials used in production, utilities, manufacturing equipment and machinery, or research and 
development (Mikesell, 2001). In one recent example, in 2004, Louisiana enacted an exemption 
on sales taxes for manufacturing machinery to be phased in over seven years, which was 
marketed by the state as “…another example of Louisiana‟s serious effort to encourage the 
growth of business” (Louisiana Revenue Information Bulletin, 04-012; Louisiana Department of 
Revenue Press Release, 2004).  
Compliance  
 
 States typically require retailers with physical presence (nexus) within a state to collect 
and remit sales taxes on taxable purchases. Thus, vendors (i.e., retailers) are responsible for 
charging and collecting sales taxes at the time of a taxable transaction and must then remit the 
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tax to the state within a specified time frame (Due and Mikesell, 1994). Since retailers are 
responsible for the collection of tax, this assures compliance at the consumer level.  
 Compliance with use taxes is more problematic. Vendors have no responsibility to collect 
this tax if they lack a physical presence within a state. Instead, states legally require consumers 
within the state that use or consume an item within that state to accrue and pay a use tax on the 
purchase (Cornia et al., 2000; Tower et al., 2006); consumers entirely self-assess and report the 
use tax to the appropriate governmental agency. Business taxpayers are routinely audited for 
compliance with both sales and use tax provisions (see Alm et al., 2004), but identifying the use 
tax due from individual taxpayers has historically been difficult. These challenges may have 
arisen because for individual transactions, there is generally “…little awareness of the tax 
obligation, no clear mechanism to pay it, and no effective means of administration and 
enforcement by the state” (Huefner and Hibschweiler, 2004, p. 74).  
All states with sales taxes have enforced compensating use taxes since the 1960s (Due 
and Mikesell, 1994). Non-compliance with the use tax by individual consumers has been 
problematic ever since the origin of this tax, but potential state revenue loss due to individuals‟ 
compliance with the use tax was generally a trivial issue until the rise of electronic commerce. 
As stated by Goolsbee (2000, p. 561): 
This apparent lack of geography in cyberspace, however, has raised some difficult 
problems regarding governmental policy, especially tax policy, toward the “new” 
economy. Although online transactions currently make up only a very small fraction of 
total retail sales, predictions of astounding future growth have caused state policy makers 
to become highly concerned about the fact that most online transactions pay no sales or 
use tax. 
 
The prediction of Goolsbee (2000) over the meteoric increase of online purchases has 
proven to be correct. The U.S. Census Bureau estimates that in 2005, sales, shipments, and 
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revenues from e-commerce amounted to $2.4 trillion, or over 12% of the overall U.S. economy 
(U.S. Census Bureau E-Stats, 2007). The rise of e-commerce has fueled concerns over non-
compliance with the use tax. Whereas use tax compliance is somewhat greater for businesses 
(although non-compliance is still problematic), use tax compliance “is very limited for 
individuals” (Bruce and Fox, 2000, p. 1375). Indeed, individual non-compliance of the use tax is 
one of the drivers behind the decline in state SUT bases relative to personal income (Bruce and 
Fox, 2000). Estimates of annual nationwide losses due to individual non-compliance are in the 
billions (Bruce et al., 2009). 
 In response to this burgeoning non-compliance, states have begun to adopt different 
measures aimed at raising attention and awareness of the use tax. As of 2003, 19 states 
incorporated a self-assessment provision on their individual income tax returns where individuals 
could accrue and report use tax owed (Huefner and Hibschweiler, 2004). Other states, such as 
Maine, have begun a “Use Tax Compliance Program” in which consumers are allowed to 
disclose and pay prior use tax obligations without incurring interest or penalties; information 
surrounding this announcement highlighted that the Maine Department of Revenue could 
potentially discover use tax liabilities from a variety of sources (Maine Use Tax Compliance 
FAQ, 2006).  
However, evidence still suggests that the majority of taxpayers are non-compliant when 
reporting the use tax. Several states have reported individual use tax compliance percentages of 
around 1% (Huefner and Hibschweiler, 2004). One common perception – albeit not one that has 
been empirically tested – is that use tax compliance is extremely low due to limited possibilities 
for detection (e.g., Huefner and Hibschweiler, 2004). Some commentators believe that the use 
tax is “largely unenforceable” (Slemrod, 2007, p. 37), emphasizing that tax evasion for use tax is 
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explicitly due to a lack of deterrence. Regardless, sales tax compliance is not a significant issue 
for state governments, but use tax compliance continues to be a burgeoning problem.  
Complexity and Attempts at Uniformity  
 
The current SUT structure is riddled with complexity and non-uniformity, given that 
more than 7,500 jurisdictions each impose this tax (Tower et al., 2006). In addition to state-level 
sales taxes, local jurisdictions such as townships, cities, or counties often levy an additional local 
sales tax, leading to a vast array of jurisdictions with different tax rates, reporting requirements, 
and occasionally, tax bases (Mikesell, 2000). This enormous complexity can lead to high 
compliance costs for taxpayers operating in multiple jurisdictions (Tower et al., 2006). 
While SUT complexity and the burdensome costs of collection have existed since the 
inception of the SUT, the explosion of electronic commerce in the late 1990s led to heightened 
awareness of this complexity (Swain and Hellerstein, 2005). Online retailers now face the 
challenge of complying with thousands of local jurisdictions, many of them with arcane rules 
regarding SUT rates and bases (Tower et al., 2006).
2
 Furthermore, the rise of online purchases 
has created heightened concern in state and local governments regarding the potential impact on 
their revenue collections (see Houghton and Cornia, 2000). Thus, the “structural flaws in the 
[sales and use] tax” have become increasingly apparent (Swain and Hellerstein, 2005, p. 605).  
In response to the rise of awareness regarding the problems of a tax system designed for a 
simpler economy, 15 states met in May 2000 to begin the Streamlined Sales Tax Project (SSTP), 
a voluntary effort toward streamlining SUT policy in multiple jurisdictions. Specifically, the 
                                                 
2
 For example, the state of California imposes SUT on fertilizer sold for use on flower gardens, but exempts 
fertilizer used on vegetable gardens. The state also generally exempts cold drinks consumed outside of the retailer‟s 
location, but generally taxes “hot” drinks (i.e., above-room temperature liquids) (Pender, 2009).     
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SSTP was formed with the intention of developing a “voluntary, streamlined, multi-state system 
for sales and use tax collection and administration” (Sheppard, 2001, p. 37). Per the Streamlined 
Sales Tax Governing Board‟s website (www.streamlinedsalestax.org), the purpose of the SSTP 
is to “develop measures to design, test, and implement a SUT system that radically simplifies 
sales and use taxes.”  
The SSTP‟s vehicle through which to achieve greater simplicity and uniformity has been 
the Streamlined Sales & Use Tax Agreement (SSUTA), drafted by the SSTP council. The 
SSUTA is a voluntary agreement among states that enables all participating states to adopt 
uniform standards for levying and collecting the SUT, leading to uniform tax returns and 
compliance rules, uniform sourcing rules (taxing a sale at the point of its destination), and 
simplified SUT rates and bases (Tower et al., 2006). The SSUTA became effective in October 
2005 (SSTP, 2005). As of April 1, 2009, 19 states are full members that are in full compliance 
with the SSUTA policies, and three states are associate members that have implemented some of 
the provisions of the SSUTA
3
 (SSTP website). 
The SSUTA is notable in that both state revenue departments and larger organizations 
supported this measure, an uncommon trend with policy changes (Swain and Hellerstein, 2005). 
State governments stand to benefit from collecting tax from remote vendors and from the 
reduction in administrative costs. Many larger corporations are already routinely involved in 
multi-jurisdictional transactions, and simplifying the administration of the SUT could greatly 
reduce compliance costs (Tower et al., 2006). However, per Swain and Hellerstein (2005), local 
businesses and some local cities have particularly raised concerns that the change in sourcing 
                                                 
3
 Full members as of April 1, 2009 are Arkansas, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, 
Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont, Virginia, 
Washington and Wyoming. Associate members are Ohio, Tennessee, and Utah.  
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requirements may have detrimental outcomes. Pressure from smaller businesses in some 
jurisdictions has forced state legislatures to delay the adoption of some of the SSUTA‟s 
provisions (Swain and Hellerstein, 2005). 
The formation of the SSTP and the adoption of the SSUTA signal that state governments 
are beginning to collectively push for greater uniformity and reduced complexity across the 
board. Along with the compliance problems inherent with the rise of electronic commerce, the 
SSTP suggests that simplification could continue to be a critical topic in this decade.   
Review of Recent Sales and Use Tax Research  
 
 Recent SUT research has primarily relied upon two types of research methodologies – 
studies that are chiefly theoretical or analytical, and studies that rely principally on the use of 
empirical data to test hypothesized relationships. This division is somewhat arbitrary, as studies 
that are principally analytical or theoretical may use data in some of their analyzed relationships; 
however, these studies are more focused on analytically evaluating the structure of the SUT 
system itself. 
 The first sub-section within this review contains a discussion of the analytical or 
theoretical studies, as divided between those that evaluated elements of the existing SUT 
structure and those that evaluated components of proposed SUT structures. The second sub-
section focuses on empirical studies, as divided between the antecedents of SUT policy (factors 
that have influenced states or jurisdictions‟ policy adoptions) and the consequences of SUT 
policy (how SUT components have influenced individual or corporate decisions or other 
attributes).  
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Evaluation of the SUT Structure  
 
From an economics perspective, one common type of tax research is the evaluation of tax 
structure. Such evaluation often focuses on the “optimal” design of a tax structure or how current 
elements of a taxation system compare against these optimal parameters. One classic definition 
of an “optimal tax” is that it satisfies the criteria of economic efficiency (a minimization of 
altered economic decisions and waste due to taxation), equity (fairness in the distribution of the 
tax burden), and simplicity (simple administration and compliance requirements) – principles 
originally espoused by Adam Smith over two hundred years ago. The majority of studies 
evaluating elements of the SUT system use some form of these criteria, although other 
evaluation parameters such as constitutional limitations are also possible (e.g., Hellerstein, 
2000).  
Optimal tax policy is typically studied more prevalently by economists than by 
accountants. Nevertheless, these studies can be very influential in the tax policy debate, and can 
be important building blocks for accountants‟ research on how taxation affects decisions.  
Evaluation of Current SUT Structures 
 
 Studies that evaluate elements of the current SUT structure tend to examine a component 
of the SUT system and evaluate how “optimal” it is against criteria such as efficiency, equity, 
and/or simplicity. Recent evaluations of elements of SUT structures have focused on 
telecommunications taxes (a type of selective SUT), components of the SSUTA, and other 
attributes. Not surprisingly, many of these studies show that the current SUT system fails to 
satisfy many of the principles of optimal tax theory. Table 1 contains a summary of these studies.  
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 Taxes on telecommunications and wireless communication are both specific-sector taxes 
(i.e., a selective SUT imposed on specific types of transactions). The focus on these taxes has 
heightened over the past decade with the rise of inter- and intra-state communications, with 
researchers investigating whether these types of taxes satisfy the criteria of optimal taxation 
principles. Cordes et al., (2000) analyzed telecommunication taxes at the state and local level in 
relationship to the principles of an optimal tax, and found that these taxes do not satisfy the 
criteria of an effective tax. In particular, Cordes et al., (2000) indicated that these taxes were 
overly complex and constituted a higher burden than similar types of consumption tax, a problem 
that could grow with the rising telecommunications activity. Similarly, Hausman (2000) 
examined the efficiency of taxes on wireless communication and concluded that these taxes were 
extremely inefficient. In particular, the economic burden of these taxes (suppression of the 
demand for wireless activity) was several billion dollars greater than the revenue gained. Both 
studies suggest that selective SUT do not satisfy the criterion of optimal taxation, particularly 
because of the loss of economic efficiency.  
 Another popular topic in the past decade has been the evaluation of components of the 
SSUTA. The SSUTA is an effort at greater uniformity among inter-jurisdictional SUT systems 
that emphasizes commonalities in administration, SUT bases, definitions, rates, sourcing rules, 
and so forth (Swain and Hellerstein, 2005). Given the wide-sweeping changes of the adopted 
SSUTA, taxation researchers have been interested in evaluating its purported reforms. 
Leskowicz (2001) argued that the SSUTA can achieve its goal of greater tax simplification, but 
its long-run success depends on the feasibility of individual state legislatures‟ adoption of these 
reforms. Haas (2004) conducted a similar examination of the long-run feasibility of the SSUTA. 
This study concluded that as structured, the SSUTA was unlikely to achieve increased 
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conformity and uniformity in its own right, but that the movement may spur Congress to become 
involved in state SUT issues. Cornia et al., (2004) also examined the long-run feasibility and 
consequences of the SSUTA, using criteria such as administrative feasibility, compliance costs, 
and political constraints. This study is unique in its analysis of the SSUTA from a firm level, in 
modeling whether a firm would be likely to voluntarily collect use taxes if provisions of the 
SSUTA were adopted. Overall, Cornia et al., (2004) concluded that there are many political and 
administrative barriers in states‟ full adoption of the reforms of the SSUTA, but that if adopted, 
the increased simplification and reduced compliance costs could encourage firms to begin 
voluntarily collecting use taxes. Taken together, these three studies suggest that the SSUTA may 
have positive long-term consequences, but that administrative hurdles must be overcome to 
obtain this result.  
 Another set of studies examined the general state SUT structures in place, rather than 
focusing on a single component. Most of these studies are driven by the principle of economic 
efficiency, and investigate whether the current SUT systems are efficient. McClure (2005) 
demonstrated that the general SUT structure is inefficient and leads to distortive outcomes. This 
distortion arises from the differential taxation of goods and services, along with the vast amount 
of system complexity. A further reason for the inefficiency of SUT is due to the treatment of 
production inputs. Under an effective tax system, economists argue that all production inputs 
should be exempt from SUT to avoid discouraging business activity; however, no state truly 
exempts all production inputs, and most therefore suffer from economic inefficiencies in their 
current system (Mikesell, 2001). Likewise, Hawkins (2002) modeled the efficiency of several 
general SUT structures and concluded that the current structure reduced efficiency – particularly 
because of relatively high SUT rates and differential exemptions. However, Hawkins (2002) also 
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demonstrated that this reduced economic efficiency had positive social benefits for the majority 
of households, who paid less SUT than they might with a more efficient system. A recurring 
finding is therefore that SUT systems do not reach the “efficient” threshold of a truly optimal 
taxation – but many households may prefer the current system because of their own reduced 
payments of tax (Hawkins, 2002). 
 A final evaluation of a component of the SUT concerns how SUT revenues vary with the 
business cycle. As compared to other types of taxes, the imposition of the SUT on inelastic 
commodities (a commodity such as food for which price has little influence on demand) 
generally has a stable rate and base from year to year and is less likely to fluctuate with the 
business cycle. However, the level of inter-state SUT variation (e.g., the definition of the tax 
base, level of tax rate, and reliance on the SUT) makes it difficult to predict how the business 
cycle will affect the short-run stability and long-run growth of SUT revenue as a whole (Dye, 
2004).   
 In the aggregate, these recent examinations of the SUT suggest that the overall SUT 
system is inefficient and does not uniformly satisfy conditions of equity or simplicity. However, 
inefficiencies may have advantages for a majority of households due to specific exemptions. 
Likewise, economists characterize the current SUT system as overly complex and burdensome; 
the effect of states‟ adoption of the SSUTA could potentially alter this, but a complete 
simplification of the SUT system may not be administratively feasible. These studies suggest that 
because the current SUT system does not satisfy the principles of optimal taxation, empirical 
studies may be necessary to determine the influence of an “imperfect” tax structure.  
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Evaluation of Proposed SUT Reforms  
 
 A similar type of taxation research that evaluates components of the SUT system 
concerns the evaluation of proposed or hypothetical SUT changes. This research addresses the 
“optimal” components of SUT in terms of efficiency, equity, and/or simplicity, either in terms of 
developing a theoretically “optimal” suggested tax structure or in evaluating a proposed SUT 
change under these criteria. Recent evaluations have included the SUT treatment of electronic 
commerce, financial services, telecommunications, nationally-administered rates, and other 
administrative or base-broadening changes. Table 2 contains a summary of recent studies in this 
research stream.  
The influence of e-commerce on SUT has been of rising concern in the past decade. With 
the rise in remote vendors making inter-state sales, taxation researchers have been concerned by 
the potential decline in the SUT base and associated tax collections (Alm et al., 2004). Several 
researchers have explored this topic by developing models of the optimal SUT treatment of e-
commerce. Fox and Murray (1997) argued that sales made from e-commerce should still be 
subject to SUT, as taxing both e-commerce and retail sales in a similar manner would help 
achieve horizontal equity and neutrality and avoid distortion. Based on these arguments, Fox and 
Murray (1997) developed a set of policy recommendations that would address the problems of e-
commerce taxation via destination-based taxes, an expanded definition of “nexus” (presence 
required to collect SUT), a broad tax base, and legislative specification of non-taxable services. 
Zodrow (2006) provided an updated examination of the optimal SUT treatment of e-commerce 
by focusing on elements of an optimal tax treatment of commodities, including equity concerns 
and administrative and compliance costs. Like Fox and Murray (1997), Zodrow (2006) 
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concluded that tax-exemption of e-commerce is not optimal and that equal tax treatment of 
traditional and e-commerce is the preferential structure.  
 Other analyses of e-commerce and SUT evaluate proposed SUT changes addressing e-
commerce. For instance, the National Tax Association (NTA) carried out a project on e-
commerce and telecommunications. This project identified a single-rate, destination-based 
sourcing, and pure state-level sourcing as elements of a successful SUT system (Houghton and 
Cornia, 2000), which could help address some of the rising concerns about the SUT treatment of 
e-commerce. Practically, Houghton and Cornia (2000) concluded that these issues were 
important, but that political stumbling blocks might impede long-run progress. Hellerstein (2000) 
examined a separate issue: the ability of Congress to legislate a nationwide state SUT on e-
commerce. Rather than examining this within the parameters of optimal tax treatment, 
Hellerstein (2000) performed a legal analysis of congressional and judicial limitations (e.g., 
Commerce Clause and Due Process Clause), concluding that despite concerns, Congress did 
have the authority to legislate issues affecting state taxation such as the SUT treatment of e-
commerce.   
 A second topic of interest for recent researchers has been the optimal SUT treatment of 
financial services for consumers. Currently, financial services (e.g., loans, insurance, investment, 
and so forth) are not subject to SUT. Grubert and Mackie (2000) stated that prior researchers had 
struggled with the issue of financial services when trying to design an optimal consumption-
based tax. They argued that from an efficiency standpoint, financial services do not technically 
meet the definition of consumption and should therefore be exempt from tax. Rousslang (2002) 
responded to this conclusion and suggested that under certain conditions, taxing financial 
services would not be distortive; thus, the SUT rate on financial services should approximate the 
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rate on general consumer goods. Jack (2000) contended that a middle-ground approach was more 
appropriate, arguing that certain expenditures should be taxed (e.g., financial service charges 
imposed proportionately), but that others (e.g., fixed financial charges) should be left untaxed to 
avoid price distortions. All three of these papers used analytical arguments of optimal conditions 
but did not test their propositions empirically; Rousslang (2002) conceded that quantitative 
empirical work was probably necessary to truly resolve this debate. Overall, this theoretical work 
could be useful in shaping policy debate and in motivating future empirical work.  
 A third area of proposed tax reform concerns the telecommunications sector. Lee (2002) 
used a general equilibrium model to evaluate the benefits of replacing the property (capital) tax 
on the telecommunications industry with an increased SUT tax on the sector. Given existing 
distortions, however, Lee (2002) concluded that a tax on telecommunications‟ property was still 
more economically efficient than a SUT. This complements work that evaluated the current 
telecommunications tax structure (e.g., Cordes et al., 2000).  
 A fourth area of examination concerns the adoption of a more uniform SUT rate. Murray 
(1997) evaluated a proposed national retail sales tax, which was touted as a replacement for the 
federal income tax system. Murray (1997) modeled the potential tax evasion that could result 
from the implementation of this tax, concluding that a national retail sales tax would be 
associated with a high degree of erosion in the tax base. This erosion could seriously undercut 
the estimated revenue generated from such a tax system and require a higher tax rate to be 
economically feasible. Slemrod (2006) used a survey of individual attitudes regarding taxation to 
demonstrate that public support for the retail sales tax was highest among those that (mistakenly) 
believed that the retail sales tax would be less regressive than the existing income tax system. 
Another recent proposal was the potential simplification of SUT by implementing a single 
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statewide rate, which would reduce administrative burdens and compliance costs associated with 
maintaining a presence in multiple jurisdictions. Cornia et al., (2000) evaluated the 
administrative feasibility of the single statewide rate proposed in five states, including a 
discussion of political or allocation issues that could arise. This study concluded that a single 
SUT would be administratively feasible, despite initial hurdles. All of these studies are useful 
from a policy perspective, but their analysis covers reforms that have not been implemented in 
the years since the studies‟ publication.  
 Finally, two studies examined various base-broadening reforms that could improve the 
SUT system. Mikesell (2000) argued that for the SUT to be an effective source of state revenue, 
remote vendors (vendors without a physical presence within a state) should also be required to 
collect and remit sales tax. Russo (2005) used an analytical model to evaluate several base-
broadening reforms – including taxation on services, consumption-based taxation, and a national 
retail sales tax – using the standard optimal tax criteria of efficiency, equity, and simplicity. 
Results from the model suggested that base-broadening measures could greatly improve 
economic efficiency. 
 Overall, these studies concern both the development of an optimal SUT structure and the 
evaluation of proposed SUT reforms. In general, economists agree that e-commerce transactions 
should also be subject to SUT, but disagree as to the optimal tax treatment of financial services.
4
 
Future empirical work on states that differentially tax these elements could help resolve the 
debate. Studies on proposed changes to the SUT structure suggest positive outcomes from 
measures including the taxation of e-commerce and base-broadening reforms, but that reforms 
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 Interestingly, more recent work on the SUT has focused on taxation of financial services, rather than on services in 
general. Studies on the taxation of services can be found in Fox (1992).  
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such as a national retail sales tax will not come without a cost. In all, these theoretical and 
analytical studies do much for refining examples of “optimal” taxation, but may need to be 
subject to empirical examination to understand the true consequences of changing the current 
SUT system.  
Empirical Studies on Antecedents and Consequences of SUT Policy  
 
 A second category of taxation research consists of empirical studies that analyze the 
antecedents or consequences of state and/or local SUT policy. These recent studies have been 
conducted by both economists and accountants; both parties use empirical data to test 
hypothesized relationships.  
Studies on the antecedents of SUT policy typically examine macro-level factors that 
drive states and local jurisdictions to adopt different tax policies. These studies help to explain 
why no states have “optimal” SUT structures and provide evidence of the influential forces in 
policy adoption. In contrast, studies on the consequences of SUT policy examine how SUT 
policy affects individual or organizational behavior. These studies therefore help to shed light on 
the ramifications of the types of SUT policies.  
Antecedents of SUT Policy 
 
State and local tax policy does not arise in a vacuum. Studies on the antecedents of state 
income tax policy have demonstrated that states engage in strategic tax competition in 
formulating taxation policy such that states imitate the behavior of competing neighboring states 
in a “race to the bottom” among state competitors (Omer and Shelley, 2004). Moreover, Vines et 
al., (1994) established that prior differences in the relative burdens of states‟ individual or 
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corporate income tax burdens was driven by differences in power between the two groups. These 
findings help to explain different tax treatment among the states.   
Similarly, researchers on the antecedents of SUT policy have also concluded that a 
variety of internal and external factors lead to differential SUT treatment. In particular, external 
factors such as inter-jurisdictional tax competition help to explain why jurisdictions may mimic 
the SUT structure of neighboring states. Likewise, internal factors such as a state‟s production 
mixture or political system are also important. Collectively, the findings of these studies suggest 
that jurisdictions are responsive to changes made in other regions, but are still influenced by 
unique demographic, economic, or political differences. Table 3 contains a summary of recent 
empirical research on the antecedents of SUT policy.   
 One of the prominent findings in recent SUT research is the importance of inter-
jurisdictional tax competition in influencing jurisdictions to adjust their own SUT bases or rates. 
Tax competition theory predicts that jurisdictions will use elements of their tax system to 
compete for resources (Wilson, 1999). Researchers have empirically demonstrated that both state 
and local jurisdictions use SUT policy to compete with neighboring areas.  
 At the state level, tax competition has been shown to influence SUT revenues, rates, and 
progressivity. Tannenwald (2002) used aggregated data from the past four decades to examine 
the influence of inter-jurisdictional tax competition on SUT and other state-level revenues, along 
with the influence of internal factors such as production mix, intangible assets, and e-commerce. 
Tannenwald (2002) concluded that competition among governments had increased over the past 
few decades and was likely to have negative long-run consequences; however, few solutions for 
reining in this behavior were feasible. Moreover, declines in SUT revenue were also due to 
factors such as consumption shifts, the rise of e-commerce, and the increase in intangible assets.  
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Tax competition also influences changes in SUT rates. Rork (2003) examined general 
SUT rates and the selective SUT on cigarettes and gasoline over a period from 1967-1996, 
concluding that the general SUT base was much less mobile than those of selective sales taxes.
5
 
For mobile tax bases (e.g., commodities such as gasoline or cigarettes), states exhibited positive 
responsiveness to the SUT rates of neighboring states (tax increases in one state led to tax 
increases in a neighboring state), whereas immobile SUT bases (e.g., general consumption) were 
associated with negative responsiveness (increases in one state led to tax decreases in a 
neighboring state). Finally, using national- and regional-aggregated data from 1977, 1985, and 
1991, Chernick (2005) found a negative neighbor effect with the progressivity of taxes – states 
with progressive tax systems were likely to border states with regressive tax systems.
6
 Internal 
determinants were also important, as states with progressive tax systems were unlikely to be 
controlled by the Republican Party. Overall, these findings suggest that states are influenced by 
the actions of their neighbors when formulating SUT policy.   
 Two recent studies examined the influence of inter-jurisdictional tax competition on 
local, county-level sales tax factors. Sjoquist and Wallace (2003) examined annual county-
aggregated data from Georgia‟s 159 counties over a 30-year period to determine the effect of tax 
competition on the adoption of a local-options sales tax. The study‟s findings support the 
existence of a mimicking effect, as counties are influenced by their neighbors‟ adoption. Luna 
(2004) studied inter-jurisdictional tax competition by examining monthly county-level data on 
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 A mobile tax base is one that is more affected by cross-border shopping and is elastic with respect to changing 
SUT rates. An immobile tax base is not generally affected by cross-border shopping and is inelastic with respect to 
changing SUT rates.  
 
6
The progressivity of the tax system refers to the distribution of the tax burden. Under a progressive tax, the 
effective tax rate paid increases as the tax base increases. Under a regressive tax, the effective tax rate paid decreases 
as the tax base increases.  
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local sales tax rates and bases from 1977-1993 for the 95 counties within Tennessee and those in 
the eight bordering states. The results showed that county sales tax rates were influenced by the 
rates of bordering counties in both the short- and long-term. Moreover, in the long-term, an 
increased sales tax rate led to a reduced sales tax base. The findings from both studies on local 
tax competition support the general finding that governments use SUT policy as a competitive 
tool that is responsive to changes in neighboring jurisdictions.  
 Beyond the external influence of inter-jurisdictional tax competition, SUT policy is 
influenced by internal factors. Two recent investigations have focused on internal state factors 
that explain SUT treatment for SUT payments on business expenditures. Christensen et al., 
(2001) analyzed state- and national-aggregated data in 1999 to determine the influence of state 
tax policy and administration on SUT payments by businesses. The overall conclusion of 
Christensen et al., (2001) was that non-income based taxes were a larger burden for corporations 
than were corporate income taxes, of which SUT payments constituted a significant component. 
Similarly, Cline et al., (2007) examined SUT payments by businesses in fiscal year 2006. 
Different state economic structures tended to influence differential state tax treatment, but 
overall, business payments of SUT were the largest portion of businesses‟ state and local tax 
burdens.
7
 The aggregate results suggest that state economic or administrative factors influence 
SUT differences among states, and that overall, SUT payments constitutes a significant burden 
for businesses.    
 Two recent studies examine how economic and political factors may affect SUT policy. 
Swain and Hellerstein (2005) examined the nationwide formulation from 1997 to 2005 of the 
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 These estimates were updated in Phillips et al., (2009), with similar conclusions.  
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SSTP and resulting SSUTA. The authors concluded that political interest groups such as larger 
businesses supported these movements toward simplification and streamlining, but that local 
governments and smaller businesses opposed these changes. The influence of political factors is 
also evident in local SUT policy adoption. Luna et al., (2007) analyzed county-level data from 
Tennessee‟s counties and those of bordering states from 1975-1999 in an investigation of the 
political and economic forces behind the adoption of the legal maximum local sales tax rate. 
Results indicated that the relative importance of these factors has shifted over time; lower sales 
tax capacity was an important driver in earlier years (1975-1984), whereas the reduced property 
tax capacity and the proportion of Republican voters was more influential in later periods (1985-
1999). Together, studies on the influences of economic and political factors suggest that the 
relative importance of a particular factor is both issue- and time-specific.   
 Beyond general state political or economic factors, another category of antecedents of 
SUT policy is business-level variables. These business-level factors have been used to explain a 
specific state‟s SUT audit selection and compliance, along with general participation in the 
SSTP. Murray (1995) and Alm et al., (2004) both investigated the antecedents of SUT audit 
selection and compliance. Murray (1995) used firm-level SUT accounts from 1986-1988 from 
the Tennessee Department of Revenue to examine the factors influencing both audit selection 
and the likelihood of business compliance. Business taxpayers were less likely to comply when 
there were additional opportunities for under-reporting, such as through SUT ambiguities. Alm et 
al., (2004) examined these same issues with an analysis of firm-level data from New Mexico 
from 1994-1996. Like Murray (1995), Alm et al., (2004) demonstrated empirically that firms 
were less likely to comply with SUT rules when there were additional opportunities to cheat 
(e.g., greater deduction variability or an out-of-state business address). Alm et al., (2004) also 
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showed that SUT auditors generally employed a systematic selection process, choosing 
businesses for audit when they had greater deductions or more variability in reporting.  
Cameron (2004) studied the antecedents of states‟ participation in the SSTP; her topic of 
interest is similar to Swain and Hellerstein (2005), but Cameron (2004) used empirical data to 
cross-sectionally test individual states‟ participation in the SSTP in 2001, rather than examining 
the nationwide factors underlying the trend. Cameron (2004) examined whether a state‟s 
business climate – business vitality or innovation capacity – was related to participation, and 
found a negative relationship between climate and participation. She also showed that states with 
higher SUT rates were more likely to participate. Overall, business-level factors affect elements 
of the SUT in terms of states‟ auditor behavior and larger policy adoption.  
Two recent studies examined unique antecedents – e-commerce sales and consumer 
factors. Bruce and Fox (2000) used national- and state-aggregated and forecasted data from 
1999-2003 to explain estimated SUT revenue losses and base declines. The authors concluded 
that e-commerce sales had a significant influence on SUT revenue and forecasted several billions 
of dollars in reduced collections.
8
 Ring (1999) examined the incidence of the SUT in 1989, and 
analyzed the factors that explained consumers‟ share of the general SUT (i.e., incidence of the 
SUT). States with higher consumer expenditures resulted in a higher share of the consumers‟ 
portion of the general SUT. While differences in consumer spending accounted for differences 
across the states, on average, consumers incurred approximately 59% of the general SUT, with 
the SUT on business purchases likely accounting for the remainder (Ring, 1999). Not 
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 These estimates have been updated several times, in Bruce and Fox (2001), Bruce and Fox (2004), and most 
recently, Bruce et al., (2009).  
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surprisingly, both studies suggest that the level of expenditures – through e-commerce sales or 
household spending – dramatically influences the resulting revenue and incidence of the SUT.  
In the aggregate, these empirical studies suggest that one of the most important 
antecedents of SUT policy for a jurisdiction is the actions of its neighbors. Other variables play a 
role based on the type of SUT policy. For broad SUT policy differences, the unique economic 
and political features of a state or local government are also important. Business-level variables 
are influential for both specific (audit selection) and broader (SSTP participation) actions 
affecting business taxpayers. The level of a state‟s e-commerce activity and consumer 
expenditures can have a dramatic influence on both the incidence and the revenue generated 
from the tax.  
These studies therefore treat components of the SUT as a dependent variable and are 
useful in helping to understand how “sub-optimal” SUT policies have resulted. A separate set of 
empirical studies examines SUT as an independent variable, and examines the extent to which 
SUT policy itself influences organizational, consumer, or other types of behavior.  
Consequences of SUT Policy  
 
Within the accounting field, researchers have documented that state income and franchise 
taxes are important in influencing the behavior of corporate taxpayers. Elements of state and 
local tax regimes drive decisions governing bank portfolio choices (Beatty and Harris, 2001), 
foreign investment (Hines, 1996; Moore et al., 1987), manufacturing employment (Lightner, 
1999; Goolsbee and Maydew, 2000), and new capital spending (Weiner, 1996; Gupta and 
Hofmann, 2003). Corporations engage in income shifting to minimize state income taxes 
(Klassen and Shackelford, 1998; Gupta and Mills, 2002), showing that state-level taxes can have 
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a powerful influence on organizational behavior. However, less attention has been placed on the 
influence of SUT on businesses or on other groups.  
Recent research on the consequences of SUT has been sparser than the empirical work on 
the antecedents of the SUT. This suggests many opportunities for future researchers interested in 
the short- or long-term results from SUT policy action. Existing studies have examined how SUT 
policies influence consumer behavior, business activity, prices, and activity within a particular 
sector, and indicate that different SUT rates and/or bases will influence decisions. See Table 4 
for a summary of this recent research.  
 Three recent studies have used empirical data to show how SUT policy influences 
individual consumer behavior. Goolsbee (2000) investigated whether consumers were more 
likely to make online purchases if they lived in states with a higher SUT rate. Using a proprietary 
survey of 110,000 households from December 1997, Goolsbee (2000) demonstrated this 
relationship, suggesting that individual consumers will cross-border shop and engage in behavior 
to minimize the incidence of the SUT (as the paper assumed that these individual consumers 
would avoid paying use tax on their online purchases). Indeed, Goolsbee (2000) estimated that 
complete SUT compliance for all online purchases could decrease the number of individuals 
buying online by up to 24%. Angelini and Shaw (2004) investigated this same research question 
with a different research method: a survey of college alumni on the relationship between SUT 
treatment and online purchases. The authors found that most individuals, particularly those with 
the greatest amount of online purchases, would be unlikely to discontinue shopping online if 
purchases were subject to SUT. These different results may be because Angelini and Shaw 
(2004) investigated the planned behavior resulting from SUT treatment, whereas Goolsbee 
(2000) studied actual behavior. Furthermore, Goolsbee (2000) studied e-commerce behavior in 
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1997, when online shopping was relatively new, whereas Angelini and Shaw (2004) used a more 
recent sample. 
Ke et al., (2000) examined state premium taxes levied on purchases of insurance 
coverage, which constitutes a type of selective SUT. Using aggregated firm-level data from 
annual statements from insurance companies from 1993-1995, Ke et al., (2000) found that states 
with higher state premium taxes had a smaller degree of property-casualty insurance coverage, 
showing that consumers minimized the incidence of premium taxes via self-insurance (Ke et al., 
2000). Overall, SUT affects consumer behavior, since consumers act to minimize the incurrence 
of payments of SUT.   
 In addition to individual consumers, evidence suggests that businesses are also influenced 
by SUT. Two studies on the insurance industry examine the influence of state-level premium 
taxes (a selective SUT). Petroni and Shackelford (1995) used insurer-specific data from one year 
(1991) to demonstrate that along with regulatory costs, premium taxes are an important 
determinant of the decision of the type of organizational structure (licensing or subsidiary) for an 
insurance company expanding into a new state. Another demonstration of how SUT can affect 
businesses is Petroni and Shackelford (1999), who again utilized firm-level data on the insurance 
industry. Their findings suggest that multi-state insurers minimize their premium tax liability by 
manipulating their reported premiums for a particular state. Thus, SUT-type taxes encourage 
businesses to engage in activities to minimize the occurrence of this tax.  
 Another group of studies examined whether state and local retail sales taxes affected the 
prices of consumer goods, to examine the incidence of the SUT.
9
 Both Poterba (1996) and 
                                                 
9
 The incidence of the SUT refers to which party bears the burden for this tax (e.g., the consumer or the retailer).  
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Besley and Rosen (1999) used local-level aggregated data for selected cities to determine how 
sales taxes influenced the prices of consumer goods. Poterba (1996) found that retail sales taxes 
were shifted into retail prices for clothing from 1947-1977 (i.e., the after-tax cost of clothing 
fully reflected the sales tax), but were not fully shifted during the Depression (1925-1939). 
Besley and Rosen (1999) investigated this same research question using a more recent period 
(quarterly data from 1982-1990) and a variety of commodities (e.g., bread, milk, shampoo, etc.). 
Results indicated that whereas retail sales taxes were fully shifted into the prices for some 
commodities, such as eggs, some commodities, such as bread, experienced over-shifting (retail 
prices rose by more than the amount of the sales tax). These results suggest that retail sales taxes 
are generally absorbed into the prices of consumer goods (i.e., consumers fully bear the sales tax 
burden), but that there are pockets of anomalies in the incidence of sales taxes.  
 A final recent topic concerns the influence of different SUT treatment on the growth of 
different industry sectors. Merriman and Skidmore (2000) used state-level aggregated data from 
1982, 1987, and 1992 to determine whether different state tax treatment of the retail and service 
sectors were related to the proportion of statewide receipts as a percentage of personal income 
attributed to each sector. The results indicate that higher SUT rates were positively associated 
with the value of the service sector, but were negatively associated with the value of the retail 
sector (Merriman and Skidmore, 2000). This macro-level analysis suggests that SUT may 
influence consumer behavior with the relative proportion of services or retail goods purchased.
10
  
 In all, these studies on the consequences of the SUT show that the imposition of this tax 
affects consumer behavior, business decisions, consumer pricing, and industry-sector receipts. 
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 Merriman and Skidmore (2000, p. 126) argue that reduced taxation of services, relative to retail goods, reduced 
the relative cost of services to consumers. This reduced cost of services may have encouraged consumers to increase 
their consumption of services relative to retail goods.  
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However, the relatively few studies within this area suggest that there are many opportunities for 
future research on the influence of the SUT. In particular, examinations of how the SUT may 
influence organizational or business decisions could yield insightful findings on how businesses 
respond to the imposition of SUT. Petroni and Shackelford (1995, 1999) demonstrated that the 
gross premium taxes levied on the insurance industry influence business decisions and drive 
businesses to minimize the incidence of this tax, but it is not clear whether these findings are 
industry-specific and would apply to the general SUT as well.  
Data Sources and Measurement Issues 
 
 SUT studies that use theoretical arguments or analytical modeling to evaluate elements of 
existing or hypothetical SUT elements do not typically rely on empirical data; instead, most 
analyses use simulated information. However, empirical studies on the antecedents or 
consequences of SUT policy are likely to be plagued by the constraints of data sources and the 
resultant measurement error. 
Data Sources 
 
 Empirical studies of SUT may use either proprietary or publicly available data sources. 
Most proprietary data sources contain information at the firm- or individual-level of analysis; 
most publicly available data sources contain aggregated data.  
Proprietary Data 
 
 One of the difficulties with SUT research is that information on SUT paid and/or remitted 
by a business or consumer is difficult to obtain. However, several proprietary data sources 
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contain information at the organizational- or consumer-level of analysis that can be used to study 
SUT issues.  
 For the firm-level of analysis, researchers may purchase firm-level information from 
certain industries that have specific disclosure requirements, such as the insurance industry. 
Thus, researchers may purchase a database such as the NAIC Property/Casualty Annual 
Statement Database to study how premium taxes (a type of selective SUT) affect behavior (e.g., 
Petroni and Shackelford, 1995, 1999). Other researchers may purchase proprietary individual-
level data, such as datasets on household spending habits available from Forrester Researcher 
(e.g., Goolsbee, 2000).  
 Creative researchers may also obtain access to proprietary data sources without incurring 
direct monetary costs. One alternative is to obtain SUT account data from filings with state 
departments of revenue (e.g., Murray, 1995; Alm et al., 2004). Another is for the researcher to 
use surveys to collect firm-level or individual-level SUT data (e.g., Angelini and Shaw, 2004). 
Publicly Available Data 
 
 Due to the difficulties in obtaining proprietary data, most empirical studies of SUT use 
publicly available, aggregated data. Local, state, or national governmental bodies have compiled 
most of these data sources. Moreover, most of the publicly available data sources that have been 
used by prior SUT researchers overlap with the data sources summarized by Hofmann (2002) as 
useful for studies of state corporate income taxation.  
  Multiple national governmental bodies have prepared state-level aggregated data on 
economic activity. The U.S. Department of Commerce‟s Bureau of Economic Analysis prepares 
a variety of regional economic statistics, including information on state-level GDP and personal 
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income (e.g., Christensen et al., 2001). The U.S. Department of Labor‟s Bureau of Labor 
Statistics prepares detailed information on employment, productivity, prices indices, and 
consumption, including the Consumer Expenditure Survey (e.g., Ring, 1999). 
The U.S. Census Bureau publishes a plethora of data. Its annual Statistical Abstract of the 
United States includes social, political, and economic summary statistics aggregated at the 
national, regional, and state levels. The Annual Survey of Manufacturers provides annual 
statistics on manufacturers, including general statistics, geographic area statistics, and 
information on the value of product shipments. The Economic Census contains statistics on U.S. 
businesses aggregated from the local to the national level and is published once every five years 
(e.g., Merriman and Skidmore, 2000). Included in the statistics gathered by the U.S. Census 
Bureau are historical state and local tax revenue collections from SUT. 
Other entities publish useful summarized information on state characteristics that may be 
useful for studies of SUT. The Council on State Government‟s The Book of the States and the 
American Council on Intergovernmental Relations‟ (ACIR) Significant Features of Fiscal 
Federalism contain data on state governmental features; however, the ACIR‟s last annual 
publication was in 1995.  
Another important data source for SUT studies concerns data on SUT bases and rates. 
Historical state SUT rate information is readily available through resources such as CCH‟s State 
Tax Handbook or Multistate Sales & Use Tax Guide or RIA‟s All States Tax Handbook. The 
AICR‟s Significant Features of Fiscal Federalism and Due and Mikesell (1994) are useful for 
obtaining older historical SUT rate information. However, these sources do not contain historical 
local SUT rate information. Researchers may be able to obtain the historical local SUT rates for 
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a particular jurisdiction by using publications from a specific state or local government (e.g., 
Luna, 2004).  
Obtaining historical SUT base information is more difficult to obtain; there is not a 
readily available comprehensive reference on states‟ historical SUT bases (i.e., what transactions 
are subject to SUT). Prior volumes of Site Selection Magazine contain information on several 
SUT exemptions that may be available for a given year. Previous issues of CCH‟s State Tax 
Handbook or Multistate Sales & Use Tax Guide or the AICR‟s Significant Features of Fiscal 
Federalism contain some information on available SUT exemptions, but summary information 
on exemptions is not always the same from year to year. Again, researchers may be able to 
obtain historical base information more readily for local jurisdictions or a particular state (e.g., 
Luna, 2004). 
Measurement and Data Issues  
 
 Whether using proprietary or publicly available data, most studies have some type of 
measurement issue that hampers the strength of the results. Researchers should consider these 
limitations when choosing the type of data source to use.  
Issues with Proprietary Data 
 
Proprietary data often contains individual-level or firm-level data that offers the 
advantage of improved precision. However, the use of this type of data comes at a high cost. 
First, obtaining appropriate proprietary data can be challenging; researchers must either purchase 
these data sources (e.g., Petroni and Shackelford, 1995, 1999) or have access to contacts that are 
willing to entrust researchers with a proprietary data source (e.g., Murray, 1995 and Alm et al., 
2004, who obtained SUT information from state departments of revenue). Second, studies that 
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rely upon individual- or firm-level data obtained from proprietary sources often lack other pieces 
of data needed for the study, and are forced to measure other variables using publicly available, 
aggregated data. For example, Goolsbee (2000) obtained proprietary information on households‟ 
online spending, but not on the tax rate in effect for those households. The need to supplement 
proprietary, micro-level data (individual-level or firm-level) with publicly available, aggregated 
data may introduce noise in the empirical model.  
Issues with Publicly Available Data 
 
 The use of publicly available data can be equally challenging. The primary difficulty 
faced by researchers is that the desired data for a study may be unavailable. For instance, nearly 
all publicly available data is aggregated, making it difficult to study the effect of SUT on 
individual firms or consumers. A related problem is that much data is unavailable on the state 
level; for instance, researchers sometimes must use national-level data to estimate the state 
effects (e.g., Ring, 1999). Other data on the state level may only be available at certain points in 
time. The U.S. Census Bureau publishes its Economic Census only once every five years; 
researchers using this data are limited to these particular time intervals (e.g., Merriman and 
Skidmore, 2000).  
Data on historical local SUT rates and both state and local SUT bases may be difficult to 
obtain. One solution is to focus on historical local SUT rates or bases within a particular 
jurisdiction (e.g., Luna, 2004; Luna et al., 2007). Another solution is to control for potential 
changes in the SUT base, such as limiting the analysis to jurisdictions with the same underlying 
SUT base (e.g., Poterba, 1996).  
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Overall, researchers must balance these practical constraints when selecting variables and 
the data for these variables. Regardless of the type of data used, researchers will still face 
potential measurement concerns.   
Directions for Future Research and Conclusions 
 
 Recent studies on SUT have included both empirical work (antecedents and 
consequences of SUT) and theoretical or analytical models or arguments (evaluation of proposed 
or current SUT structures). Accounting researchers have many opportunities to contribute to the 
SUT literature, particularly in the area of empirical work.  
Directions for Future Research  
 
Future accounting researchers interested in SUT may wish to study the consequences of 
SUT policy, investigate the use of alternative research methodologies, or integrate the study of 
SUT with other areas of taxation. This work could help expand the boundaries of SUT research.  
Consequences of SUT Policy  
 
One of the largely unexplored areas within SUT research pertains to the consequences of 
SUT policy. Recent research has examined SUT policy as it influences consumer prices, 
business decisions in the insurance industry, and consumer decisions to avoid the SUT. 
However, much work remains to be conducted regarding the influence of SUT on business 
decisions. Researchers have shown that “taxes matter” within other contexts – for instance, 
elements of the state corporate income tax influence a variety of business decisions, including 
multi-state allocations of employment and investment (Hofmann, 2002). Gross premium taxes, 
which function like a selective SUT on the insurance industry, influence decisions such as 
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organizational structure (Petroni and Shackelford, 1995) and income shifting (Petroni and 
Shackelford, 1999). It would be useful to investigate whether the general SUT influences 
business decisions in other industries that must also incur corporate income taxes, such as 
companies within the manufacturing or service industry. Once researchers have established 
whether the general SUT matters for business decisions, they could shift focus to quantifying the 
magnitude of the effects (Shackelford and Shevlin, 2001). This would be a particularly fertile 
area for accounting researchers, given that questions of whether taxes influence business 
decisions have been at the heart of accounting taxation research for more than a decade (Scholes 
et al., 2002).  
 Another area for future accounting researchers concerns the consequences of the SUT for 
individual consumers. Most research on the influence of SUT on consumer behavior uses 
economic theory to explain why consumers act to minimize the incidence of SUT (e.g., 
Goolsbee, 2000; Ke et al., 2000). Future researchers may wish to examine non-economic 
explanations for consumer behavior. For example, individual compliance for payment of the use 
tax portion of the SUT is around 1% (Huefner and Hibschweiler, 2004), whereas around 68% of 
income not subject to withholding information is reported to the Internal Revenue Service 
(National Tax Advocate, 2005). This discrepancy suggests that consumer behavior in relation to 
the SUT may be partially attributable to non-economic factors such as social norms.  
Alternative Research Methodologies or Data Sources 
 
 Future accounting researchers may wish to use different research methodologies to 
explore some of these common research questions. Most recent empirical SUT has used archival 
data sources. However, the use of these secondary data sources often necessitates a non-
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experimental research design, in which researchers cannot clearly establish causality (Shadish et 
al., 2002). Researchers may therefore wish to use laboratory experiments or experimental 
economics to investigate questions of causality, particularly when concerning individual 
consumers. The use of experimental methods could also help resolve discrepancies in prior 
studies. Goolsbee (2000) concluded from an analysis of archival data that consumers were more 
likely to buy online (and thus effectively avoid paying SUT) if they lived in a high-SUT 
jurisdiction; however, Angelini and Shaw (2004) concluded from a survey analysis that 
impositions of SUT on online transactions would not affect purchases. Future researchers could 
use an experiment to help triangulate these findings, such as conducting an experimental market 
study with mock buyers and sellers. SUT compliance is another area that could benefit from an 
experimental methodology. Studies of business compliance of SUT have used firm-level data 
provided by state revenue departments (e.g., Murray, 1995; Alm et al., 2004). A study of 
individual SUT compliance could use an experiment as an alternative for generating this data.  
 Qualitative research methodologies are another alternative to archival research 
methodologies. Qualitative methods rely on the analysis of non-numerical data, and typically 
entail either a field study (generation and analysis of data via direct contact through participants) 
or a content analysis (analysis of non-numerical secondary data). Outside the study of 
management accounting, the use of qualitative research methods is rare in accounting, including 
taxation research (Merchant and Van der Stede, 2006). However, qualitative analyses could 
provide richer insight on the setting and context in which taxation decisions occur. Researchers 
may want to perform a field study or content analysis on the passage of SUT policies within a 
particular state; these findings could help inform prior literature on the complex antecedents of 
these actions. Another possibility is a field study of the SUT function within a corporate taxation 
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department, which could shed light on the manner in which SUT influences organizational 
behavior.   
 Future researchers conducting archival analyses could greatly benefit from an 
improvement in data sources. Firm-level and individual-level data are difficult to obtain. 
Hofmann (2002) suggested the creation of a database of anonymous state taxation filings across 
state revenue departments. The state coordination of the SSUTA may improve the feasibility of 
such a creation, which could greatly improve the level of precision in empirical studies of SUT. 
In the absence of this type of coordination, researchers could continue to work with individual 
state revenue departments to obtain micro-level data (e.g., Alm et al., 2004). Alternatively, 
creative researchers may wish to explore alternative sources of aggregated data, or investigate 
industries (such as the insurance industry, e.g., Petroni and Shackelford, 1995) with disclosures 
that contain this type of detail.  
Integration of SUT 
 
 A final area of future SUT research for accountants concerns the integration of SUT with 
other aspects of state and local taxation (SALT). This would be particularly appropriate as the 
SUT field matures. Most accounting research to date has focused on the state corporate income 
tax element of SALT (Hofmann, 2002); researchers could focus on integrating these findings, 
such as determining if corporate income tax variables still influence corporate location decisions 
when controlling for SUT. Another promising area could integrate an examination of SUT and 
corporate income tax competition. Researchers have shown that jurisdictions engage in strategic 
tax competition when establishing elements of the state corporate income tax (Omer and Shelley, 
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2004) as well as county-level SUT bases and rates (Luna, 2004). Accounting researchers could 
focus on how tax competition between these two types of taxes interacts.  
 This type of integrative research could also take place between the SUT and elements of 
federal income taxation. For instance, researchers could determine whether non-economic factors 
that influence individual compliance for federal income tax purposes (such as social norms; 
Bobek et al., 2009) would also hold true for SUT compliance. Organizational interests shape 
federal income tax laws (Roberts and Bobek, 2004). However, SUTs are imposed by 
traditionally less-powerful jurisdictions such as counties and states; the types of interest groups 
that would influence the adoption of SUT policies is unclear.    
Conclusion 
 
 In summary, SUTs are an important source of revenues for state and local governments. 
These taxes also constitute a significant portion of the taxes incurred by businesses and 
individuals alike. Given the economic significance of the SUT for multiple parties, it is important 
for tax researchers to not only evaluate current and proposed SUT structures, but to continue 
empirical investigations of the antecedents and consequences of SUT. 
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STUDY ONE: THE INFLUENCE OF STATE SALES & USE TAXES ON CAPITAL 
EXPENDITURES AND MANUFACTURING EMPLOYMENT 
Introduction 
 
Governments have used taxation policy as a political strategy for courting businesses for 
hundreds of years (Buss, 2001). At the state level, the use of this strategy to maximize economic 
growth has increased dramatically since the 1980s, as states use tax incentives as a tool for 
attracting increased investment and employment (Goolsbee and Maydew, 2000). While some 
economists challenge the relative net effects of tax incentives on business location decisions and 
state economic development (see Wasylenko, 1997; Buss, 2001), state governments continue to 
spend billions of dollars a year to attract businesses (Peters and Fisher, 2004; Corporation for 
Enterprise Development, 2007).   
Prior researchers have analyzed an array of general tax system factors in an attempt to 
distill the relative net effect of tax incentives on the location of business activity. These studies 
have examined both taxes in general (e.g., Wasylenko, 1997) and specific tax incentives (e.g., 
Faulk, 2002). Studies have investigated a variety of elements of the state corporate income tax 
system, including the corporate income tax rate (e.g., Lightner, 1999), formula apportionment
1
 
(e.g., Lightner, 1999; Goolsbee and Maydew, 2000), the number of tax incentives (e.g., Gupta 
                                                 
1
 A state‟s formula apportionment system pertains to the distribution (apportionment) of a business‟s taxable income 
to a state, based on its relative proportion of property, payroll, and/or sales within the state (Hofmann, 2002). 
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and Hofmann, 2003), unitary reporting
2
 (e.g., Gupta and Hofmann, 2003), and the throwback 
rule
3
 (e.g., Lightner, 1999; Gupta and Hofmann, 2003).  
 One general tax system incentive that researchers have not extensively examined is the 
role of state sales and use taxation (SUT) in driving economic development and business 
activity. Wasylenko (1997, p. 43) commented in a review of the literature on the link between 
taxation and economic development that “sales taxes might influence firm location,” but that few 
studies have examined this connection. This gap is striking, given the importance of SUT. 
Combined collections from the general and selective SUT amount to approximately one-half of 
state revenues, constituting states‟ largest source of revenue (U.S. Census Bureau, 2008). The 
significance of SUT on business inputs is especially prevalent. In fiscal 2008, a report prepared 
by Ernst & Young LLP for the Council on State Taxation (COST) estimated that businesses paid 
more than $130 billion in state sales tax on “businesses‟ operating inputs and capital equipment 
purchases” (Phillips et al., 2009, p. 4), an estimate that is more than double the amount paid for 
the state corporate income tax.
4
 Since SUT constitutes a higher proportion of business taxes than 
the state corporate income tax, is often imposed at a higher rate, and applies to both business 
inputs and outputs, SUT has “the potential to cause much larger location distortions than have 
                                                 
2
 Unitary (combined) reporting refers to state corporate income tax regimes that tax the apportioned income of all 
members of an affiliated group, rather than only the entities that have nexus in the state (presence within the state; 
Hofmann, 2002). 
 
3
 The throwback rule pertains to the sales factor within the apportionment formula, and requires that sales made to a 
state with no nexus be sourced back to their state of origin (Hofmann, 2002). 
 
4
 The COST report estimates that “property taxes on business property” constitute the highest proportion of total 
state and local taxes (35.5%), followed by “general sales taxes on business inputs” (22.2%) (Phillips et al., 2009, p. 
3). However, property taxes are almost uniformly imposed at the local level. Sales taxes paid on business inputs are 
estimated as the largest proportion of overall state-level business taxes (32.4%).  All estimates are prepared by Ernst 
& Young‟s Quantitative Economics and Statistics division; a previous annual estimate reported that the models used 
for estimation contain “state-specific, industry-by-industry flows of business intermediate input and investment 
purchases based on national input-output relationships and state output estimates” (Cline et al., 2005, p. 4).  
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generally been found in the literature” (Bruce et al., 2003, p. 38). This suggests that SUT could 
be an important factor in understanding the location of business activity.
5
  
States may be able to use SUT as a tax incentive to encourage economic development by 
lowering overall statewide SUT rates or by manipulating elements of the state‟s SUT base (e.g., 
the amount on which the SUT rates are applied, which may be manipulated by offering 
exemptions). Most states do not offer general production input exemptions, but instead exempt 
certain narrowly-targeted business purchases by specified industries such as manufacturing 
(Bruce and Fox, 2000; Mikesell, 2001). 
The purpose of this study is to examine the influence of state and local SUT bases and 
rates on state economic development, as they may be an important option for spurring economic 
development. Specifically, this study investigates the extent to which SUT bases and/or rates 
influence employment and capital investment for manufacturing firms as compared to other tax 
system and economic factors. The analysis uses state-aggregated panel data on capital 
expenditures and manufacturing employment from 1983-2006 to examine the effects of SUT 
rates and bases.  
 The results of the study demonstrate that SUT exemptions are more important than SUT 
rates in encouraging capital expenditures and employment in the manufacturing sector. This 
pattern remained when controlling for state- and year-specific effects. In particular, SUT 
exemptions for machinery and materials appeared to play a more important role in fostering 
capital expenditures from 1983-1996 than in a more recent period. SUT exemptions for 
machinery had a positive effect on manufacturing employment for all sample years, while SUT 
                                                 
5
 State revenue departments and economic development bureaus often tout elements of their SUT system as an 
example of incentive packages. For example, the SouthernCarolina Alliance, a regional economic development 
organization, describes South Carolina‟s low SUT rates and prevalent SUT exemptions as tax incentives that could 
benefit businesses choosing to relocate or expand in the area (http://www.southerncarolina.org/).  
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exemptions for materials also had a positive influence during the 1997-2006 period. In all, 
findings are in line with the conclusion that the tax base has a more important role in facets of 
economic development than the tax rate itself (Gupta and Hofmann, 2003). Despite the overall 
robustness and statistical significance of these results, however, the practical effect of SUT 
exemptions on both measures of economic development remains small. 
The results of this study contribute to the taxation literature in several important ways. 
First, this study demonstrates how SUT may influence a state‟s employment or investment 
growth and provides further details as to whether the traditional “state corporate income tax 
regime variables” (Gupta and Hofmann, 2003, p. 2) are still significant when examined in 
conjunction with SUT, another element of state tax structure. The fact that many corporate 
income tax elements fail to achieve statistical significance when controlling for state and year 
effects suggests the limited economic impact of these variables. Second, unlike prior studies on 
the link between taxation and economic development that have analyzed the influence of state 
taxation policies on either employment (e.g., Lightner, 1999; Goolsbee and Maydew, 2000) or 
capital investment (e.g., Gupta and Hofmann, 2003), this study presents both for the same period. 
This joint investigation provides further details as to which outcomes tax variables affect. Third, 
the examination of an extensive sample period (1983-2006) extends the study of the influence of 
tax incentives to a more recent period, since the most recent broad studies on taxation and 
business activity used data ending over a decade ago (e.g., Goolsbee and Maydew, 2000; Gupta 
and Hofmann, 2003; Harden and Hoyt, 2003; Kunce, 2006).  
Fourth, this study contributes to the literature on the outcomes of differing SUT policy as 
it affects businesses. Less research has been conducted on how businesses are specifically 
affected by SUT (Petroni and Shackelford, 1995, 1999 are exceptions); businesses such as 
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manufacturers are ultimately producers rather than consumers (Mikesell, 2001), with different 
motivations than individuals. This shows that targeted SUT exemptions do have a statistically 
significant influence on businesses under some conditions. Finally, this study has implications 
for policymakers, as results indicate that state legislatures‟ tweaking of SUT laws to provide 
incentives for specific types of businesses has a low magnitude of economic influence on 
employment or investment growth. While business leaders have recently proclaimed the 
necessity of favorable SUT treatment for manufacturers in stimulating investment and growth 
(e.g., Brunell, 2008), the results of this study suggest that this benefit is small in magnitude. 
Thus, such legislative action to offer favorable SUT treatment to manufacturers may lead to little 
net economic benefits among jurisdictions (Fox and Murray, 2004).  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section presents prior 
research and hypothesized relationships. The third section provides the research methodology, 
which contains the statistical model, variable definitions, data sources, and method of analysis. 
The fourth section presents results. The fifth section concludes with a discussion of the study‟s 
findings.  
Prior Research and Hypothesis Development  
Prior Research 
 
One of the basic goals of empirical tax research is to determine whether tax policies 
affect business decisions (Shackelford and Shevlin, 2001). The underlying framework of much 
research on the effect of taxes on business activity is the Scholes and Wolfson paradigm (SW, 
1992; updated by Scholes et al. 2002), which predicts that both tax and non-tax costs affect  
business decisions, as both can help achieve overall corporate profit or wealth maximization 
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(Shackelford and Shevlin, 2001). Multi-jurisdictional domains, in which tax rates and bases may 
vary across jurisdictions, are powerful settings in which to investigate whether taxes influence 
business activity. In particular, multi-state taxation discrepancies provide a rich environment 
through which to examine this area, especially given the growing interest in state taxation. 
However, most prior studies of state taxation have focused on income-based taxes, often to the 
exclusion of non-income taxes such as SUT (Shackelford and Shevlin, 2001). Given states‟ 
declining SUT collections due to e-commerce (Bruce et al., 2009) and the economic significance 
of SUT to businesses (Bruce et al., 2003), understanding how SUT influences business decisions 
is important.      
 According to Buss (2001), state legislatures‟ use of tax incentives to attract business and 
influence business activity has increased in the past few decades. Despite the frequency with 
which taxation incentives are used to attract businesses, “researchers cannot say how, when, and 
where with much certainty” such incentives or tax system factors will influence economic 
development (Buss, 2001, p. 101). Part of the reason for the lack of precise knowledge over the 
influence of tax incentives is due to the lack of consistency in how “economic development” and 
the accompanying “tax system factors” are studied.  
One issue faced by researchers is the definition of tax incentives and tax system factors. 
Many earlier studies on the link between taxation and economic development used somewhat 
less precise measures of tax incentives, such as examining a state‟s overall tax burden rather than 
parceling out the effects of specific components of the tax system (Buss, 2001). Not surprisingly, 
these earlier studies often failed to find an effect of taxation policies on economic development. 
More recent studies have been more precise in the definition of “tax incentives” (e.g., Goolsbee 
and Maydew, 2000; Gupta and Hofmann, 2003). This has resulted in research that has shown 
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that taxation policies had a statistically significant, albeit at times economically small, effect on 
state economic development (Wasylenko, 1997). 
Another classification is needed on the definition of state economic development, or the 
location of business activity. Most researchers use an aggregate approach; micro-level studies 
measuring branch location have waned in the past 15 years (Wasylenko, 1997). Studies using an 
aggregate approach avoid the statistical difficulties in matching firm-specific variables with 
state-aggregated tax variables and can often use longer timeframes. Two of the most common 
proxies for aggregate measures of economic development are employment and capital 
investments.  
Studies of employment are popular in the economic development literature (Wasylenko, 
1997).
6
 While some earlier studies showed little effect of taxation on employment (e.g., Carlton, 
1983), subsequent studies have demonstrated that higher corporate tax rates affect employment 
(e.g., Newman, 1983; Lightner, 1999), whereas others found that the overall increase in taxation 
(e.g., Wasylenko and McGuire, 1985) or the state apportionment formula (e.g., Goolsbee and 
Maydew, 2000) had a more significant effect. The influence of taxation policies on employment 
may also be more predominant in more capital-intensive industries (e.g., Newman, 1983) or 
during specific periods (e.g., Carroll and Wasylenko, 1994). Overall, the preponderance of 
evidence suggests that tax system factors influence employment.  
                                                 
6
 Studies of the influence of tax incentives on employment may be popular because, “Job growth, despite down-
sizing, right-sizing, and productivity growth in manufacturing, is still the variable politicians identify most often 
with prosperity” (Wasylenko, 1997, p. 39). 
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Other researchers have examined how state tax policy influences new investments.
7
 
Studies on the link between taxation and capital expenditures have shown the influence of 
elements of the corporate income tax system, such as corporate income tax rates (e.g., Hines, 
1996), the marginal after-tax rate of return (e.g., Papke, 1987; Tannenwald, 1996), and elements 
of the formula apportionment system (e.g., Weiner, 1996; Gupta and Hofmann, 2003).
8
 The 
relationship between corporate income tax factors and new investment appears established, 
although differing studies produce different estimates of the relative magnitude of these effects 
(e.g., Hines, 1996; Gupta and Hofmann, 2003). 
Both studies of employment and capital investments have focused on elements of the 
corporate income tax system. However, businesses pay comparatively less in corporate income 
taxes than they do in SUT, which in turn may have an even greater influence on the location of 
business activity (Bruce et al., 2003). Research on both employment and investment has also 
been conducted over older periods; none of the identified prior studies examine a period after 
1996 (Lightner, 1999; Goolsbee and Maydew, 2000; Gupta and Hofmann, 2003; Kunce, 2006). 
Thus, it is unclear whether tax system factors beyond the corporate income tax may also relate to 
employment and investments in a more recent timeframe. 
 
                                                 
7
For manufacturers, studies of investment output may be more informative than studies of employment growth 
because many manufacturers have increased their plant investments while decreasing their workforce (Wasylenko, 
1997).  Some commentators view this proxy for location as the “engine that drives employment and income growth” 
(Gupta and Hofmann, 2003, p. 2). 
 
8
 The joint examination of multiple tax system factors also demonstrates the relative importance of each in its 
relation to new capital expenditures – combined reporting and throwback rules have the most influence, followed by 
apportionment formula rules and corporate income tax rates, with the number of incentives of comparatively lesser 
importance (Gupta and Hofmann, 2003). 
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Hypothesis Development 
 
The majority of the prior literature on the connection between state taxation policy and 
economic development has ignored non-corporate income tax factors, including the role of SUT. 
However, a few prior studies have examined the connection between SUT and economic 
development. 
Bartik (1989) failed to find a relationship between the SUT rates and the number of small 
business start-ups, but advocated that future researchers should examine the precise exemptions 
available within a particular industry (i.e., elements of the SUT base) in addition to the SUT rate. 
Another conclusion of Bartik (1989) was that the study of a targeted industry, such as 
manufacturing, could be more useful for an examination of the effects of SUT than a cross-
industry evaluation.  
Several studies have investigated the relationship between SUT factors and employment. 
Wasylenko and McGuire (1985) examined whether the percentage of revenue a state derived 
from the SUT was related to the percentage change in employment, but found no significant 
effects. Likewise, Harden and Hoyt (2003) studied the relationship between a state‟s total 
employment growth and the general sales tax revenue as a proportion of personal income from 
1980-1994, and failed to find a significant relationship. However, Carroll and Wasylenko (1994) 
investigated the relationship of a host of general tax system factors, including SUT, on overall 
and industry-specific employment from 1967 to 1988. The authors found no connection between 
total employment and the proportion of sales tax revenue to state personal income, but found 
industry-specific effects for the finance, service, and manufacturing industries at different points 
in time. The lack of a specific measurement of sales tax rate and base in all prior studies, 
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however, leaves open questions regarding the influence of these components of the SUT, 
particularly in a more recent period.  
Two intraregional studies have likewise produced conflicting results regarding the 
importance of SUT on employment. A study from the Washington State Department of Revenue 
examined whether offering sales tax deferrals and exemptions for distressed areas and 
manufacturing sales tax deferrals affected employment in these distressed areas, and did not find 
that these tax incentives significantly affected employment (Washington Department of 
Revenue, 1996, p. 20, as cited by Buss, 2001). However, this study examined the influence of 
one element of the SUT base on employment in distressed areas within a particular state. Mark 
et al., (2000) examined the influence of various types of taxes, including the SUT rate, on total 
private-sector employment growth in the Washington D.C. metropolitan area from 1969-1994, 
and found that higher SUT rates resulted in lower employment growth in the following year. 
Thus, Mark et al., (2000) concluded that employment growth rates of businesses were sensitive 
to SUT rates. However, whether the results of these intraregional studies would generalize to a 
broader setting is empirically untested.     
In summary, prior studies have shown mixed results regarding the influence of SUT on 
business activity, but these discrepancies may be due to the failure to measure both the taxable 
base and rate of SUT within a state, or to confine the examination to a particular industry. 
Logically, the incidence of the SUT should affect taxpayer decision-making, as the SUT is a 
significant burden on business taxpayers. Reduction of the costs of doing business, including 
taxation, enables businesses to achieve their profit and wealth maximization goals. Thus, when 
controlling for other business taxes and costs, this desire to reduce the amount of SUT paid gives 
incentives for businesses to locate capital expenditures within a state that provides lower SUT on 
68 
 
these expenditures. Reduction of the total SUT burden could be achieved through both lower tax 
rates and lower bases subject to tax (i.e., more exemptions). The effect of this behavior would be 
particularly pronounced in a capital-intensive industry. Since SUT are levied on purchases of 
tangible goods, including capital expenditures, it follows that: 
H1: For a capital-intensive industry, capital expenditures are inversely related to the 
state‟s SUT base and/or rate.  
 
In addition to the level of capital expenditures, one other commonly used proxy for 
economic development within a state is the level of employment. A state‟s SUT policies may also 
influence its level of employment within certain industries. For instance, an increased reliance on 
SUT may relate to decreased manufacturing employment and increased service employment 
(Carroll and Wasylenko, 1994), while higher SUT rates may decrease employment growth 
within a particular region due to the increased cost of doing business (e.g., Mark et al., 2000). As 
an increased SUT burden within a state increases the cost of doing business and employing 
workers within the state, it is logical that businesses would seek to minimize this burden through 
minimizing both the SUT rate and the SUT base that are subject to tax. This leads to the second 
hypothesis:  
H2: For a capital-intensive industry, the level of employment in a state is inversely 
related to the state‟s SUT base and/or rate.  
Research Method 
Sample Selection  
 
To test whether SUT bases and rates influence new investment or employment decisions, 
this study will focus on the aggregate measures of capital expenditures and employment for the 
manufacturing sector within a particular state. Using aggregate data enhances comparability with 
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prior findings and avoids the challenges of matching firm-level data with aggregate tax variable 
measures. 
This study will also confine its focus to the manufacturing industry for several reasons. 
First, prior literature suggests that SUT incentives may influence specific sectors (e.g., Carroll 
and Wasylenko, 1994) but not across-the board economic development; the use of a specific 
sector therefore provides a more precise testing ground. Second, SUTs are imposed on purchases 
of tangible goods. Manufacturers‟ production is capital-intensive and depends on the acquisition 
of tangible goods; companies within this industry thus will likely be more sensitive to such 
differences in SUT bases and rates. Third, many state legislatures have introduced SUT 
reductions or exemptions specifically targeting manufacturers (Mikesell, 2001). Fourth, 
analyzing this sector enhances comparability with prior results. While some commentators have 
proclaimed that the manufacturing sector now has little overall importance in the overall U.S. 
economy (e.g., Ramaswarmy and Rowthorn, 2000), the manufacturing industry has been credited 
with driving U.S. economic growth and has been particularly important in fostering economic 
recovery during recent recessions (Manufacturing Institute, 2006). Given the dramatic 
contraction in manufacturing activity during the current recession, understanding the extent to 
which taxation factors influence this activity is of vital importance (Schneider and Shin, 2009).   
 This study uses panel data on capital expenditures and employment from 1983 to 2006. 
The use of a long time period helps control for economic factors that may independently affect 
employment or capital investments (Goolsbee and Maydew, 2000) and provides a wide window 
during which many states have changed their SUT bases or rates (see Due and Mikesell, 1994). 
This sample period also enables a more recent examination of the effect of tax system changes, 
since the most recent broad studies of tax influences of state employment used data ending in the 
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mid-1990s (Goolsbee and Maydew, 2000; Gupta and Hofmann, 2003; Harden and Hoyt, 2003; 
Kunce, 2006). This results in 1,200 total state-year observations.  
Empirical Model and Variable Definitions  
 
 Equation 1 contains the empirical model used to test H1:  
CAPXit = ά + B1SUTRATEi t-1+ B2MACHINEit-1 + B3MATERIALSi t-1+ B4CORPRATEit-1 + 
B5COMBINEit-1+ B6THROWi t-1+ B7PROPFACit-1 + B8PERRATEit-1 + B9INCENTit-1 + 
B11VALUEit-1 + B10BONUSit-1 + B12ENERGYit-1 + B13PUBLICit-1 + B14GROWTHit-1  
+ έi            (1)   
 
where CAPX is the natural log of the level of capital expenditures within the manufacturing 
sector for a particular state in a given year; SUTRATE, MACHINE, and MATERIALS are the test 
variables measuring SUT rates and bases for the manufacturing sector; CORPRATE, COMBINE, 
THROW, PROPFAC,, PERRATE, INCENT, and BONUS are controls for other tax system 
variables; and VALUE, ENERGY, PUBLIC, and GROWTH are non-tax control variables. All test 
variables, tax system factors, and control variables are lagged for one year to control for potential 
endogeneity.   
 Equation 2 contains the empirical model used to test H2:  
EMPLi = ά + B1SUTRATEit-1 + B2MACHINEit-1 + B3MATERIALSit-1 + B4CORPRATEit-1+ 
B5COMBINEit-1+ B6THROWit-1 + B7PAYFACit-1 + B8PERRATEit-1 + B9INCENTit-1 + 
B10VALUEit-1 + B11STAUNEMPit-1 + B12GROWTHit-1+ έi    (2) 
  
where EMPL is the natural log of the level of employment within the manufacturing sector for a 
particular state in a given year; SUTRATE, MACHINE, and MATERIALS are the test variables 
measuring SUT rates and bases for the manufacturing sector; CORPRATE, COMBINE, THROW, 
PAYFAC,, PERRATE, and INCENT, are controls for other tax system variables; and VALUE, 
STAUNEMP, and GROWTH are non-tax control variables. Again, all test variables, tax system 
factors, and control variables are lagged for one year to control for potential endogeneity. Table 
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5 describes the variables, measurement, expected signs, and data sources used to estimate the 
above equations.  
Dependent Variables 
 
 As collected by the U.S. Census Bureau, the Annual Survey of Manufacturers’ reported 
measure of “capital expenditures” changed during the sample period. For 1996 and previous 
years, information on the level of new capital expenditures for the manufacturing sector (as 
classified by SIC code) is available; for 1997 and subsequent years, data on the level of new and 
used (total) capital expenditures for the manufacturing sector (as classified by NAICS code) is 
available.
9
 The changes in classification from SIC code to NAICS code also had significant 
ramifications for the classification of “manufacturing” activities. In particular, auxiliary 
establishments for manufacturers such as data processing or accounting services were previously 
classified as part of manufacturing activities under the SIC classification scheme, but are 
classified under the type of auxiliary activities under the NAICS classification.
10
 Thus, it is 
necessary to bifurcate the sample.  
For the purposes of testing Equation 1, these measurements are converted by taking the 
natural logarithmic values to correct for potential non-linear relationships and scaling concerns 
(Gupta and Hofmann, 2003). Therefore, following Gupta and Hofmann (2003), SICCAPX 
represents the natural log of the level of new capital expenditures for the manufacturing sector 
                                                 
9
  According to the Census Bureau, “new and used capital expenditures” refers to “all expenditures during the year 
for both new and used structures (excluding land) and equipment chargeable to asset accounts for which 
depreciation amortization accounts are ordinarily maintained.” Thus, expenditures for used structures would still be 
subject to state SUT. Refer to: http://www.census.gov/csd/ace/faq/quesnum7.htm 
 
10
 More information on the development of the NAICS classification scheme can be found at: 
http://www.naics.com/info.htm   
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(in millions) from 1983-1996; NAICSCAPX represents the natural log of the level of new and 
used capital expenditures for the manufacturing sector (in millions) from 1997-2006.  
 Likewise, during the sample period, the Bureau of Economic Analysis switched from 
classifying sector employment using SIC code to using NAICS code. To match the classification 
used for capital expenditures, following Goolsbee and Maydew (2000), SICEMPL is the natural 
log of the level of manufacturing employment (as defined by SIC code) for a given state from 
1983-1996. NAICSEMPL is the natural log of the level of manufacturing employment (as defined 
by NAICS code) from 1997-2006.  
SUT Test Variables  
 
Prior studies that have examined the influence of SUT on business activity have used less 
precise measures of SUT, such as the proportion of revenue from sales tax (Wasylenko and 
McGuire, 1985) or SUT revenues as a proportion of personal income (Carroll and Wasylenko, 
1994; Harden and Hoyt, 2003). The present study develops more refined measures to test the 
influence of SUT rates and bases for the manufacturing sector. The independent variable 
SUTRATE measures the SUT rate in effect on January 1 for a given year.
11
 The measures of the 
state sales tax base for manufacturers, MACHINE and MATERIALS, are modifications of Gupta 
and Hofmann‟s (2003) measure of the corporate income tax base, coded as the extent to which 
                                                 
11
  In measuring the SUT rate, some difficulty may arise since local cities or counties in many states may levy an 
additional local-option sales tax on top of the base state rate (Goolsbee, 2000). Thus, following Goolsbee (2000), 
sensitivity tests restrict the sample to the states that impose a uniform statewide rate across the sample period to 
control for potential error in the “sales tax rate” variable in those states that also impose local option taxes. Results 
regarding the SUT rate are inferentially identical between the entire sample and among states only imposing a 
statewide rate, suggesting that insights are not lost due to the lack of data on historical local option sales tax rates.  
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purchases by manufacturers are generally exempt from SUT.
12
 MACHINE reflects whether a 
state exempts purchases of machinery and equipment by manufacturers; MATERIALS reflects 
exemptions for purchases of materials used in production.
13
 These variables enable the 
examination of the effect of the SUT bases and rates on economic activity with a specific 
industry, and are analogous to variables used in prior studies of the corporate income tax (e.g., 
Goolsbee and Maydew, 2000; Gupta and Hofmann, 2003).   
Other Tax System Factors  
 
Other variables are needed to control for a variety of additional tax factors that could 
influence state-level economic development. First, controls are needed for corporate income tax 
factors since many prior studies have established a connection between these factors and 
business activity. CORPRATE represents the highest state corporate income tax rate in effect for 
a given year (Lightner, 1999; Goolsbee and Maydew, 2000; Gupta and Hofmann, 2003). 
COMBINE controls for a state‟s use of combined reporting (unitary) tax system for its corporate 
income tax base (Weiner, 1996; Williams et al., 2001; Gupta and Hofmann, 2003). THROW 
measures if a state imposes the throwback rule for corporate income tax purposes (Gupta and 
Hofmann, 2003). 
                                                 
12
 Gupta and Hofmann (2003, p. 6) defined the corporate income tax base as “the computation of a firm‟s taxable 
income subject to tax.” Thus, exemptions diminish a state‟s SUT base, as this reduces the total value of transactions 
that are subject to SUT.  
 
13
 The classification of whether a sales tax exemption exists for manufacturing purchases of materials or 
machinery/equipment is complicated, particularly since states may have varying levels or types of exemptions. As 
indicated in Table 1, MACHINE and MATERIALS are based on Site Selection magazine‟s classification of the sales 
tax treatment for these items, in which items are either fully exempt (indicated as exempt with no further 
restrictions), partially exempt (indicated as exempt, but with restrictions, such as IRB revenue bonds, phased-in 
exemptions, etc.), or fully taxable (exemption not indicated).  
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Second, non-corporate income tax variables are also important. PERRATE represents the 
highest state individual (personal) income tax rate in effect for a given year (Goolsbee and 
Maydew, 2000; Gius and Frese, 2002). INCENT measures the number of general tax system 
incentives available for the manufacturing industry (Gupta and Hofmann, 2003) not captured by 
the above variables.
14
   
Some of the taxation variables differ based on whether capital expenditures or 
employment is investigated. One control includes the state‟s formula apportionment factors for 
corporate income taxation.
15
 For the estimation of capital expenditures, PROPFAC represents the 
state‟s property apportionment factor for a given year (Gupta and Hofmann, 2003). For the 
estimation of employment, PAYFAC represents the state‟s payroll factor for a given year 
(Goolsbee and Maydew, 2000). For estimations of capital expenditures from 1997 onward, 
BONUS measures whether a state-year allows federal bonus deprecation.
16
 
 
                                                 
14
 Following Gupta and Hofmann (2003), this variable is composed as a count of 13 non-SUT tax incentives 
available for businesses identified per Site Selection Magazine. These items include: “corporate income tax 
exemption,” “personal income tax exemption,” “excise tax exemption,” “tax exemption or moratorium on land or 
capital improvements,” “tax exemption or moratorium on equipment or machinery,” “inventory tax exemption on 
goods in transit,” “tax exemption on manufacturers‟ inventories,” “tax incentive for creation of jobs,” “tax incentive 
for industrial investment,” “tax credits for use of specified state products,” “tax stabilization agreements for 
specified industries,” “tax exemption to encourage research and development,” and “accelerated depreciation of 
industrial equipment.”  
 
15
 These controls are necessary because prior studies have shown that a state‟s formula apportionment system is 
related to the level of new investment (e.g., Hines, 1996; Gupta and Hofmann, 2003) and employment (e.g., 
Goolsbee and Maydew, 2000) within a state.  
 
16
 Federal income tax bonus deprecation rules permitted taxpayers to take an additional amount for first-year 
depreciation on qualifying property purchased after September 11, 2001 and placed in service before January 1, 
2005. Some states adopted these provisions, whereas others chose to “de-couple” from the federal income tax 
guidelines and did not permit additional deductions. Thus, controls are included for states‟ adoption of bonus 
depreciation in these qualifying years. For years before 2001, all states are coded as not allowing bonus depreciation 
(“0”).  Beginning in 2001, states that adopted bonus depreciation are coded as “1” and those that did not are coded 
as “0”.  
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Non-Tax System Controls 
 
Non-tax system factors may also affect a state‟s overall level of capital expenditures and 
employment, so controls are needed for these elements. First, estimations of both capital 
expenditures and employment require controls for the differences in the sizes of the states. More 
recent studies have used “value added by manufacturers” as a direct measure of the size of the 
state‟s manufacturing infrastructure (Klassen and Shackelford, 1998; Gupta and Hofmann, 
2003).
17
 VALUE therefore controls for the value added by the manufacturing industry in a given 
state and is a proxy for size that is specific to the manufacturing industry. A state‟s economic 
development may also vary due to overall economic growth; thus, GROWTH controls for the 
annual percentage change in a state‟s overall personal income (analogous to Goolsbee and 
Maydew, 2000).  
Finally, some of the non-tax controls vary based on whether capital expenditures or 
employment are the dependent variable. For the estimation of capital expenditures, ENERGY 
controls for the average total energy costs, a large manufacturing expense that varies by state 
(Gupta and Hofmann, 2003). PUBLIC controls for a state‟s total general expenditures less public 
welfare expenditures (Gupta and Hofmann, 2003). For the estimation of employment, 
STAUNEMP controls for the state unemployment rate (Goolsbee and Maydew, 2000). 
 
 
                                                 
17
 The variable “value added by manufacturers” is a measure of manufacturing activity; this is calculated as the cost 
of shipments less the cost for materials, supplies, fuel, electricity, containers, and contract work, adjusted for the 
change in beginning and year-end finished goods and work-in-process inventories. Earlier studies used state 
population as a control for size (e.g., Papke, 1987, 1991), but controlling for “value added by manufacturers” is a 
more direct control for the size of the manufacturing industry. In the current study, “population” and “value added 
by manufacturers” are very highly correlated (correlation coefficient > 0.90); thus, only “value added by 
manufacturers” is used for purposes of the analysis.  
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Method of Analysis  
 
The sample period for both capital expenditures and manufacturing employment begins 
in 1983. Both dependent variables have data available through 1996 using SIC codes to classify 
manufacturing activity, resulting in an initial model of 700 state-years (14 years x 50 states). 
Data for dependent variables using the NAICS code for manufacturing is available for both 
dependent variables from 1997 through 2006, resulting in a second model of 500 state-years (10 
years x 50 states). These initial models include information from all states, including those that 
lack either a statewide sales and use tax or corporate income tax.
18
  
The basic approach to testing the hypothesized relationships is to determine whether 
states with a lower SUT rate and more SUT exemptions for manufacturers have higher levels of 
capital expenditures and/or employment, when controlling for other tax and non-tax factors. 
Each relationship is tested using a basic pooled model (with no controls for state-specific or 
temporal effects), a model with state dummy variables (i.e., state fixed-effect model), and a 
model with both state and year dummy variables (i.e., two-way fixed-effects model). While the 
pooled model controls for factors established in the prior literature as influencing capital 
expenditures and employment, there are likely an array of other state-specific factors that could 
affect economic development activities (such as labor costs, education level of the workforce, 
transportation infrastructure, etc.). Thus, the inclusion of state dummy variables controls for any 
additional unmeasured state-specific factors that could influence capital expenditures and 
                                                 
18
 Alaska, Delaware, Montana, Oregon, and New Hampshire do not impose a statewide sales and use tax; these 
states are therefore coded as imposing a tax rate of “zero,” full sales and use tax exemptions, and so forth. However, 
subsequent sensitivity analysis considers which elements of states‟ tax systems influence economic development by 
restricting the analysis to the 39 states that impose both corporate and sales and use taxes; results on this subsequent 
analysis are reported later. (States that lack a corporate income tax are: Michigan, Texas, Nevada, South Dakota, 
Washington, and Wyoming (Gupta and Hofmann, 2003)). 
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employment (Gupta and Hofmann, 2003). The final model specification includes state dummy 
variables as well as year dummy variables to also control for any additional unmeasured 
differences across years that could influence the dependent variables (such as nationwide 
recessions; Goolsbee and Maydew 2000). 
All three types of models offer different levels of inference. The basic pooled model 
provides information on the across-the-board differences among the states. Thus, this model 
provides information on cross-state differences over time (i.e., interstate differences) in the 
relationship between tax system factors and the dependent variables (capital expenditures and 
employment) when controlling for the non-tax system factors specified in the empirical model 
(see Equations 1 and 2). The state fixed-effect model (i.e., including dummy variables for the 
states) controls for unobservable state-specific effects that do not vary over time. Thus, this 
model provides information on within-state differences over time (i.e., intrastate differences) in 
the influence of tax system factors on the dependent variables. The two-way fixed-effects model 
(i.e., including dummy variables for both the states and years) controls for both unobservable 
state-specific effects (assumed not to vary over time) and unobservable time-specific effects 
(assumed not to vary across states). Thus, this model provides information on within-state 
differences when controlling for temporal differences in the influence of tax system factors on 
the dependent variables.  
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Results 
Hypothesis 1 – Capital Expenditures  
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations  
 
 Table 6 presents descriptive statistics for the variables included in the capital 
expenditures models, as well the Pearson correlation matrix of the variables included in the 
models. Examination of the summary information shows that over the entire sample period for 
all states, the mean statewide sales tax rate was 4.45%, and most states either partially or fully 
exempted purchases of materials or machinery and equipment by manufacturers. Surprisingly, 
the lagged value of SUTRATE is strongly positively correlated with both SICCAPX and 
NAICSCPAX (correlations > 0.30). However, the lagged values of MACHINE and MATERIALS 
are both significantly positively correlated with both measures of capital expenditures, 
suggesting that increased exemptions are associated with increased capital expenditures.
19
  
Model Results – New Capital Expenditures, 1983-1996 
 
 Table 7 reports the results for the models of new capital expenditures for 1983-1996, 
including the pooled model, the model with state dummy variables (state fixed-effect model) and 
the model with both state and year dummy variables (two-way fixed-effects model).
20
 The table 
contains the coefficient estimates for each independent variable and the applicable t-statistics, all 
of which are corrected for heteroskedasticity using robust standard errors. The adjusted R
2
 of the 
                                                 
19
 None of the correlations between the test variables and other independent variables exceed 0.35. Variance 
Inflation Factors (VIF) for both the capital expenditure and employment models are all inspected to ensure that the 
model does not suffer from multicollinearity. In all models, the VIFs are below 10.0, suggesting that 
multicollinearity is not a problem hampering the overall interpretation of the model.   
 
20
 For all reported fixed-effect models in the study, a Hausman (1978) test was conducted to determine whether a 
fixed-effects or random-effects model was more appropriate. In all cases, the Hausman test indicated that the fixed-
effect model was preferred. Thus, random effects models are never presented.  
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pooled model is 0.78; the adjusted R
2
 is 0.96 when including state dummy variables, a result in 
line with Gupta and Hofmann (2003), and is 0.97 when including controls for both state and 
temporal effects.  
The first column in Table 7 presents the model results for the pooled model, which 
compares across states over time. Results indicate that for the pooled model, the coefficients for 
MACHINE and MATERIALS are both positively related to SICCAPX (p < .01, all tests two-
tailed); thus, new capital expenditures are higher in states that offer more exemptions for these 
purchases. However, SUTRATE is also positively related to new capital expenditures (p < .01), 
which also implies that new capital expenditures are higher in states with higher SUT rates. The 
coefficients on all remaining tax system factors and control variables are statistically significant 
in the predicted direction, with the exception of CORPRATE and PERRATE, which fail to reach 
statistical significance, and PROPFAC, which is unexpectedly positive.  
 The second column in Table 7 presents the model results when controlling for state fixed-
effects (i.e., including state dummy variables), which enables within-state comparisons over 
time. With this model specification, the coefficients on both MATERIALS and SUTRATE remain 
positive and statistically significant (p < .05). The final column in Table 7 uses a two-way fixed-
effects model (i.e., including state and year dummy variables) which compares within states 
when controlling for temporal differences. In this specification, the SUTRATE is no longer 
statistically significant. Instead, the coefficients for MACHINE (p < .05, two-tailed) and 
MATERIALS (p < .10, two-tailed) are both positive and statistically significant. None of the tax 
system control factor remain statistically significant across all model specifications, although 
both the negative coefficient on THROW and the positive coefficient on INCENT are statistically 
significant in both the pooled model (across states) and the model with state dummy variables 
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(within states), a result in line with Gupta and Hofmann (2003). Across all model specifications, 
the coefficient on PUBLIC is negatively related to capital expenditures (p < .01).
 21
 The 
coefficients on both VALUE and GROWTH are positive and highly significant (p < .01), as 
predicted.  
 Examining all three models of new capital expenditures together suggests that the 
seemingly surprising result for SUTRATE is likely due to a failure to control for time-specific 
effects. Closer inspection of the changes in SUT rates across the period suggests that many states 
increased their SUT rates in unison at certain points in the business cycle, particularly during the 
recession of the early 1980s.
22
 These results also show the importance of exemptions for 
machinery and materials in a state‟s level of new capital expenditures. This suggests that the 
SUT base is more important than the rate in influencing new capital expenditures. Results also 
suggest that the throwback rule, an element of the corporate income tax base, has a greater 
influence on new capital expenditures than does the corporate income tax rate alone. In contrast 
to the conclusions of prior literature (e.g., Goolsbee and Maydew, 2000; Gupta and Hofmann, 
2003), by itself, the property factor weight has little influence on new capital expenditures when 
controlling for elements of the SUT system and both state and year effects. Thus, the 
significance of elements of the tax system base appears to outweigh rates alone. SUT exemptions 
                                                 
21
 The negative coefficient on PUBLIC implies that more governmental expenditures are associated with less capital 
expenditures by manufacturers, a result consistent with Gupta and Hofmann (2003). While this finding may appear 
counter-intuitive, one explanation is that “…to the extent that public expenditures are funded by taxes, 
higher…public spending may simply reflect higher tax burdens, and thus discourage business expansion” (Gupta 
and Hofmann, 2003, p. 15).  
 
22
 Supplemental analysis restricts the model of capital expenditures from 1988-1996 (with all independent variables 
lagged by one year) to exclude the SUT changes during the early- and mid-1980s. While the coefficient on 
SUTRATE remains significantly positive in the pooled model, it is no longer statistically significant in the state 
fixed-effect model (i.e., including state dummies). This suggests that the seemingly positive relationship between 
SUT rates and capital expenditures is likely due to an effect of the early- and mid-1980s.  
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may matter more because such exemptions are specifically targeted to the manufacturing sector 
and have a greater effect on overall taxes paid than rates alone.
23
    
Model Results – New and Used Capital Expenditures, 1997-2006 
 
 Table 8 presents the results for analyses of new and used capital expenditures for 1997-
2006. The models‟ overall predictive power in explaining statewide capital expenditures is 
similar to the earlier years (adjusted R
2
 of 0.75 in the pooled model and 0.97 when including 
state and year dummies). The coefficient for SUTRATE is again strongly positive and statistically 
significant (p < .01) in the pooled model; however, the variable is no longer statistically 
significant when controlling for state and temporal effects. Again, this suggests that while states 
with more capital expenditures do tend to impose higher sales tax rates, the relationship between 
capital expenditures and sales tax rates is due to other state-specific or macroeconomic factors. 
In contrast to earlier periods, exemptions for machinery and materials appear to have little 
influence on capital expenditures in later periods. The coefficient on MATERIALS is positively 
related to new and used capital expenditures in the pooled model (p < .05, two-tailed), but loses 
statistical significance when controlling for state and year effects. This suggests that while states 
with higher levels of capital expenditures tend to exempt manufacturers‟ purchase of materials, 
within-state differences are negligible. Likewise, the coefficient on MACHINE never reaches 
statistical significance in any of the model specifications. Thus, the SUT rate and base do not 
explain capital expenditures in more recent times.   
The results for some of the other tax variables are puzzling. As predicted, the coefficient 
for combined return reporting has a significantly negative relationship with the capital 
                                                 
23
 This finding may be reflective of the fact that changes in sales tax rates (e.g., 6% compared to 5%) are less 
dramatic than changes in the SUT base (e.g., 6% compared to 0%).  
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expenditures in the pooled model (p < .01), but has a statistically significantly positive 
relationship in both of the fixed-effects models (p < .10 for both models). Likewise, the 
coefficient for INCENT is in the predicted positive direction in the pooled model, but becomes 
negative when controlling for state-specific and temporal effects (p < .01 for both models). These 
changes in the sign of the coefficients between the models suggest that the patterns seen in 
comparing across states (pooled model) are not robust to making comparisons within a state 
(fixed-effect models). The coefficient on PROPFAC is significantly positive across all model 
specifications (p < .10). None of the other tax system factors has any statistical significance 
across the different model specifications. Again, the control variables VALUE and GROWTH 
have a have a strong positive relationship with NAICSCAPX, while PUBLIC has a strong 
negative relationship.  
Overall, these results suggest that while favorable tax system factors are associated with 
recent capital expenditures across the states, the state‟s use of a favorable tax system element 
(e.g., the absence of combined return reporting or the throwback rule, a greater number of tax 
incentives, etc.) is not associated with greater capital expenditures within the state. In particular, 
elements of the SUT system have had little influence.
24
  
                                                 
24
 A variety of sensitivity tests were conducted to consider whether variables definitions and model specification 
affect the robustness of the results. First, all analyses were rerun using data from the 39 states that impose both the 
SUT and the corporate income tax. Second, analysis was conducted on the 13 states that only impose a single 
statewide rate for all years of the study‟s sample to control for potential variations in local option rates (Goolsbee, 
2000).Third, a state‟s overall SUT revenue as a proportion of total personal income was substituted for the SUT rate 
(Carroll and Wasylenko, 1994; Harden and Hoyt, 2003). Fourth, further analysis used a binary measure of 
exemptions (distinguishing between those states that fully tax these manufacturing purchases and those that offer 
some degree of exemption as indicated by Site Selection). Fifth, analysis considered the product of the SUT rate and 
the tax treatment of machinery and materials.  None of these sensitivity analyses changed the interpretation of the 
reported results.  
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Hypothesis 2 – Manufacturing Employment  
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations  
 Table 9 shows summary statistics and the correlation matrix for the variables included in 
the employment model. The lagged variable of SUTRATE is strongly positively correlated with 
both SICEMPL and NAICSEMPL, indicating that states with higher sales and use tax rates had 
higher manufacturing employment over the sample period (both correlations > 0.35). The lagged 
values of both MACHINE and MATERIALS are also both strongly positively correlated with both 
measures of manufacturing employment, showing that states with higher manufacturing 
employment tended to have more exemptions for purchases made by manufacturers. 
 Model Results – Manufacturing Employment (SIC Code), 1983-1996 
 Table 10 presents the results of the models of manufacturing employment for 1983-1996, 
including both the pooled model and the two fixed-effect models. The adjusted R
2
 for the pooled 
model is 0.72; the value improves to 0.99 when controlling for state and year effects, a result in 
line with Goolsbee and Maydew (2000). One strong result across all model specifications is that 
the coefficient on SUTRATE is strongly positive (p < .01). This suggests that manufacturing 
employment is higher in states with higher SUT rates, and that within-state differences follow 
this pattern as well. This result is puzzling. Closer inspection suggests that states with a greater 
manufacturing base may have been more likely to impose higher SUT rates, as manufacturers 
may have already located in a state before its SUT rates increased.
25
 The coefficient on 
                                                 
25
 For example, the five states that do not impose statewide SUT and hence have a 0% rate for the purposes of this 
model (Alaska, Delaware, Montana, New Hampshire, and Oregon) do not have a strong manufacturing base. Many 
of the states with highest capital expenditures in the manufacturing sector (such as California, Michigan, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, and Texas) also imposed much higher SUT rates than average, even at the beginning of the sample 
period (and even when lagging a year for endogeneity concerns). This suggests that during this period, the presence 
of a manufacturing base may drive states to alter their SUT rates, rather than the alternative.    
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MATERIALS is significantly positive in the pooled model, but never attains statistical 
significance in either of the two fixed-effect models. However, the coefficient of MACHINE is 
positive and statistically significant in both the pooled model and in both of the fixed-effect 
model specifications (all p < .05). Thus, manufacturing employment for 1983-1996 was higher in 
states that exempted manufacturers‟ purchases of machinery and equipment, and this relationship 
was robust to comparisons within states.    
 The interpretation of many of the tax control variables changes when controlling for state 
and temporal effects, suggesting that the differences seen across states over time are not present 
when comparing within states. The coefficient on CORPRATE is positive in the pooled model (p 
< .01), but is negative in the model controlling for state-specification effects (p < .10) and loses 
statistical significance when controlling for both state and temporal effects. The coefficient on 
COMBINE is significantly negative in the pooled model, but loses statistical significance in both 
of the fixed-effect specifications. As predicted, the coefficients on PERRATE and INCENT in the 
pooled model are significantly negative and positive, respectively, but the sign of these 
coefficients reverses when controlling for fixed and temporal effects (all p < .10, two-tailed). 
This indicates that states with higher levels of manufacturing employment tend to impose a lower 
tax burden on businesses, but this relationship is absent within states.  
 The results for manufacturing employment (SIC code) for 1983-1996 provide further 
evidence that SUT exemptions, rather than the SUT rate itself, are the enticements that lead to 
increased manufacturing employment within a state. In conjunction with the findings for capital 
expenditures for 1983-1996, this indicates that SUT exemptions for machinery are particularly 
beneficial for economic development.  
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Model Results – Manufacturing Employment (NAICS Code), 1997-2006 
 
 Table 11 details the results for the various model specifications for manufacturing 
employment (NAICS code) from 1997-2006. The overall predictive power of the models is 
similar to the earlier years (adjusted R
2
 of 0.73 for the pooled model, increasing to 0.99 when 
controlling for state and year effects). The overall interpretation of these results is also similar to 
the findings for the earlier years. While the coefficient on SUTRATE is again strongly positive 
for the pooled model, it is significantly negative in the fixed-effect specification (both p < .05) 
and loses statistical significance when controlling for both state-specific and year effects. The 
coefficients of MACHINE and MATERIALS are positive and statistically significant in the pooled 
model and in both of the fixed-effect model specifications (all p < .05), indicating that SUT 
exemptions are associated with higher levels of manufacturing employment both across and 
within states. Thus, elements of the SUT base appear to have a positive influence on 
manufacturing employment in later years, whereas the effect of the SUT rate is inconsistent.  
 The other tax system factors do not demonstrate a consistent relationship with 
manufacturing employment. One exception is that the coefficient for PERRATE is negative in 
both the pooled model and when controlling for state and temporal effects (p < .05). For the 
other tax control variables, the coefficients on COMBINE, PAYFAC, and INCENT are all 
statistically significant in the predicted direction for the pooled model, but either lose statistical 
significance or switch signs when controlling for state and temporal effects. In the more recent 
model specification for manufacturing employment, the coefficient for PAYFAC is negative in 
the pooled model (p < .10), but is strongly positive in the two-way fixed-effects model (p < .01). 
Overall, these findings provide further evidence that the cross-state relationship of favorable tax 
system factors with high levels of manufacturing employment is not present within states (i.e., 
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when controlling for state-specific and/or temporal effects). However, the presence of SUT 
exemptions appear to be beneficial for increased manufacturing employment in more recent 
times.  
 Additional sensitivity analyses examine the robustness of these findings. The 
interpretation of the presented results does not change under the majority of the alternative 
analyses.
26
 One additional analysis substitutes a measure of state SUT reliance (a state‟s overall 
SUT revenue as a proportion of total personal income, Carroll and Wasylenko, 1994; Harden and 
Hoyt, 2003) for the SUT rate.
27
 When controlling for state and temporal effects, this measure has 
a positive relationship with manufacturing employment in the earlier years (in line with the effect 
of the SUT rate), but has a negative relationship with employment in the later years (1997-2006). 
This suggests that heavier state reliance on SUT in more recent years is associated with 
decreased statewide manufacturing employment.
28
  
 
 
                                                 
26
The sensitivity tests for the employment models were similar to the sensitivity tests conducted for the 
specifications of capital expenditures. First, analyses were conducted using data from only the 39 states that impose 
both the SUT and corporate income tax. Second, analyses were rerun using only the 13 states that impose a single 
statewide rate for all years of the sample. Third, further analysis used a binary measure of exemptions (between 
those fully taxing and those offering some degree of exemptions). Fourth, tests considered the effect of the product 
between the state‟s SUT rate and its exemptions for machinery or materials. In all cases, these sensitivity analyses 
did not change the interpretation of the reported results.  
  
27
 These two measures are very highly correlated (correlation coefficient = 0.69) and hence are not included in the 
same model due to multicollinearity concerns.  
 
28
 Supplemental analysis considers the effect of only including year fixed-effects (i.e., year dummy variables) for all 
of the capital expenditure and employment models. The model results for all SUT test variables and other tax system 
factors were inferentially identical between the year fixed-effect specifications and the pooled models. The only 
exception was that whereas the coefficient on PAYFAC did not have a statistically significant relationship in the 
pooled model of manufacturing employment for 1997-2006, the coefficient was significantly negative when 
controlling for year effects (p < .06, two-tailed).  
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Practical Effect  
 
The study‟s findings also provide information regarding the relative economic influence 
of the different tax incentives. All models of capital expenditures and manufacturing 
employment examined these dependent variables in logarithmic form. Thus, analysis of the 
coefficients of the independent variables included in these equations represents the percentage 
change in the dependent variable due to a unit change in each independent variable. Across all 
model specifications, the economic influence of the applicable tax variables is relatively small, 
particularly when controlling for state and time effects.  
For example, Table 11 indicates that for manufacturing employment for 1997-2006, the 
coefficient on MACHINE when controlling for state-specific and temporal is 0.043. As this 
variable was measured at three different levels, this means that a change within a state from fully 
taxing machinery to offering limited exemptions, or between offering limited exemptions and 
fully exempting the purchase, would increase state manufacturing employment by 0.043%. 
Given that the average state manufacturing employment was 322,729 jobs during this period, this 
means that an increase in the level of SUT exemptions for machinery would result in an addition 
of less than140 manufacturing jobs for the average state per year.
29
 Similarly, Table 7 indicates 
that the coefficient on MACHINE for new capital expenditures from 1983-1996 was 0.051. With 
the average statewide value of new capital expenditures at approximately $1.96 billion across the 
sample period, this implies that the average state would experience an addition of less than $1 
million in new capital expenditures due to a change between these levels of exemptions. The 
                                                 
29
 Across the different presented models, many of the coefficients measuring SUT exemptions reached statistical 
significance. However, an inspection of the size of the coefficients shows that their economic influence is small, 
particularly when controlling for state and time effects. This finding is in line with intraregional studies that have 
shown a negligible economic influence for SUT exemptions on employment within distressed areas (see Buss, 
2001). 
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seemingly small practical effects of SUT exemptions may be a result of states‟ adoption of 
exemptions as a means of protecting existing industries or in response to tax competition from 
other states (e.g., Omer and Shelley, 2004). While elements of the SUT system are only a small 
part of a very complex process, the relatively small size of economic development growth due to 
these SUT elements when controlling for state and year effects may give policymakers pause.    
Discussion 
Summary of Findings  
 
Overall, the study‟s results suggest that SUT exemptions are more important than the 
SUT rate itself in encouraging economic development in the manufacturing sector. Hypothesis 1 
examined whether SUT factors have influenced capital expenditures by manufacturers. Results 
from state-level panel data from 1983-2006 do not demonstrate that higher SUT rates have 
hampered manufacturers‟ capital expenditures. Instead, results suggest that the level of SUT 
exemptions for manufacturers‟ purchases of machinery and materials had a positive effect on the 
level of capital expenditures for the 1983-1996 period, but played a more negligible role in the 
1997-2006 period. Since the number of states offering SUT exemptions has increased since the 
1980s, perhaps the marginal influence of these incentives has declined. This could be evidence of 
a “race to the bottom” (Goolsbee and Maydew, 2000; Gupta and Hofmann, 2003; see also Fox 
and Murray, 2004) that is present in both the SUT arena as well as in the corporate income tax 
realm.  
Hypothesis 2 investigated the effect of SUT factors on manufacturing employment. 
Again, higher state SUT rates did not act as a deterrent to increases in manufacturing 
employment; SUT exemptions were more important. Among all states, exempting 
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manufacturers‟ purchases of machinery has a statistically significant positive effect for all 
sample years, whereas exempting purchases of materials also has an influence on employment 
during the 1997-2006 period. This finding is in line with the conclusion that the tax base has a 
more important role in facets of economic development than the tax rate itself (Gupta and 
Hofmann, 2003). However, the practical effect of SUT exemptions on both measures of 
economic development appears small.  
Limitations 
 
The results of this study should be interpreted in conjunction with its limitations. First, 
due to the switch from SIC to NAICS for industry classification for the manufacturing sector, the 
dependent variables of capital expenditures and employment in the manufacturing sector were 
not measured in the same manner across all sample periods. However, separate analyses were 
conducted from 1983-1996 and for 1997-2006, which also enables the investigation of whether 
any independent variables were of greater importance in different periods. Second, data on 
“new” capital expenditures is available for the earlier period, whereas the later period used “new 
and used” capital expenditures. While capital expenditures on used structures are still subject to 
SUT, this change may present difficulties in comparing between sample periods for this variable. 
Third, the measurement of the SUT variables is also imprecise. No two states offer identical SUT 
exemptions for manufacturers, as many differ in their definitions of the manufacturing process 
itself and in when the production process begins; thus, much subjectivity exists in classification 
of the SUT treatment of transactions. However, data on SUT exemptions was drawn from a 
third-party source that had independently classified the tax treatment for these transactions across 
the sample period, and additional analysis used alternative measurement schemes. Fourth, a host 
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of additional factors may have influenced manufacturers‟ capital expenditures or employment; 
however, all results are presented in conjunction with controls for state-specific and temporal 
effects. Finally, results may be subject to potentially endogeneity. While this study did not use 
instrumental variables, the study‟s use of lagged independent variables and fixed-effect models 
does help address this concern.  
Conclusion  
 
 The results of this study are important for academics and policymakers alike. The 
findings suggest that state SUT exemptions may play a role in fostering increased capital 
expenditures and employment within the manufacturing sector, but that the SUT rate itself does 
not. The lack of importance for the SUT rate parallels the findings of other studies that have 
found that the corporate income tax rate itself has a limited role in economic development (e.g., 
Goolsbee and Maydew, 2000; Gupta and Hofmann, 2003). Indeed, in the pooled model 
specifications, SUT rates are positively related to capital expenditures and manufacturing 
employment - suggesting that states with higher levels of economic development in the 
manufacturing sector also have higher SUT rates; thus, high SUT rates are not a deterrent to 
manufacturers. This also could be because SUT exemptions for purchases of materials and 
machinery/equipment are specifically tailored for the manufacturing sector. Thus, these industry-
specific incentives play a more important role.  
 This study makes several contributions to the taxation literature. First, this study indicates 
that SUT exemptions have had an influence on capital expenditures and employment. The study 
addresses the concerns raised by Bartik (1989), who argued that targeted SUT exemptions, such 
as those available for manufacturers, could be a useful platform for examining the influence of 
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SUT. Thus, the findings add to the literature on how SUT affect businesses (e.g., Petroni and 
Shackelford, 1999) in terms of these aggregate measures. Second, this study addresses a number 
of corporate income tax factors in conjunction with the SUT factors. Interestingly, when 
controlling for state and year effects, little evidence exists that favorable corporate income tax 
treatment has a beneficial influence on within-state economic development. Overall study results 
provide further evidence that many tax system changes meant to affect economic development 
may not have the desired effect (Fox and Murray, 2004).  
 Finally, the results of the study are particularly important for policymakers. In the 
ongoing economic recession, policymakers have placed increased attention on the balance 
between using the tax code to stimulate economic development and satisfying their own revenue 
needs (e.g., Brunell, 2008). The results of this study provide information of how SUT 
exemptions may influence business activity.      
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STUDY TWO: USE TAX VERSUS INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE 
Introduction  
 
Taxpayer non-compliance is a significant problem in the United States. Estimates of the 
annual “compliance gap” at the federal level run to nearly $345 billion, signifying an immense 
difference between tax owed under provisions of the tax law and taxes actually paid (Mazur and 
Plumley, 2007). The problem of taxpayer non-compliance is so serious that Weisbach and Plesko 
(2007, p. 110) comment, “…tax compliance and administration are the biggest and most 
important unanswered questions” in taxation research.  
Taxpayers that underreport their tax liabilities are considered non-compliant. This non-
compliance may be attributable to ignorance (underreporting due to unawareness of proper tax 
treatment) or tax evasion (deliberate underreporting). While ignorance has not been a frequent 
topic of prior research, tax evasion has been extensively studied. Early studies of tax compliance 
focused on economic models of tax evasion (e.g., Allingham and Sandmo, 1972). However, pure 
economic models fail to account for all causes of taxpayer compliance (Andreoni et al., 1998) 
and do not explain why taxpayers comply at rates higher than predicted by these pure economic 
models (Alm et al., 1992; Korobow et al., 2007). Recent research has recognized the importance 
of non-economic factors in explaining tax compliance.  
One significant non-economic factor is the social psychological construct of social 
norms, which are collectively understood standards of social behavior that influence individuals‟ 
actions (Cialdini and Trost, 1998). Social norms of tax compliance have been found to influence 
individuals‟ federal income tax compliance decisions (e.g., Cowell, 1990; Alm et al., 1995; 
Wenzel, 2004; Bobek et al., 2007b; Korobow et al., 2007). Another non-economic factor which 
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may influence individual tax compliance is the tax setting; for instance, income tax compliance 
may be different based on the specific income or expense item (e.g., Bobek and Hatfield, 2003; 
Wenzel, 2004) or between taxpayers in different countries (e.g., Alm et al., 1995; Bobek et al., 
2007b). However, these prior tax compliance studies of non-economic factors are united in their 
examination of income tax compliance; in particular, “there is a large literature on individual 
compliance with the income tax, but little work on compliance with other taxes” (Alm et al., 
2004, p. 210). Thus, the general findings about income tax compliance may not apply to other 
types of taxation. One important example of this is state use tax. Like income tax, state use tax 
compliance requires taxpayers to self-report, but overall use tax compliance rates are abysmal 
and result in billions of dollars a year in lost taxation revenue (Hass, 2004; Bruce et al., 2009).  
 The primary purpose of this study is to extend prior research by comparing taxpayer 
compliance across two different tax settings: federal income tax and state use tax. Specifically, 
this study examines whether social norms, detection mechanisms, and/or ignorance explain 
potential differences in compliance rates across different settings, and assesses the relative 
importance of these explanatory factors. This study also investigates whether social norms vary 
between different tax settings. These relationships are explored with a three-by-two between-
subjects experimental design eliciting taxpayers‟ responses to hypothetical compliance scenarios 
across different tax settings (use tax, income tax on a gain, and income tax on cash income) and 
detection mechanisms (present or absent).  
 Based on the final sample of 148 experienced taxpayers, the results indicate that both 
social norms and tax compliance behavior differ across tax settings. Specifically, taxpayers in the 
study had social norms that were more favorable toward tax compliance in a federal income tax 
setting (i.e., cash income reporting) than in a state use tax setting. Taxpayers also displayed 
98 
 
higher compliance intentions for federal income tax than for state use tax. Results indicated that 
these differences in compliance intentions were at least partially due to differences in social 
norms across different tax settings. Interestingly, some differences in social norms and 
compliance intentions were also observed between different income tax settings, despite the fact 
that both were income tax items that represented equal monetary payments and relied fully on 
self-reporting. Overall, the results indicate that the tax setting has an important influence on the 
social norms of tax compliance and on tax compliance behavior itself.  
 The results of this study contribute to the tax compliance literature in several important 
ways. First, this study extends individual taxpayer compliance research to a non-income tax 
(state use tax), and demonstrates that some explanatory factors have a varying influence across 
different tax settings. This provides additional evidence that individual tax compliance behavior 
is context-specific and is influenced by the applicable tax setting (e.g., Bobek and Hatfield, 
2003). Second, the importance of social norms in this study provides support regarding the 
significance of non-economic factors in tax compliance behavior (Andreoni et al., 1998). Future 
tax compliance researchers should therefore be precise in their examination of tax compliance 
settings and the associated explanatory variables. Finally, the results suggest that policymakers 
seeking to improve tax compliance rates may need to focus on specific tax settings to 
successfully influence compliance.   
 The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The second section develops 
hypotheses. The third section details the research method. The fourth section presents results. 
The fifth section concludes.   
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Theory and Prior Research 
Background on Tax Setting 
 
While prior tax compliance studies have almost uniformly examined the income tax (e.g., 
Andreoni et al., 1998; Alm et al., 2004), understanding compliance with other tax settings is also 
important. One alternative tax setting is sales and use taxation (SUT), which constitutes states‟ 
largest source of revenue (U.S. Census Bureau, 2008). Understanding SUT compliance is critical 
given the recent economic downturn and state governments‟ increased emphasis on enforcing 
existing tax laws. In a review of the literature, Andreoni et al., (1998) implied that SUT 
compliance could have different antecedents than income tax compliance, but that this area has 
not been extensively investigated. This may be especially true for individual use taxes. 
Consumers are typically responsible for paying use tax in their state on property purchased 
remotely or out-of-state on transactions that either are not originally subject to sales tax, or are 
originally subject to a differential (lower) sales tax rate (Due and Mikesell, 1994). While retailers 
collect sales taxes at the time of a sale, retailers do not collect use taxes; instead, individual 
consumers entirely self-assess and pay the use tax to the appropriate governmental agency. 
Most states have imposed use taxes for decades, but compliance among individual 
consumers has historically been almost nonexistent (Goolsbee, 2000).
40
 Within the past decade, 
however, the rise in electronic commerce has fueled states‟ concern with individuals‟ non-
compliance with use tax laws. Indeed, due to increases in online sales, the Multistate Tax 
Commission estimated that approximately $15 to $17 billion per year is lost due to individual 
non-compliance with the state use tax (Haas, 2004). State revenue departments have responded 
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 Business taxpayers are routinely audited for compliance with both sales and use tax provisions (see Alm et al., 
2004), but identifying the use tax due from individual taxpayers has historically been difficult. 
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with increased compliance mechanisms, amnesty programs, and taxpayer education, but overall 
compliance is still around 1%.
41
 This low compliance rate may stem from economic factors such 
as a lack of sufficient enforcement by state revenue departments (Huefner and Hibschweiler, 
2004). Given the importance of non-economic factors such as social norms in explaining income 
tax compliance, however, these factors may also play a role in explaining why use tax 
compliance rates are so low. Thus, understanding the social norms of tax compliance is an 
integral part of targeting the compliance gap. 
Social Norms Theory 
 
The social psychology theory of social norms posits that human behavior can at least 
partially be explained by understanding the social norms governing a specific action. The 
construct of social norms refers to, “rules and standards that are understood by members of a 
group, and that guide and/or constrain social behavior without the force of laws” (Cialdini and 
Trost, 1998, p. 152). Social norm theorists predict that social norms will influence individuals‟ 
behavior to the extent that individuals seek to “…act effectively, to build and maintain 
relationships with others, and to maintain self-image….” (Cialdini and Trost, 1998, p. 152). 
Social norms include expectations both of society in general (either general societal expectations 
or observations of others‟ behavior) and those of close personal connections (either arising from 
ourselves or close others). Thus, individuals are driven to conform to applicable social norms 
held for a given behavior (Cialdini and Trost, 1998). Legal scholars posit that when laws are 
aligned with social norms, compliance will be higher because the law will enforce existing social 
                                                 
41
 The individual use tax compliance rate of 1% is in stark contrast to the estimates that around 68% of income not 
subject to withholding or informational reporting is reported to the Internal Revenue Service (National Tax 
Advocate, 2005).  
 
101 
 
sanctions (Cooter, 2000). Social norms may therefore have an important influence on tax 
compliance decisions, and may serve to curb non-compliance when the tax law and social norms 
of tax compliance are aligned.  
 Social norms originate from internal values, close personal connections, and society in 
general; all may influence behavior. Norms for behavior include personal norms, which concern 
individuals‟ own expectations for behavior, and subjective norms, which pertain to expectations 
from valued or close others (Cialdini and Trost, 1998). Personal norms arise from self-
internalized values and reflect private ethical or moral standards of behavior (Schwartz, 1977); 
thus, individuals are likely to comply with personal norms to preserve self-worth and to avoid 
negative self-images (Schwartz, 1977; Cialdini and Trost, 1998). Subjective norms are the 
perceptions of perceived “important” individuals, such as close friends or family members, and 
arise from individuals‟ perceptions of whose opinions are important and what constitutes those 
opinions or expectations. Individuals are likely to comply with the expectations of those close to 
them when they value the relationship or perceive the referent “other” as similar to themselves 
(Cialdini and Trost, 1998).   
 Another broad category of social norms concerns general societal expectations and 
individuals‟ perceptions and observations of others‟ behavior (Cialdini and Trost, 1998). Both 
types concern society at large; injunctive norms refer to societal expectations of appropriate 
behavior, whereas descriptive norms pertain to the actual behavior of others. Similar to personal 
and subjective norms, injunctive norms also consist of perceived expectations of behavior; 
however, injunctive norms arise from a much broader definition of societal “others.” Individuals 
are likely to follow injunctive norms to garner social approval by others or to avoid social 
sanctions. Like subjective norms, individuals are even more likely to be attuned to injunctive 
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norms if they see the source as similar to themselves or wish to foster a positive relationship with 
the originating group (Cialdini and Trost, 1998). In contrast, descriptive norms do not concern 
expectations, but are “…derived from what other people do in any given situation” (Cialdini and 
Trost, 1998, p. 155). Descriptive norms are particularly powerful in influencing individuals‟ 
behavior in new, ambiguous, or uncertain situations (Cialdini and Trost, 1998). 
Prior tax researchers have primarily investigated the influence of social norms on tax 
compliance behavior (e.g., Davis et al., 2003), but have devoted less attention to understanding 
the composition of the social norms of tax compliance themselves. Social norms originate as a 
means of describing and explaining different types of human behavior and differ depending on 
the behavior described. Thus, norms governing different types of behavior will vary, even if the 
types of behavior have communalities (Cialdini and Trost, 1998). One difference in behavior 
concerns the tax setting. Individuals‟ tax compliance behavior is not a simple decision, but spans 
multiple types of taxes (e.g., income or use tax) and decisions within a particular type of tax 
(e.g., the amount of an income or deduction item to report). Each setting is also rooted in a 
different set of laws. Given that different tax settings constitute different types of behavior, this 
leads to the first hypothesis:    
H1: Social norms of tax compliance will differ based on the tax setting. 
Factors in Tax Compliance Intentions 
 
 One reason that understanding the differences in social norms across different tax settings 
is important is due to their influence on individuals‟ tax compliance decisions. Prior tax 
compliance research (e.g., Andreoni et al., 1998) has focused on both economic (e.g., detection 
rates) and non-economic (e.g., social norms) causes of tax evasion (i.e., purposeful 
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underreporting). Economic factors focus on the monetary consequences of tax evasion, including 
the risk of detection and the severity of punishment (Allingham and Sandmo, 1972). Social 
norms of tax compliance are individuals‟ standards of acceptable behavior regarding compliance 
with tax laws. Individuals‟ non-compliance behavior may also be attributable to ignorance 
(unawareness of proper tax treatment). Thus, economic factors (such as the presence or absence 
of a detection mechanism), social norms, and ignorance may all affect tax compliance intentions. 
Moreover, differences in these factors may explain differences in tax compliance intentions 
across diverse tax settings. Figure 1 depicts the experimental model of the hypothesized 
relationships; the influence of each variable is discussed in the sections below.   
Economic Factors and Compliance 
 
 One important set of factors that can influence taxpayers‟ compliance are economic 
factors pertaining to the probability of detection and the penalty if caught. Simply stated, the 
economic theory of tax evasion predicts that tax compliance is more likely to the extent that the 
economic consequences of not complying, such as detection and punishment, are higher.  One of 
the earliest theoretical models of income tax evasion was the work of Allingham and Sandmo 
(1972), who used theory on the economics of crime to predict that as rational, utility-maximizing 
individuals, taxpayers‟ compliance behavior is influenced by both the penalty rate and the 
probability of detection. Allinghm and Sandmo (1972) predicted that increasing the penalty rate 
tends to increase the amount of income declared and decrease the amount of income tax evasion, 
whereas increasing the detection probability also decreases evasion. Thus, policymakers can 
increase penalties and increase audit expenditures to reduce potential non-compliance. The 
simple model of Allingham and Sandmo has been highly influential in subsequent empirical 
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studies of tax evasion (Sandmo, 2005), including studies of taxpayer compliance in laboratory 
settings (Alm and Jacobson, 2007).  
 Researchers have built upon Allingham and Sandmo‟s (1972) basic theoretical model in 
explaining taxpayer compliance. For example, while Allingham and Sandmo (1972) only 
examined the actual probability of detection, subsequent work has found that the perceived 
probability of detection is more pertinent to taxpayers‟ compliance decisions (e.g., Carnes and 
Englebrecht, 1995). Even with these modifications, however, pure economic models of tax 
compliance vastly over-predict rates of non-compliance and fail to explain current levels of 
income tax compliance (Korobow et al., 2007). Economists have remarked that examinations of 
tax compliance should therefore incorporate non-economic contextual factors (Andreoni et al., 
1998; Slemrod, 2007). Social norms constitute one such important non-economic variable.  
Social Norms and Compliance  
 
Prior tax researchers have investigated how individuals‟ social norms of tax compliance 
influence their tax compliance decisions. These prior studies have considered the influence of 
different types of social norms. Tax compliance researchers have found that both personal and 
subjective norms affect individuals‟ propensity to comply with income tax laws. One component 
of personal norms concerns moral obligation. Individuals with higher levels of moral obligation 
(personal norms) are more likely to be compliant (e.g., Hanno and Violette, 1996; Bobek and 
Hatfield, 2003). Similarly, ethical beliefs regarding tax compliance (e.g., Kaplan and Reckers, 
1985; Reckers et al., 1994) and individuals‟ level of moral reasoning (e.g., Kaplan et al., 1997) 
affect compliance intentions. The social influence of peers (subjective norms) also influences 
compliance behavior (Hanno and Violette, 1996; Bobek and Hatfield, 2003), including both 
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hypothetical and actual compliance behavior (Webley et al., 2001). More recently, Blanthorne 
and Kaplan (2008) concluded that subjective norms influence compliance behavior via their 
direct influence on ethical beliefs.
42
  
Several prior analytical studies have examined the influence of broader, nebulous social 
norms. Davis et al., (2003) demonstrated analytically that social forces interact with enforcement 
to determine society‟s level of compliance, with the social norms governing tax compliance (the 
risk that an individual will suffer some type of social stigma by cheating) interacting with 
whether society is initially compliant or non-compliant (see also Cowell, 1990). Likewise, 
Korobow et al., (2007) demonstrated in an analytical model that sharing compliance information 
among networked agents actually reduced levels of societal compliance. Experimental results 
have mirrored these models, finding that nearly all individuals cheat when non-compliance is 
established as the general social norm (Alm et al., 1999). Similarly, an archival study of cross-
country compliance found that audits are only effective for societies with general social norms 
encouraging compliance, not for those in which cheating is the norm (Bergman and Nevarez, 
2006).  
Fewer studies have examined the joint influence of both personal and subjective norms 
along with broader societal expectations; however, evidence from studies that have jointly 
examined these influences suggests that personal and subjective norms play a stronger role. 
Survey data on actual tax compliance behavior indicated that personal norms had the strongest 
                                                 
42
 While social norms originating from personal and peer expectations are important antecedents of tax compliance 
behavior, they are insufficient in fully explaining this behavior. For example, stronger personal norms help to reduce 
cheating behavior, but are insufficient to eliminate all tax evasion unless there is also reduced opportunity for non-
compliance (Bobek and Hatfield, 2003); thus, economic variables are still important. Personal norms regarding 
specific tax evasion behavior are also influenced by individuals‟ general ethical orientation (Henderson and Kaplan, 
2005).  
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influence on compliance, and that general social norms were influential for individuals that 
identified more strongly with the referent group (Wenzel, 2004). Moreover, Wenzel (2005) 
established that personal norms (ethics) directly influence tax compliance, but that the influence 
of social norms on tax compliance is more complex. Similar relationships emerge in cross-
country studies, as Bobek et al., (2007b) demonstrated that personal and subjective norms have a 
much stronger influence on tax compliance intentions
43
 than do injunctive and descriptive norms.  
Ignorance and Compliance 
 
 Most economic and non-economic factors (such as social norms) focus on explaining the 
willful underreporting of tax liabilities (tax evasion). However, another reason for taxpayer non-
compliance may be due to ignorance, as this factor is likely responsible for significant amounts 
of revenue loss (Everson, 2006). Increasing economic sanctions (such as audits or penalties) or 
improving social norms will not influence compliance if taxpayers are genuinely unaware of 
their tax responsibility.
44
  
 According to Manly et al., (2005), non-compliant taxpayers may be truly unaware of their 
filing responsibility or may not understand the appropriate tax treatment for a specific item. In 
addition to the ineffectiveness of economic sanctions, Manly et al., (2005) also argued that 
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 Compliance intentions refer to taxpayers‟ intended behavior in a tax compliance situation. Behavioral intentions 
and actual behavior are theoretically linked when the individual perceives some degree of control in the situation. 
Since individuals may be uncomfortable disclosing their actual behavior or suffer from retrospective recall, studies 
of behavioral intentions may be preferable (Ajzen, 1991; see also Bobek et al., 2007b). Moreover, a joint 
investigation of actual tax compliance behavior and behavioral intention indicated that „hypothetical evaders‟ 
(reporting an intention to engage in tax evasion) and „actual evaders‟ (those who reported having actually evaded 
income taxes in the past) had similar motivational and attitudinal measures, but differed on perceived opportunity to 
evade (Webley et al., 2001). 
 
44
 Distinguishing between unintentional and intentional non-compliance is particularly difficult in analyses of 
archival data (Slemrod, 2007), which gives experimental and survey methodologies an advantage in investigating 
this phenomenon. 
 
107 
 
ignorant taxpayers would not be motivated by guilt; thus, personal norms would also be 
ineffective at explaining all non-compliance behavior. Instead, such taxpayers may need 
education or some other type of external stimulus to properly comply (Manly et al., 2005). Thus, 
studies of non-compliance should distinguish between ignorance and tax evasion to truly 
understand the root causes of these behaviors.  
Differences in Tax Compliance Intentions 
 
Differences in economic factors, social norms, and ignorance may explain differences in 
tax compliance intentions across diverse tax settings. First, individuals are more likely to evade 
taxes if faced with a lower probability of being detected (e.g., Allingham and Sandmo, 1972). 
Thus, economic factors such as the existence of a detection mechanism may also explain low 
individual use tax compliance. For example, state revenue departments have historically placed 
little emphasis on enforcement and detection of state use taxes for individual consumers 
(Huefner and Hibschweiler, 2004). Thus, differences in compliance rates between individual 
income and use tax may be due to the lack of detection mechanisms for the latter. The 
compliance rate differences between these types of taxes might be reduced if both types of non-
compliance had similar detection opportunities.   
Second, as non-economic factors such as social norms are useful in explaining income 
tax compliance (e.g., Wenzel, 2004, 2005; Bobek et al., 2007b), these factors may also play a 
role in explaining why compliance rates differ across settings. This is in line with the finding that 
social norms account for differences in income tax compliance across different countries (Bobek 
et al., 2007b). The historically low use tax compliance rates could be affected by the fact that 
when cheating is the norm in a society, the odds that an individual will comply with tax laws 
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decline significantly (Alm et al., 1999; Davis et al., 2003). Thus, taxpayers may be less likely to 
comply with use tax laws than individual income tax requirements with the reasoning that “no 
one else is doing it, so why should I?” In particular, descriptive norms could be particularly 
negative toward tax compliance behavior when there is widespread societal non-compliance. 
 Finally, it is also possible that compliance rates differ between tax settings due to 
ignorance. Historically, very few individuals have paid state use tax; “noncompliance [with use 
tax] is widespread so the [online] transactions are, effectively, tax-free” Goolsbee (2000, p. 561). 
Moreover, states‟ increased compliance and education programs are relatively recent innovations 
(see Huefner and Hibschweiler, 2004; Nellen, 2007). Tax compliance may be lower for state use 
tax than for federal income tax simply because of a lack of knowledge about the latter. Even 
within the income tax, a significant portion of non-complying taxpayers are ignorant of the 
proper taxation treatment (Everson, 2006). While the idea of ignorance has been overlooked in 
most prior tax compliance researcher, taxpayers must first be aware of the appropriate tax 
treatment before they can fully comply. Thus, taxpayers that are less familiar with the tax laws 
for a particular tax setting may be less likely to comply.  
Collectively, differences in economic factors, social norms, and ignorance may drive 
differences in individual tax compliance across different tax settings. In other words, when 
controlling for these factors and their interactions with the tax setting, the presence of a different 
tax setting (e.g., a different type of tax law) in and of itself would not have a significant effect on 
tax compliance. This leads to the second and third hypotheses: 
H2: Tax compliance intentions will differ across tax settings.  
 
H3: The tax setting will interact with social norms, economic factors, and ignorance, such 
that differing tax compliance intentions across tax settings will be accounted for by 
differences in social norms, economic factors, and ignorance.  
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Research Method  
 
 This study uses a three-by-two between-subjects experimental design to test the 
hypothesized relationships. The use of an experimental design is an appropriate research 
technique when studying non-economic factors that influence taxpayer compliance (Alm and 
Jacobson, 2007). 
Participants 
 
This study uses experienced taxpayers as participants. Students enrolled in introductory 
accounting classes at a large southeastern university recruited eligible participants. Following 
Bobek et al., (2007a, p. 99), eligible participants were defined as “non-accounting students over 
the age of 25 who are U.S. citizens or residents” and that had previously filed a U.S. federal 
income tax return. These undergraduate students received extra-credit points for supplying: (1) 
names and e-mail addresses for eligible participants and (2) a signed statement that the potential 
participants had agreed to give their email addresses and met the defined eligibility criteria. 
Students‟ extra-credit points were awarded for identifying eligible participants and were not 
related to the actual completion of the study by these participants.    
Based on this recruiting technique, 272 possible participants were contacted via email.
45
 
Out of the possible participants, 167 individuals responded; the responses of 148 participants 
could be used in the final analysis. This resulted in a usable response rate of 54.5%.
46
  
                                                 
45
 Two e-mail addresses bounced and were not deliverable.   
 
46
 Out of the 19 participants that could not be included, two participants did not indicate whether they had ever filed 
a federal income tax return, two participants did not complete the actual experimental task, and 15 failed the 
manipulation check addressing whether the scenario dealt with federal income or state use taxes. 
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Table 12 reports the sample demographics regarding the final sample of 148 participants. 
Comparison of the sample to U.S. census data indicates that the sample was older (68% between 
the ages of 45 and 64) and had a higher proportion of females (65%) than the national 
population. Participants were also slightly better educated and had a higher income than the 
overall national population. The majority of participants typically used a paid preparer to prepare 
their tax return (51.5%), corroborating prior U.S. tax research (e.g., Bobek et al., 2007b). The 
additional analysis section of the paper considers the influence of demographic variables; with 
the exception of income, no demographic variables influenced the results.
47
  
 E-mail reminders were sent to participants after one week and “final reminders” were 
emailed after two weeks. Comparison of early (before any reminders) and late respondents 
allows for the consideration of non-response bias. These groups only differed on the party 
responsible for tax return preparation, with late respondents significantly more likely to use a 
paid preparer (46% compared to 66%, p < .05). However, as this demographic variable was not 
related to any of the study‟s dependent variables, this suggests that few insights are lost due to 
potential non-response bias.  
Experimental Task  
 
The experimental task consisted of a hypothetical tax compliance scenario. This scenario 
varied across the experiment‟s six treatment conditions, in which both the tax setting (state use 
tax, federal income tax on a gain, and federal income tax on income received in cash) and the 
                                                 
47
 The majority (nearly 87%) of participants resided in the state of Florida. Thus, most participants lived in a state 
that imposes use taxes. From a practical consideration, the state of Florida is particularly vulnerable to erosion in its 
SUT collections due to individual non-compliance with the use taxes (the Florida Chamber of Commerce estimates 
that uncollected use taxes were approximately $3 billion in 2006 (www.flchamber.com)). Participants that resided in 
Florida compared to other states did not significantly vary in any of the study‟s independent or dependent variables. 
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detection mechanism (present or absent) were manipulated. Participants were randomly assigned 
to one of these six conditions. All participants completed the study entirely in a computerized, 
online environment, allowing respondents to complete the experiment on their own time and in a 
natural setting (Bryant et al., 2004).
48
 Cell sizes for each of the six treatment conditions ranged 
from 22 to 26 participants.   
 The manipulation for “tax setting” consisted of three hypothetical tax scenarios: two for 
individual federal income tax (a gain on the sale of a painting and cash receipts for service 
income) and one for state use tax (an out-of-state purchase of jewelry).
49
 All scenarios were 
designed as situations with high opportunities for tax evasion, whereby the taxpayer has the 
ability to passively evade taxes via underreporting; all scenarios also required equal monetary 
payments. Table 13, Panel A reproduces the text of these dilemmas. The first income tax 
dilemma consisted of a taxable gain (a concept used in prior tax research, e.g., Kaplan et al., 
1997 and Henderson and Kaplan, 2005). Based on feedback from pilot-testing, a second 
individual income tax scenario was developed to control for potential differences among 
different types of federal income tax underreporting dilemmas. This consisted of the receipt of 
service income in cash (a concept used in prior tax research, e.g., Kaplan et al., 1997). The final 
scenario pertained to a state use tax dilemma; like the other dilemmas, it was designed to convey 
an underreporting dilemma whereby the taxpayer could passively evade taxes.  
                                                 
48
 The study was initially pilot-tested in both online and paper-based forms; responses did not differ due to form.  
This corroborates evidence suggesting that studies using in-laboratory and out-of-laboratory online settings yield 
similar results (e.g., Alexander et al., 2006).   
 
49
 Both income tax scenarios were specified as pertaining to federal income tax to ensure comparability with prior 
research.  
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The second manipulated variable pertained to the presence or absence of a detection 
mechanism. The presence or absence of a detection mechanism is not related to the taxpayer‟s 
responsibility to pay the tax liability, but affects the probability of detection in the event of 
evasion. No additional information was provided for the “absence” of a detection mechanism 
condition. The presence of a detection mechanism consisted of an external notification to a 
taxing authority of an event that may have triggered a tax liability. Table 13, Panel B reproduces 
the text of the detection mechanism manipulations.  
The instrument contained manipulation check questions to assess whether participants 
perceived the correct type of tax (federal income or state use), and whether participants in the 
“detection mechanism present” condition perceived higher detection risks than those that lacked 
this information. Fifteen participants (14 in scenarios concerning federal income tax) answered 
the manipulation check incorrectly and were excluded from the study‟s analysis. To test the 
effectiveness of the manipulation of the detection mechanism, participants indicated their 
perceived likelihood that they would be audited in a similar situation if they failed to report the 
event, ranging from 1 (unlikely) to 7 (very likely). The means and standard deviations in 
response to this question for the “present” versus “absent” detection mechanism conditions were 
4.35 (1.95) and 3.52 (1.80), respectively, and were significantly different at p = .008 (two-tailed), 
indicating an effective manipulation.  
Experimental Procedures 
 
Participants were e-mailed a link to an online questionnaire corresponding to one of the 
six experimental conditions. Participants first provided general demographic information and 
answered questions assessing their familiarity with different types of taxes. Next, participants 
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read information regarding the hypothetical tax compliance scenario (i.e., one of the six 
experimental conditions). They then responded to manipulation check questions regarding the 
questionnaire and answered questions regarding how they and others would behave in a similar 
situation, including their own behavioral intentions. Participants then responded to questions 
assessing their social norms; items measured personal, subjective, injunctive, and descriptive 
norms for the specific scenario in question and for the type of tax (income or use) in general. 
Finally, participants responded to questions measuring their attitudes, including their attitude 
toward the additional money, political ideology, fear of being audited, opinions regarding 
ignorance of types of taxes, and perceptions of fairness for the specific type of tax. Additional 
analysis reported in the text considers the effect of these attitudes on compliance intentions; with 
the exception of one of the measures of fairness, none significantly affected the results. 
Appendix B contains a copy of the experimental questionnaire.    
The study‟s questionnaire was pilot-tested multiple times. First, several experienced 
taxpayers provided extensive feedback regarding the clarity of the scenarios and the 
questionnaire items. Second, a sample of 62 experienced taxpayers completed the questionnaire 
either online or in a paper-based form; as there were no differences in responses based on form, a 
decision was made to use an online questionnaire for the study‟s actual data collection. Based on 
these pre-testers, the tax compliance scenarios were revised to provide more information, the 
third scenario of “receipt of cash income” was added, and changes were made to some of the 
questionnaire items. Third, a sample of 97 experienced taxpayers completed the online 
questionnaire under normal experimental conditions. Based on their feedback, some wording 
changes were made to the questionnaire‟s items and to the scenarios. Finally, to ensure that there 
were no issues with the final version of the questionnaire, 25 students in a graduate accounting 
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class completed the final version of the (paper-based) questionnaire in-class; no further changes 
were made to the questionnaire. Information gathered from the two samples of experienced 
taxpayers indicates that taxpayers felt that they could respond truthfully to the questionnaire‟s 
items (average of 6.65 on a 1-7 Likert scale with 7 = “strongly agree”).  
Measurement of Variables  
 
The primary dependent variable is taxpayer compliance intentions. As modified from 
Henderson and Kaplan (2005) and Bobek et al., (2009), this variable was measured as the 
response to, “Placed in a similar situation, do you think you would report [the event] and pay the 
$500 in taxes?”50 Participants answered on a 7-point Likert-type scale with “very unlikely” and 
“very likely” as the anchors. The mean (standard deviation) of responses across all experimental 
conditions was 4.70 (2.26).
51
  
 Two of the hypothesized independent variables, ignorance and social norms, are 
measured. The construct of ignorance is measured with two questions. First, prior to viewing the 
case scenario, participants indicated their familiarity with the tax laws governing the type of tax 
scenario in question.
52
 On a 7-point scale ranging from “not at all” (1) to “very” (7), the mean 
responses for familiarity were relatively low for individuals in the use tax (2.04) and gain (mean 
                                                 
50
 “The event” was stated as “the purchase” in the use tax condition, “the gain” in the gain scenario, and “the cash 
receipts” in the cash receipts scenario. While taxpayers‟ own behavioral intentions were of primary concern, 
questions also assessed participants‟ opinions of the likelihood of compliance of the average U.S. taxpayer and the 
hypothetical taxpayer in the scenario.  
 
51
 Thirty-two percent of participants indicated that they would be “very likely” to report the taxable event if they 
were placed in a similar situation, suggesting that the majority of participants might not be completely compliant.  
 
52
 Participants across all experimental conditions answered questions regarding their familiarity with the tax laws 
governing each of the three types of scenarios (prior to receiving information on the hypothetical tax scenario). 
Analysis indicated that participants were equally familiar with the tax laws governing the different scenarios across 
the cell treatments. Only participants‟ responses to their familiarity with the tax laws governing the scenario that 
they evaluated were used for the study‟s analyses.  
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of 2.34) scenario, and were statistically significantly higher for those in the cash receipts scenario 
(3.32, p < .01, two-tailed). Second, after viewing and answering questions regarding the case 
scenario, participants also indicated whether “most people do not know they are responsible for 
paying…” tax on the type of tax scenario in question; the 7-point scale ranges from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) and addresses participants‟ perceptions of widespread ignorance. 
Participants were statistically significantly more likely to view that there was widespread 
ignorance regarding use tax responsibility (mean of 5.95, p < .001) than of taxes due on gains 
(mean of 4.24) or cash receipts for services provided (mean of 4.29).  
The measure for social norms is modified from the tax compliance scale of Bobek et al., 
(2009), which developed a scale measuring the four distinct types of social norms identified by 
Cialdini and Trost (1998). This scale included items measuring all categories of social norms of 
tax compliance (personal, subjective, injunctive, and descriptive) based on prior tax compliance 
research on social norms. Each category included items governing both general (i.e., assessing 
general tax compliance for either income or use tax) and specific (i.e., pertaining to the 
hypothetical tax compliance scenario) social norms. All items were coded such that higher scores 
indicate more favorable social norms toward tax compliance.  
Following the process used in Bobek et al., (2009), these items were subjected to factor 
analysis to obtain an overall measure for each of the four types of social norms. To obtain 
separately interpretable factors reflecting each of the four types of social norms, Principal 
Components Analysis using Varimax (orthogonal) rotation was used. The initial factor analysis 
was conducted on 26 items. Eleven of these items were eliminated due to their poor loading (less 
than 0.60) on any factor. To identify distinct factors matching the four types of social norms, 
three items (two items measuring personal norms and one item measuring subjective norms) 
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were deleted due to their loading onto a factor primarily composed of different types of social 
norms. The final scale resulted in twelve items.  
Table 14 reports the final results of the factor analysis, including the item loadings and 
percentage of the variance explained for each factor. Four distinct factors were extracted, each 
corresponding to the type of social norm identified by Cialdini and Trost (1998) and measured 
by Bobek et al., (2009). Collectively, the four factors explained 78% of the data‟s variance. 
Factor 1 contained questions representing subjective norms (e.g., most people you know would 
disapprove if you….) and explained 49% of the variance; Factor 2 represented personal norms 
(e.g., would you feel guilty if you….) and explained 12% of the variance; Factor 3 represented 
descriptive norms (e.g., what percentage of U.S. taxpayers would….) and explained 9% of the 
variance; and Factor 4 represented injunctive norms (e.g., would most people feel justified if 
they…) and explained 8% of the variance. The orthogonal factor scores for each of these four 
factors were retained as the measure of the four distinct types of social norms.  
Results 
Hypothesis 1: Social Norms 
 
 Hypothesis 1 investigates whether social norms differ based on the tax setting. The initial 
analysis uses multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) to examine whether participants‟ 
social norm factor scores varied based on the tax setting contained in the hypothetical tax 
compliance scenario. Table 15, Panel A presents the results of this MANOVA analysis using the 
factor scores of the four different types of social norms as dependent variables (all considered 
simultaneously). The results reveal that participants exhibited statistically significant differences 
(p = .001, two-tailed) in social norms depending on the tax setting.  
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Table 15, Panel B presents descriptive statistics and results of separate analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) on each social norm factor score separately. Inspection of the mean factor 
scores for each tax setting (with higher scores indicating more favorable social norms toward tax 
compliance) shows that participants in the different experimental conditions did not vary in their 
overall subjective norms (Factor 1) or injunctive norms (Factor 4). The ANOVA results for 
personal norms (Factor 2) show a marginally statistically significant difference (p < .10, two-
tailed) in personal norms based on the tax setting. Examination of the mean factor scores 
between the different types of taxation indicates that this difference is because individuals 
exhibited significantly lower personal norms related to complying with the use tax on out-of-
state purchases than with income tax on cash receipts (p < .05, two-tailed). Thus, participants‟ 
standards for behavior resulting from their internalized values are more favorable toward 
compliance for paying income tax on income received in cash than for paying use tax on out-of-
state purchases.  
Finally, the ANOVA results for descriptive norms (Factor 3) show a strongly statistically 
significant difference (p < .001, two-tailed) in descriptive norms based on the tax setting. 
Analysis of the mean factor scores for the three different tax settings indicates that descriptive 
norms for the use tax and gain scenario are both significantly lower (p < .001, two-tailed) than 
descriptive norms associated with the cash receipts scenario. As descriptive norms measure 
perceptions of actual situational behavior, participants perceived that actual tax compliance 
would be substantially lower for those two scenarios than for income tax on cash receipts.
53
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 Results were inferentially identical when also controlling for the presence of a detection mechanism. This result is 
in line with the finding that taxpayer subjective norms are equivalent between groups with high or low evasion 
opportunities (Blanthorne and Kaplan, 2008).  
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Overall, results indicate that participants judged descriptive norms (what others actually 
do in a situation) lower for both the use tax and the income tax due on a gain than for the income 
tax associated with cash receipts. Participants‟ personal norms (their internalized values) were 
lower for the use tax than for income tax associated with cash receipts. This provides preliminary 
evidence that individuals‟ social norms differ based on the tax setting.  
Hypothesis 2: Differences in Compliance Intentions  
 
 Hypothesis 2 addresses whether tax compliance intentions differ based on varying tax 
settings. Analysis controls for the tax setting as well as the presence of a detection mechanism 
(since both factors were manipulated in the experimental design). Table 16, Panel A reports 
descriptive statistics of tax compliance intentions based on the condition assignments of tax 
setting (use tax, gain, or income) and detection mechanism (absent or present). These descriptive 
statistics indicate that in the absence of a detection mechanism, taxpayers have significantly 
higher tax compliance intentions in the cash receipts scenario (mean of 5.72) than in either the 
use tax (mean of 3.73) or gain (mean of 3.83) scenarios (p < .01, two-tailed). When a detection 
mechanism is present, then the use tax scenario (mean of 4.27) is significantly lower than the 
cash receipts (mean of 5.60) scenario (p < .05, two-tailed), but the gain scenario (mean of 4.92) 
is not significantly different from either of the other two. These descriptive statistics show that 
participants are consistently less likely to pay use tax on an out-of-state purchase than income tax 
on cash receipts for services.  
Table 16, Panel B reports the results of ANOVA analysis on the effect of both condition 
assignments on tax compliance intentions. These results indicate differences among tax 
compliance intentions based on the tax setting (p < .001, two-tailed). However, no differences 
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emerged due to detection mechanism (p > .15). Tukey HSD post-hoc analysis indicates that the 
difference in tax setting is due to differences between the cash receipts scenario and both of the 
other two scenarios (both p < .01, two-tailed). When controlling for the two manipulated 
variables, the model is significant (p = .002), but the relatively modest adjusted R
2
 (9.1%) 
indicates that other variables can help to explain tax compliance intentions.  
Alternative analysis (tables not shown) considers participants‟ assessment of the 
compliance intentions of the hypothetical taxpayer in the scenario. The presence or absence of a 
detection mechanism did not affect participants‟ likelihood assessments; however, the tax setting 
did have a strong effect (p < .001, two-tailed). Moreover, post-hoc analyses indicate that 
differences existed among all three types of tax scenarios (for all comparisons, p < .03, two-
tailed). Specifically, participants viewed the hypothetical taxpayer as the least likely to comply in 
the use tax scenario (overall mean of 2.93 on a 1-7 likelihood scale), followed by the gain 
scenario (mean of 3.95) and the cash receipts scenario (mean of 4.86). Thus, while participants 
were only less likely to comply in the use tax scenario than in the cash receipts scenario, they 
were likely to view that others’ compliance in the use tax scenario would be less than in both 
income tax situations.   
Overall, Hypothesis 2 predicts that individuals‟ tax compliance intentions will differ 
based on the tax setting. Results show that individuals‟ tax compliance intentions are lower for 
paying use tax and income tax on gains than for paying income tax on cash receipts. Moreover, 
assessments of others‟ behavioral intentions are lower for the use tax scenario than for both of 
the income tax scenarios. This illustrates that tax compliance intentions differ based on the tax 
setting.   
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Hypothesis 3: Accounting for Differences in Tax Compliance Intentions   
 
Given the difference in tax compliance intentions based on the tax setting, Hypothesis 3 
investigates why such differences occur. Table 17 reports the results of an analysis of covariance 
(ANCOVA) model of tax compliance intentions that includes the tax setting as a fixed factor, 
while controlling for the presence of a detection mechanism, the two measures of ignorance 
(familiarity and widespread ignorance), and the four social norm factors. The model also 
includes interaction terms between the tax setting (scenario) and the detection mechanism, the 
tax setting and the ignorance measures, and the tax setting and the social norm factors. In other 
words, the model contains several moderators (detection, ignorance, or social norms) for the tax 
setting; these moderators control for the varying level of influence that such factors might have 
on tax compliance based on the particular tax setting.   
 The expectation is that differences in these constructs will account for differences in tax 
compliance intentions based on the tax setting. The results support this prediction, as the “tax 
setting” variable is no longer statistically significant when controlling for these other constructs 
(p > .40, two-tailed; see Table 17).   
The findings also suggest that differences in tax compliance intentions are due to 
differences in social norms. Subjective norms (Factor 1), personal norms (Factor 2), and 
descriptive norms (Factor 3) are all strongly statistically significant in explaining tax compliance 
intentions (p < .001, two-tailed). However, injunctive norms are not related to tax compliance 
intentions.
54
 The interaction term between descriptive norms and the tax setting is also 
statistically significant (p < .05, two-tailed), indicating that descriptive norms influence 
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 Alternative analysis substitutes some of the injunctive norm items that were not retained by the factor analysis; 
results are inferentially identical. Thus, injunctive norms do not appear to be related to tax compliance intentions in 
these contexts.   
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taxpayers‟ tax compliance intentions differently based on the tax setting. The ignorance 
measures, detection mechanisms, and interactions with the tax setting all fail to achieve 
statistical significance in this overall model. The overall model has an adjusted R
2
 of 0.622, a 
large improvement over the earlier specification.        
Further analysis explores the effect of these variables and the interaction terms. Separate 
regression analyses were conducted on tax compliance intentions for each of the three sub-
samples of the different tax settings (see Table 18). Table 18 displays the results of the analyses 
for the separate sub-samples. Several interesting findings emerge. First, subjective norms (Factor 
1), personal norms (Factor 2), and descriptive norms (Factor 3) are related to tax compliance 
intentions for all three scenarios; however, the effect of descriptive norms is lessened for the cash 
receipts scenario (p < .05, two-tailed, compared to p < .001, two-tailed, for the other two 
scenarios). Descriptive norms are the most salient in “a novel or ambiguous situation” (Cialdini 
and Trost, 1998, p. 155). This result is consistent with the finding that participants demonstrated 
substantially greater familiarity with laws on the cash receipt of income than the other two 
scenarios (p < .01), as reported in the Measurement of Variables sub-section. Second, 
participants‟ self-reported familiarity of the applicable tax laws affects their tax compliance 
intentions in the use tax scenario (p < .05, two-tailed). This implies that increasing participants‟ 
familiarity with use tax laws could improve compliance. However, this relationship does not 
emerge with the gain or cash receipts scenarios.
55
 Finally, the model explaining use tax 
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 Additional analysis substitutes whether participants have ever been in a similar position to the scenarios for their 
self-reported familiarity of the tax laws governing such scenarios. This variable is only statistically significant in the 
cash receipts scenario, where participants had lower tax compliance intentions if they received cash payments for 
services more frequently (p < .01, two-tailed).  
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compliance explains a larger proportion of the variance (adjusted R
2
 of 0.733) than the model of 
the gain scenario (adjusted R
2
 of 0.553) or the cash receipts scenario (adjusted R
2
 of 0.382). 
Supplemental analysis (tables not shown) investigates the causes of differences in 
perceptions of others’ compliance intentions. Similar to results for individuals‟ tax compliance 
intentions, when controlling for social norms, detection mechanisms, ignorance, and the 
interactions thereof, the “tax setting” factor is no longer statistically significant. ANCOVA 
analysis finds that descriptive norms and assessments of widespread ignorance are both related 
to the assessments of third-party compliance intentions (both p < .02, two-tailed).  
Overall, Hypothesis 3 predicted that social norms, detection mechanisms, and ignorance 
would account for differences in tax compliance intentions between tax settings. The results 
partially support this, as descriptive norms explain compliance in the use tax and gain scenario, 
while familiarity is related to compliance in the use tax scenario, but not in either of the income 
tax scenarios. The presence of a detection mechanism, however, is not statistically significantly 
related to compliance.  
Additional Analyses 
 
 Several additional analyses consider the effect of additional variables on the study‟s 
results. First, while no differences emerge in individuals‟ compliance intentions due to the 
presence or absence of a detection mechanism, additional analyses consider whether participants‟ 
perceptions of detection risk (perceived likelihood that they would be audited if they did not 
report the tax) influences their behavioral intentions. Prior tax research has indicated that the 
perceived probability of detection is more salient to taxpayers‟ compliance decisions than the 
actual detection risk (e.g., Carnes and Englebrecht, 1995). When separately examining the results 
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for each type of tax and substituting “perceived detection risk” in for the manipulated “detection 
mechanism” variable, results are changed for the cash receipts scenario. As displayed in Table 
19, in this condition, perceived detection risk is positively related to compliance intentions (p < 
.05, two-tailed), while descriptive norms (Factor 3) are no longer significantly related to this 
dependent variable. The adjusted R
2
 for this tax scenario also improves from 0.382 to 0.457 with 
this substitution. Results for the other two tax scenarios remain unchanged. Perceived detection 
risk does not have a statistically significant effect on tax compliance intentions in the overall 
analysis (p < .30, two-tailed). This suggests that the perceived risk of audit has the greatest 
influence on tax compliance intentions for cash-based income, and provides further evidence that 
descriptive norms do not influence taxpayers‟ behavior for this tax setting.  
 Second, additional analysis considers the influence of demographic and control variables. 
The addition of the demographic variables does not change the overall interpretation of the 
results.
56
 Two variables have a statistically significant effect on tax compliance intentions 
beyond the effect of the study‟s independent variables: income and fairness. As shown in Table 
20, both of these control variables remain statistically significant when adding the significant 
variables from Table 17. Specifically, participants that perceived the use or income tax system as 
“fair to most people” had higher compliance intentions (p < .05, two-tailed); supplemental 
analysis finds that the connection exists for those evaluating both scenarios in the income tax 
system, but not for the use tax system. Another interesting result is that participants with higher 
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 Differences in tax compliance intentions due to the type of tax scenario were not due to demographic differences. 
Alternative analysis first assesses the effect of demographic and other control variables (age, gender, income, 
education, political ideology, fear of being audited, use of a paid preparer, and attitude toward additional money) on 
tax compliance intentions to develop a “baseline” measure in which to compare the effects of the hypothesized 
variable. Next, the manipulated “tax setting” measure is added to the baseline model to test whether compliance 
intentions differ based on the tax setting. The tax setting variable is statistically significant (p < .01, two-tailed), 
indicating that differences in tax compliance intentions based on the tax setting are not due to demographic factors. 
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reported incomes had higher compliance intentions (p < .06, two-tailed); supplemental analysis 
finds that this pattern is driven by participants in the gain condition. This finding contradicts 
recent archival and experimental economics research that has found a negative connection 
between income and compliance rates (e.g., Johns and Slemrod 2008; Alm et al., 2009), and 
suggests that this previously documented association may be due to differences in tax rates or 
evasion opportunities between the groups. However, given that the adjusted R
2
 improves only 
slightly when including these additional demographic variables (from 0.622 to 0.653), 
demographic characteristics may not have a strong influence on tax compliance decisions.  
Conclusion 
Summary of Findings 
 
 Overall, the study‟s findings suggest that taxpayers view compliance differently under 
different tax settings. Hypothesis 1 examines whether social norms associated with tax 
compliance differ based on the tax setting. Analysis of the four types of social norms (Cialdini 
and Trost, 1998) shows that individuals‟ personal norms of tax compliance (internalized values) 
are higher for paying income tax on cash receipts than for paying use tax on out-of-state 
purchases. Individuals also have significantly higher descriptive norms (perceptions of what 
others would do in a particular situation) for paying income tax on cash receipts than for paying 
income tax on gains or for paying use tax on out-of-state purchases.  
 Hypothesis 2 studies whether a difference emerges in compliance intentions based on the 
tax setting. Results show that participants are more likely to comply with reporting cash income 
subject to income tax than in reporting out-of-state purchases subject to use tax or gains subject 
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to income tax. However, supplemental analysis reveals that participants viewed others as less 
likely to comply in paying use tax than for both of the income tax scenarios.  
Finally, Hypothesis 3 investigates which explanatory factors account for these differences 
in compliance intentions. Results suggest that social norms play an important role in individuals‟ 
compliance. In particular, descriptive norms account for some of the differences in tax 
compliance across different tax settings, as these norms have a stronger influence on compliance 
with the use tax and income tax on gains than on income tax levied on cash receipts. 
Furthermore, participants‟ self-reported familiarity with use tax laws influences their compliance 
intentions for this scenario, whereas perceived detection risk is only significant in the cash 
income scenario.  
Limitations  
 
The study‟s results should be evaluated in conjunction with its limitations. First, this 
study uses a hypothetical case scenario to evaluate participants‟ tax compliance intentions. 
Participants‟ responses may not reflect their actual behavior. However, prior studies have shown 
a connection between hypothetical and actual compliance behavior (Webley et al., 2001). 
Second, 15 of the participants failed the manipulation check and were excluded from the 
analysis; however, this equates to an overall failure rate of less than 10% and suggests that few 
additional insights were lost from these participants. Third, individuals may not have been 
comfortable admitting that they would engage in tax evasion behavior due to social desirability 
bias. In pilot tests, however, participants strongly agreed that, “I felt that I could respond 
truthfully to the questions asked” (average of 6.65 on a 1-7 Likert scale with 7 =”strongly 
agree”). Fourth, the study‟s sample was not drawn from a random sample of U.S. taxpayers; in 
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particular, the study had a higher proportion of female, older participants than would be expected 
in the national population. While only income influenced tax compliance intentions beyond the 
effect of the study‟s independent variables, generalizations to the overall population should be 
made within caution.  
Discussion 
 
The results of this study offer important implications to taxation researchers and 
policymakers. First, this study adds to the growing body of work suggesting that tax compliance 
behavior may differ based on the situation (e.g., Bobek and Hatfield, 2003). However, this prior 
research on individuals‟ tax compliance has almost universally examined the income tax to the 
exclusion of other types of taxes (see Andreoni et al., 1998). This study is the first to compare 
behavioral compliance intentions for the use tax compared to the individual income tax; results 
indicate that antecedents of use tax compliance may be different from other types of taxation 
compliance. Moreover, the results show that differences exist even for the same type of reporting 
decision (i.e., passively evading taxes via underreporting). These results suggest that 
understanding the underlying causes of tax compliance behavior is complex and that future 
researchers should consider antecedents of compliance within particular tax settings (Ajzen and 
Fishbein, 1980).    
Second, this study demonstrates the varying influence of social norms, detection 
mechanisms, and ignorance on tax compliance across different settings. Prior literature that has 
examined the influence of social norms has studied this from an income tax perspective, which 
could explain why descriptive norms (what others actually do in a given situation) have appeared 
to be of little consequence to behavior (e.g., Wenzel, 2004; Bobek et al., 2007b). This study 
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demonstrates that descriptive norms are of particular importance in novel compliance situations. 
Moreover, whereas increased familiarity with specific income tax laws does not appear to affect 
compliance intentions in the study, increased familiarity with use tax laws does. This suggests 
that the influence of ignorance is context-specific.   
Finally, this study offers information to policymakers seeking to remedy the problems of 
tax compliance, an issue that has become increasingly relevant in the recent economic downturn. 
The results of this study show that social norms play a more important role than do economic 
factors; governmental attempts to change social norms may be more effective than increased 
audit rates. State revenue departments could continue efforts at increasing awareness of the use 
tax, but may not be successful in reaching critical levels of compliance without changed social 
norms (see Davis et al., 2003). Future researchers should therefore consider how societal norms 
toward tax compliance could be changed. 
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STUDY THREE: ANTECEDENTS OF THE ADOPTION OF THE STREAMLINED 
SALES & USE TAX AGREEMENT 
Introduction  
 
 The current sales and use tax (SUT) system in the U.S. is riddled with complexity. 
Current estimates are that the U.S. has over 7,500 state and local SUT jurisdictions, leading to 
enormous compliance costs for vendors operating in multiple jurisdictions (Tower et al., 2006). 
This complexity is compounded by the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that vendors 
are only required to collect SUT on sales in jurisdictions in which the vendors have a physical 
presence.
1
 Thus, most SUT systems suffer from the inherent complexity of applying an archaic 
tax structure to an increasingly mobile economy, along with potentially billions of dollars in lost 
SUT revenue from remote sales (Bruce et al., 2009).  
Part of the reason for the vast complexity across SUT systems is that governments 
independently developed their SUT systems without attempting to coordinate their systems with 
other jurisdictions. A significant turning point occurred in 2000 with the development of the 
Streamlined Sales Tax Project (SSTP), a cooperative state effort “to simplify and harmonize their 
sales and use tax regimes” (Hellerstein and Swain, 2004, p. iii). Nearly all state governments 
imposing the SUT have worked together on this venture with the goal of simplifying the 
administration and enhancing compliance of SUT (Duncan and Luna, 2007). The SSTP‟s attempt 
at voluntary coordination of the SUT system among state governments is groundbreaking. 
                                                 
1
 Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992). Taxpayers are required to pay compensating use taxes on 
purchases normally subject to SUT in which an out-of-state vendor is not required to collect SUT, but in actuality, 
most of these remote sales are effectively tax-free due to consumers‟ non-payment of use tax (Fox and Swain, 
2007). 
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Ultimately, the longer-term goal of the SSTP is to induce “Congressional authorization for 
streamlined states to collect tax from remote vendors” (Fox and Swain, 2007, p. 626). Thus, 
proponents of the SSTP hope that cooperative state action will ultimately lead to federal 
legislative intervention that enables states to collect SUT from remote vendors that may lack 
physical presence within the state (Fox et al., 2008).
2
 While such federal legislative action has so 
far been unsuccessful, recent media reports have suggested that federal action is again being 
contemplated, in part due to the involvement of the SSTP (McCullagh, 2009).  
To achieve these efforts, the SSTP drafted the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement 
(SSUTA), which is a “blueprint” for state tax legislation that brings about the streamlining 
movement‟s goals (Hellerstein and Swain, 2004).3 Individual state legislatures may pass 
conforming legislation in line with the SSUTA‟s provisions. As of 2009, the SSUTA‟s 
Governing Board consists of 19 “fully conforming” states that have passed and implemented 
legislation in line with all provisions of the SSUTA, and three “associate member” states that 
have achieved substantial compliance with these provisions in their state statutes.
4
  
                                                 
2
 In Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a remote seller only had a 
responsibility to collect SUT in a jurisdiction to the extent that the seller had a physical presence within the 
jurisdiction. Part of the Court‟s reasoning was that requiring a seller to comply with the thousands of SUT 
jurisdictions across the nation would impose an undue burden on interstate commerce. The Court also ruled that 
Congressional action could overturn this decision. Thus, the streamlining movement aims to simplify SUT systems 
and the collection process with the goal of lobbying Congress to enact legislation that would enable states to collect 
SUT from remote sellers.  
 
3
 The SSUTA went into effect on October 1, 2005, after at least 10 states with 20% of the population levying sales 
tax were deemed to be in compliance with the SSUTA. For member states, the effective date of the SSUTA 
triggered the beginning of the amnesty program for businesses and launched a centralized registration point for 
retailers.  
 
4
 The 19 fully conforming states are: Arkansas, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, 
Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont, Washington, 
West Virginia, and Wyoming. The three associate member states are: Ohio, Tennessee, and Utah. Fully conforming 
states are those that have been deemed in full compliance with the SSUTA. Associate members are those that are not 
currently in compliance with the SSUTA, but are scheduled or expected to be in compliance soon. 
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While initial naysayers doubted that states would be able to cooperatively coordinate 
their SUT systems, the number of states that have collaborated to achieve greater uniformity and 
simplicity has been remarkable. Legislative changes under the SSUTA include increased 
interstate uniformity, centralized vendor registration, simplification of reporting procedures, and, 
controversially, destination-based sourcing rules for conforming members (taxing a sale at the 
point of its final destination, rather than at the origin).
5
 States that have adopted the terms of the 
SSUTA have amended state tax laws such that their SUT systems align with the tax system 
provisions outlined by the SSUTA to increase uniformity in areas such as administration of SUT, 
base definitions, or sourcing rules. In addition to changing their state tax structures, conforming 
members of the SSUTA offer amnesty as an incentive for vendors that choose to voluntarily 
collect sales taxes in all member states, even if such vendors lack a physical presence within the 
state. Appendix C contains a summary of the major changes brought about by the SSUTA, most 
of which are aimed at simplified compliance and administrative rules for vendors.  
Understanding what induces a state to conform to the SSUTA provisions is important in 
explaining the roots of state tax policy change and collective state action and in understanding 
the future trajectory of the SSUTA. Swain and Hellerstein (2005) suggest that state interest 
groups have influenced SSUTA adoption, although this proposition has not been empirically 
tested. States with higher SUT rates were more likely to agree earlier to participate in the SSTP, 
                                                                                                                                                             
(www.streamlinedsalestax.org). Wisconsin has petitioned to be admitted as an associate member effective July 1, 
2009, and as a fully conforming member as of October 1, 2009.  
 
5
 On December 12, 2007, the Streamlined Sales Tax Governing Board voted to change its policy regarding sourcing 
rules, in response to the difficulty faced by many states in implementing changes in sourcing policy. States are now 
permitted to use origin-based sourcing for intrastate sales, or taxing a sale at the point of origination of the sale, but 
such states will not be “full members” of the SSUTA until January 1, 2010 or until five other states use intrastate 
origin-based sourcing under the SSUTA, whichever occurs later (www.streamlinedsalestax.org). Destination-based 
sourcing continues to be required for all interstate sales.  
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but it is unclear whether this same relationship would also hold true for the adoption of the 
SSUTA (Cameron, 2004). Further investigation is necessary to truly understand the antecedents 
of states‟ adoption.  
The purpose of this study is to empirically examine the factors, including interest group 
strength, that influence a state‟s decision to adopt legislation conforming to the provisions of the 
SSUTA. This is investigated through a cross-sectional empirical model. A secondary purpose is 
to examine the political strategies and tactics used by various interest groups in states that either 
have or have not conformed to the SSUTA. Examination of strategies and tactics is conducted 
through a case study analysis of a conforming state (Kansas), a non-conforming state (Texas), 
and an associate member state (Tennessee), all of which have faced substantial controversy in 
their move toward SSUTA conformance.  
Results of the empirical model show that states with a higher SUT rate are more likely to 
adopt provisions of the SSUTA. Moreover, states with a larger number of taxing jurisdictions 
were marginally less likely to adopt these provisions. Higher Republican support among voters 
increased the odds of adoption, while pre-SSUTA origin-based sourcing was not an across-the-
board deterrent to adoption. Case study results complement the findings of this model, as 
business interests were not as important as those of local governments and state revenue 
departments. While the presence of origin-based sourcing did not emerge as a roadblock to 
SSUTA adoption in the empirical model, it was a matter of considerable debate in the states 
examined in the in-depth case study. In particular, local government concerns over the change in 
sourcing requirements were ultimately more influential than small business concerns over the 
cost of the sourcing change, and the strong advocacy role of state revenue departments was 
important in achieving adoption. These results supplement the empirical model and suggest that 
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the strength and involvement of governmental interest groups is particularly important in 
taxation policy adoption.    
The results of this study contribute to the literature in several important ways. First, this 
study extends work on political strategies (Hillman and Hitt, 1999) to the field of SUT, in which 
the investigation of the intricacies of intrastate interest groups and strategies is relatively rare 
(Anderson et al., 1989 is an exception). Second, this study sheds light on why and how states 
have been able to implement the changes required to comply with the SSUTA, suggesting that 
changes in sourcing requirements are not an inherent deterrent to adoption, but that supportive 
governmental interest groups are critical. Third, understanding the importance of governmental 
interest groups and their role in influencing tax policy changes contradicts the notion that 
businesses are the predominant interest group in influencing tax policy changes (e.g., Salamon 
and Siegfried, 1977; Quinn and Shapiro, 1991; Suarez, 1998). All of these findings have 
important implications in understanding upcoming policy changes, including the possibility of 
new consumption taxes (e.g., Deloitte, 2008) and other types of inter-jurisdictional tax policies.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: the second section presents 
theoretical development. The third section presents the research method and results for the cross-
sectional empirical model.  The fourth section provides the research method and results for the 
qualitative case study. The fifth section concludes. 
Theoretical Development  
Theories of State Tax Policy Adoption 
 
Theoretical models of state policy innovation fall in two primary categories: diffusion 
models and internal determinants models (Berry and Berry, 1999). Diffusion models of adoption 
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predict that a state‟s adoption of a new tax or other policy is due to the emulation of similar 
behavior in other states. In comparison, internal determinants models of adoption posit that 
intrastate political or economic factors influence a state in adopting a particular policy (Berry and 
Berry, 1999). These are complementary, not competing, models; many studies investigate both 
diffusion and internal determinants variables. As a type of policy innovation, states‟ adoption of 
new tax policies can be studied through these theoretical lenses.   
 Diffusion models of state tax policy adoption include both regional diffusion and tax 
competition theory. Regional diffusion theory predicts that states are more likely to adopt the 
policies of neighboring and/or similar states (Berry and Berry, 1999). In the SUT realm, Georgia 
counties were more likely to adopt a local-option sales tax if neighboring counties had already 
adopted this tax (Sjoquist and Wallace, 2003). In contrast, tax competition theory is a special 
case of regional diffusion theory – states use taxation policies to compete for resources; 
therefore, jurisdictions are more likely to adopt tax policies of competing jurisdictions. Tax 
competition theory has been influential in explaining the adoption of SUT policies, such as the 
actions behind states‟ adoption of selective cigarette and gasoline sales taxes (Rork, 2003) and 
changes in Tennessee‟s county-level sales tax rates and bases (Luna, 2004). These diffusion 
models of policy adoption are particularly important when analyzing either pooled or time-series 
data.   
 Internal determinants models of state tax policy adoption examine intrastate 
characteristics, such as economic or political factors, that influence a particular state‟s decision. 
Economic or fiscal factors include elements from a state‟s economy that may induce or preclude 
state policy change. For example, policy changes may be influenced by the level of urbanization 
(e.g., Berry and Lowery, 1987) or unemployment (e.g., Goolsbee and Maydew, 2000). A state‟s 
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fiscal health may also influence policy adoption. Poor fiscal health is strongly linked to an 
increase in the probability of adoption of a new revenue source (Berry and Berry, 1992), whereas 
a fiscal crisis may make a state‟s policy officials more receptive to taxation policy changes in 
general (Vines et al., 1994).  
 Certain political factors may also make tax policy adoption more feasible. The political 
party of both state governmental leaders as well as voters may influence the types of policies 
adopted. States with a Republican governor are more likely to adopt taxation policies that favor 
corporate taxpayers (Klassen and Shackelford, 1998). States with a progressive state and local 
tax system are unlikely to be controlled by the Republican Party (Chernick, 2005). In more 
recent years, Tennessee counties with a larger proportion of Republican voters were more likely 
to have implemented a local option sales tax increase (Luna et al., 2007).
6
 Other political 
variables may also be of importance. For example, single-party control of the governor and the 
upper house (i.e., the state senate) may make policy changes more feasible (Gilligan and 
Matsusaka, 2001), whereas state policy changes are more likely in election times (Berry and 
Berry, 1990).  
Another category of internal determinants that is particularly important for studies of 
state tax policy adoption concerns tax system factors. Simply stated, the existing tax structure 
within a jurisdiction will influence its decision to adopt an innovation. For example, a county‟s 
sales tax or property tax capacity (i.e., the relative ability to generate additional sales or property 
                                                 
6
 Luna et al., (2007) suggest that this result might be due to the fact that higher-income taxpayers may be more likely 
to vote Republican, and may therefore prefer increases in sales taxes as opposed to other taxes due to their the 
regressive nature of the tax.    
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tax revenue) has influenced a county‟s decision to raise its sales tax rate to the state-mandated 
legal maximum level (Luna et al., 2007).  
 Overall, internal determinants models are informative when studying adoption with either 
cross-sectional or pooled data. One particular type of internal determinant pertains to the power 
of various interest groups, as the strength of a state‟s interest groups may also affect policy 
innovation. Thus, states, adoption of new tax policies can be studied from the perspective of 
interest group theory (Stigler, 1971; Peltzman, 1976; Becker, 1986; Vines et al., 1994).  
Interest Group Theory 
 
 Interest group theory predicts that governmental policy adoption, including taxation, is 
dependent upon the relationship between the strength of competing interest groups, which may 
be due to factors such as the interest group‟s wealth and/or constituent base. Interest groups that 
are able to transfer wealth and other resources to politicians thus influence the political process 
and engage in these actions to ensure the adoption of policies that serve their own economic 
advantage (Peltzman, 1976; Vines et al., 1994).  
 Taxation is one type of policy adoption that competing interest groups seek to influence. 
Specifically, some interest groups use their political influence to seek lower taxation (Becker, 
1983, 1985). One influence on a government‟s taxation policies is therefore the comparative 
strength and political influence of competing interest groups such as differing entities and/or 
differing individual constituencies.  
Interest group theory has been particularly useful in explaining state taxation policies. 
Vines et al., (1994) found lower state corporate taxation rates in states with a higher degree of 
business group strength. The same general finding of the importance of interest groups holds true 
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for other types of taxation, including property taxes (e.g., Hunter and Nelson, 1989) and tobacco, 
gasoline, and freight excise taxes (e.g., Salamon and Siegried, 1977; Hunter and Nelson, 1992; 
Trogdon and Sloan, 2006; Decker and Wohar, 2007). Likewise, general state sales taxes are 
lower when constituents have a greater ability to form opposing interest groups (Anderson et al., 
1989). States with heavier reliance on SUT, as proxied by higher SUT rates, are also more likely 
to be early participants in the SSTP (Cameron, 2004). These studies suggest that interest group 
theory is a useful lens to study state taxation. However, less is known about how interest groups 
are able to influence taxation policy outcomes.  
Political Strategy Formulation 
 
 Understanding how certain interest groups are able to successfully influence state 
taxation policy outcomes requires examining the formulation and execution of political strategies 
by these entities. One useful framework for understanding political strategies is the Hillman and 
Hitt (HH, 1999) model of political strategy formulation. Prior accounting researchers have used 
the HH framework to help explain the relationship between political involvement and corporate 
environmental performance (e.g., Cho et al., 2006; Kassinis and Vafeas, 2006), corporate 
influences on professional regulation (e.g., Roberts et al., 2003), and corporate influence on new 
federal taxation policy development (e.g., Roberts and Bobek, 2004).  
 The HH framework focuses on general approaches to political strategy, the levels of 
participation, and the specific strategies and tactics used by organizations. Organizations may 
adopt either a transactional (specific issue) or relational (long-term) approach to political 
strategy; relational strategies are more likely when organizations are dependent upon government 
policies. Entities may choose either an individual (solo) or collective (cooperative) level of 
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participation. An individual approach is often chosen when policy outcomes are narrowly 
tailored toward a particular interest group, whereas a collective approach is more common if an 
organization has fewer financial or intangible resources.  
Depending upon their general political approach, interest groups may utilize informative, 
financial incentives, and/or constituency building strategies to achieve their goals. The use of 
informative strategies implies the strategic use of information aimed at legislators, such as 
through testifying at political hearings. Constituency-building strategies attempt to develop 
constituent support for policy issues, such as through grassroots campaigns to the public to 
communicate with decision makers. Financial incentive strategies involve the use of pecuniary 
benefits to achieve financial rewards, such as via direct political or political action committee 
(PAC) contributions. Thus, the HH framework is a useful tool for understanding how economic 
interest groups may seek to influence the policy process, including the formulation of state 
taxation policy.  
Research Questions 
 
States‟ adoption of the SSUTA may be examined through the prism of interest group 
influence (a type of internal determinants‟ model). In one of the most pertinent papers on the 
SSUTA, Swain and Hellerstein (2005, p. 612) write, “Though not a startling conclusion, the 
progress, contours, and detours of streamlining can be explained largely by traditional interest 
group politics…” Both state revenue departments and larger corporations have tended to favor 
this measure, whereas smaller businesses and local jurisdictions have raised concerns about the 
effects of enactment. Adoption of the SSUTA has been relatively uneventful in states without a 
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large opposition, but that progress has slowed when faced with resistance from opposing interest 
groups (Swain and Hellerstein, 2005).  
Both state revenue departments and multi-state corporations are united in their support 
for the SSUTA, albeit for different reasons. State governments stand to benefit from collecting 
tax from remote vendors and from the reduction in administrative costs. Indeed, states with 
higher SUT rates are more likely to be early participators in the SSTP (Cameron, 2004). 
Moreover, many larger corporations are already routinely involved in multi-jurisdictional 
transactions, and simplifying the administration of the SUT could greatly reduce their 
compliance costs (Robinson, 2006). “Main street” retailers could also improve their competitive 
position with the reduction of the gap in SUT compliance requirements between “brick and 
mortar” and remote retailers.  
However, per Swain and Hellerstein (2005), both smaller businesses and local 
jurisdictions have expressed concerns over the manner in which greater uniformity leads to SUT 
system changes. These interest groups have especially raised concerns about the potential 
detrimental outcomes from changing sourcing requirements. Many smaller businesses currently 
operate on a pure intrastate basis; businesses previously using origin-based sourcing could 
therefore be threatened with dramatically increased complexity if required to use destination-
based sourcing.
7
 Moreover, local jurisdictions may stand to lose revenue as a result of this 
                                                 
7
 As required by SSUTA, destination-based sourcing requirements dictate that sales that are delivered or shipped to 
the location of the customer must be sourced to their destination (e.g., the consumer‟s place of business or 
residence), rather than to the point of origin (e.g., the vendor‟s location). For example, a consumer residing in 
Unincorporated County (imposing a 5% SUT rate) that orders a pizza from a pizza parlor in Nearby Town 
(imposing a 6% SUT rate) would pay 5% tax on the pizza if it was delivered to his place of residence. The increased 
complexity in SUT reporting requirements for businesses that deliver products to additional locations could raise 
SUT compliance costs.  
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change, particularly for jurisdictions containing businesses with large amounts of remote sales.
8
 
Pressure raised by these interest groups in some jurisdictions has forced state legislatures to 
delay the adoption of some of the SSUTA‟s provisions (Swain and Hellerstein, 2005).  
The degree to which specific interest groups have influenced states‟ decisions to adopt 
the provisions of the SSUTA is an untested empirical proposition. Moreover, it is empirically 
unclear whether states that have been unable to enact proposed legislation to conform to the 
provisions of the SSUTA have stronger interest group opposition (such as smaller businesses) 
than in other states, or instead whether the supportive interest groups (such as larger 
organizations) were not as powerful in these states. This leads to the following research question: 
Research Question 1: Did the strength of opposing and/or supportive interest groups 
affect states‟ adoption of the provisions of the SSUTA?  
  
Also unclear is how these interest groups have used political strategies to work toward 
their desired policy outcomes, and what specific types of tactics and strategies have been used by 
these groups. Understanding the strategies used by groups in both conforming and non-
conforming states can illuminate the reasons behind the success or failure of different interest 
groups, and can provide guidance over strategies for successful adoption of other types of inter-
jurisdictional tax policy changes (e.g., Deloitte, 2008). Such strategies can be interpreted in terms 
of the HH framework, which helps categorize interest groups‟ political behavior. Thus, the 
study‟s second research question investigates: 
                                                 
8
 States previously using origin-based sourcing required all sales for SUT purposes to be sourced to the origin (e.g., 
the vendor‟s location). Under a switch to destination-based sourcing, jurisdictions containing businesses that make 
large volumes of intrastate deliveries may lose SUT revenue. One of the key reasons for the SSUTA‟s requirement 
of destination-based sourcing was to develop uniform requirements on which jurisdiction had the right to tax a 
transaction.  
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Research Question 2: What was the general approach to political action, level of 
participation, and types of political strategies in states that are conforming or not 
conforming to the provisions of the SSUTA?  
 
Research Question 1: Research Methods and Results  
Research Methods 
 
 Research Question 1 examines whether states that have conformed to the SSUTA by 
adopting its provisions had differences in opposing and supportive interest group strength 
compared to non-adopting members. This is studied via a cross-sectional empirical model of the 
45 U.S. states that impose a state-level SUT.
9
 Ideally, this research question would be 
investigated using panel data, as states have been deemed fully conforming members of the 
SSUTA in multiple years (i.e., 2005 onward). However, due to data availability issues, only a 
cross-sectional investigation of states considered fully conforming members as of January 1, 
2009 can be conducted at this point in time. This limitation is partially assuaged by the fact that 
the majority of adopting states were voted fully conforming members of the SSUTA in 2005.  
Empirical Model and Variable Definitions  
 
  To investigate Research Question 1, the following empirical model is proposed:  
SSUTA = a + bX + cC + έ,        (3) 
where SSUTA is a dummy variable measuring whether a state has adopted the provisions of the 
SSUTA and is a member of the SST Governing Board (taking a value of 1 if adopted and 0 
otherwise), X is a vector of test variables measuring interest group theory factors, and C is a 
                                                 
9
 Alaska, Delaware, Montana, New Hampshire, and Oregon are excluded, as these states do not impose a state-level 
SUT. Moreover, Washington D.C. does impose a SUT, but is excluded due to data availability concerns and to 
enhance comparability among the states.  
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vector of control variables that includes tax system, fiscal, and political controls that may affect 
state tax policy decisions. Table 21 describes the variables, measurement, expected signs, and 
data sources used to estimate the above equation.  
 The dependent variable SSUTA measures whether a state has adopted the provisions of 
the SSUTA and is a member of the SST Governing Board as of January 1, 2009. At this point, 
states are fairly evenly divided into adopters and non-adopters; 19 states have been deemed 
conforming states that were full adopters of the SSUTA (full members) and three states are 
considered to be in substantial compliance (associated members); all 22 states are members of 
the SST Governing Board. Given that the model is limited to 45 observations, no distinction is 
made between fully conforming members (19 states as of January 1, 2009) and associate 
members (three states) in the presented analysis, although additional analysis considers these 
differences. 
This study uses three interest group theory test variables to assess the relationship 
between the strength of opposing or supportive interest groups and SSUTA. First, the 
independent variable BUSRATIO measures the proportion of large businesses compared to small 
businesses within the state. Specifically, this is the percentage of state employment by businesses 
with 500 or more employees, divided by the percentage of state employment by businesses with 
20 or fewer employees. This variable is examined as a ratio between large and small businesses 
to conserve a degree of freedom.
10
 Next, following Cameron (2004), STATESUT is a proxy for 
the strength of state revenue departments, and is measured as the 2007 state SUT rate; this 
measure offers more stability than the proportion of state government collected from SUT and 
                                                 
10
 Inferentially identical results were obtained when examining these proxies separately. 
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ensures comparability with prior literature. Finally, LOCALJUR is the proxy for the strength of 
local jurisdictions within a state. LOCALJUR is measured as the number of total jurisdictions 
within a state imposing an additional local general SUT. As suggested by Swain and Hellerstein 
(2005), BUSRATIO is expected to have a positive relationship with SSUTA, as states with a 
greater proportion of large businesses compared to small businesses are expected to be more 
likely to have adopted this policy. STATESUT is also expected to have a positive relationship, 
while LOCALJUR is expected to have a negative relationship.  
  Other controls that may influence a state‟s adoption of the SSUTA are also included. 
These controls are limited to internal state determinants; diffusion factors are not examined given 
the cross-sectional nature of the data analysis. ORIGIN is a tax system control that measures 
whether states utilized origin-based SUT sourcing (for states that have adopted the SSUTA, this 
variable is measured prior to their adoption). The SSUTA requires that states utilize destination-
based sourcing for determining the appropriate SUT rate on a taxable sale; thus, states that 
instead use origin-based sourcing would need to make more legislative changes to fully adopt the 
SSUTA provisions and may be less likely to adopt (Hellerstein and Swain, 2004). Although in 
December 2007 the SSTP Governing Board voted that states could use origin-based sourcing for 
intra-state sales as conforming members of the SSUTA, this provision does not apply until at 
least five states have reached this threshold or January 1, 2010, whichever is later. Thus, a state‟s 
use of origin-based sourcing is still an impediment to adoption for the period of this study.   
 SUTLOSS is a fiscal stress control, measured as the “low” estimate of 2008 state and 
local revenue losses arising solely from e-commerce as a percentage of 2003 total state tax 
collections, as developed in the updated estimates by Bruce and Fox (2004). States are more 
likely to make taxation policy changes in times of fiscal stress (Berry and Berry, 1992; Vines et 
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al., 1994). Thus, states with greater SUT revenue losses are expected to be more likely to adopt 
the provisions of the SSUTA. 
 Finally, REPUBLIC is a political control. Following Luna et al., (2007), REPUBLIC is 
measured as the percentage of Republican voters in the most recent (2004) Presidential election 
for which data is available. The Republican Party is generally associated with pro-business 
taxation policies, but it is unclear in this instance whether Republicans would support the interest 
of larger or smaller corporations; thus, the expected sign of this variable is ambiguous.  
Results 
Descriptive Statistics  
 
 Table 22 displays descriptive statistics for the variables used in the model for both 
adopting (i.e., Governing Board members) and non-adopting states. Panel A provides 
information on the differences in interest group, fiscal, and political factors between adopting 
and non-adopting states; Panel B contains the frequency of the use of pre-SSUTA for these two 
groups.  
 Panel A shows that on average, adopting states have fewer interstate SUT jurisdictions 
than non-adopting states (LOCALJUR). Due to the small sample size, this is the only difference 
between the two groups that reaches statistical significance (p < .10, two-tailed). While 
differences are not statistically significant, adopting states also have higher SUT rates 
(STATESUT), but, in contrast with predictions, show weaker relative large business to small 
business strength (BUSRATIO) as compared to non-adopting states. Adopting states also display 
stronger voter support for Republican candidates (REPUBLIC), but show comparable degrees of 
revenue loss due to e-commerce (SUTLOSS). Panel B demonstrates that surprisingly, 
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substantially more adopting states had pre-SSUTA origin-based sourcing (ORIGIN) than did 
non-adopters. 
Method of Analysis for Empirical Model  
 
 A dichotomous logit model is used to test the influence of interest groups on states‟ 
adoption of the SSUTA. The basic approach for testing this research question is to determine 
whether interest group strength explained states‟ adoption of the provisions of the SSUTA, when 
controlling for tax system, fiscal stress, and political factors. Before analyzing logistic regression 
results, non-parametric (Spearman) correlations among the independent variables were 
examined.
11
 As shown in Table 23, none of the correlations exceeded 0.45, indicating that 
multicollinearity was not likely a problem.
12
  
 The empirical model is estimated using logistic regression; parameters of this model are 
estimated using maximum likelihood estimation. The overall model fit is assessed using a log 
likelihood chi-squared statistic; overall model fit is statistically significant (chi-squared = 20.174, 
p=.003; Log Likelihood = -42.187). Furthermore, the Nagelkerke R
2
 is 0.482. The model 
correctly predicts 80.0% of all adoptions, as compared to a naïve model (which predicts no 
adoptions) of 51.1%. This improvement is evidence of some degree of predictive accuracy. The 
current model performs stronger in classifying adoptions (86.4%) than non-adoptions (73.9%). 
The results of the logistic regression analysis are shown in Table 24.
13
  
                                                 
11
 Non-parametric (Spearman) correlations are examined due to the small sample size of the model.  
 
12
 Furthermore, the variance inflation factor (VIF) for each variable in the model fell below 3.0.  
 
13
 Sensitivity tests considered this dependent variable in two alternate ways: treating the three “associate member” 
states as non-adopters, and excluding the associate members from the empirical model. When treating the associate 
members as non-adopters, the overall model remains statistically significant (p = .021) and accurately predicts over 
73% of adoptions. The coefficients for STATESUT (p < .05, two-tailed) and REPUBLIC remain statistically 
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 The results of the model also provide information regarding the individual coefficients. 
The coefficients for the interest group theory variable BUSRATIO
14
 and the fiscal control 
variable SUTLOSS
15
 were both statistically insignificant and will not be discussed further. The 
coefficients for both of the remaining interest group variables were statistically significant and 
were in the expected direction. The estimated coefficient for STATESUT was statistically 
significant (p < .05, two-tailed) and positive, indicating that states with higher state SUT rates 
were more likely to have conformed to the SSUTA‟s provisions. This is in line with the finding 
of Cameron (2004) that states with higher SUT rates were more likely to be early participants in 
the SSTP project. Similarly, states with increased numbers of local sales tax jurisdictions (p < 
.10, two-tailed) were less likely to have adopted these reforms, suggesting that increased 
complexity via the number of taxing jurisdictions is a deterrent to adoption.
16
 Taken together, 
these results suggest that the features of the state and local SUT regime within a state are likely 
to drive adoption, rather than facets of the business community.  
                                                                                                                                                             
significant (p < .10, two-tailed). When excluding the associate members from the empirical model, the overall model 
remains statistically significant (p = .008) and accurately predicts over 76% of adoptions. The coefficients for 
STATESUT and REPUBLIC both remain statistically significant (p < .05, two-tailed), as does ORIGIN (p < .10, 
two-tailed), although again, the sign is in the opposite direction than anticipated. This suggests that increased SUT 
rates and Republican support were among the most robust factors in predicting adoption. 
 
14
 Sensitivity tests substituted the cut-offs of 100 employees (large businesses) and 10 employees (small businesses), 
as well as the percentage of a state‟s total receipts earned by these categories of businesses. Inferentially identical 
results were obtained, as none of these variables were statistically significant in explaining a state‟s adoption of the 
SSUTA. 
 
15
 Sensitivity tests substituted the “high” estimate in the updated Bruce and Fox (2004) study, as well as the initial 
estimated 2006 state revenue losses in SUT as a proportion of total state taxes originally developed by Bruce and 
Fox (2001). Results are inferentially identical, and neither of these variables approaches statistical significance. 
 
16
 Additional analysis substitutes the proportion of a state‟s taxing jurisdictions for the total number of taxing 
jurisdictions. When examining the ratio of (jurisdictions imposing the SUT/governmental units in the state), the 
coefficient is negative and statistically significant (p < .03, two-tailed), and the predictive power of the model 
remains high. This demonstrates that the strength of local governmental jurisdictions, rather than the pure size of the 
state, is the driver of adoption. However, under this specification, the 2007 SUT rate is no longer statistically 
significant; substitution of the 2006 SUT rate in this model specification does yield a marginally statistically 
significant result for this variable (p < .10, two-tailed).  
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 The coefficients for two of the control variables, ORIGIN and REPUBLIC, are 
statistically significant as well (both p < .05, two-tailed). The coefficient for REPUBLIC is 
positive, indicating that states with an increased number of Republican voters are more likely to 
adopt the SSUTA provisions. In more recent years, areas with increased Republican voters have 
been more apt to increase local option SUT (Luna et al., 2007). The coefficient for ORIGIN was 
unexpectedly positive, as states that used origin-based sourcing in 2003 (i.e., prior to adoption of 
SSUTA changes) were more likely to adopt. This surprising finding is in line with descriptive 
statistics for adopting and non-adopting states; 54.5% of adopting states had an origin-based 
sourcing system at the beginning of 2003, whereas only 34.8% of non-adopters had this system. 
This finding appears to be driven by the fact that the three “associate members” of the SSUTA 
that have partially conformed (Ohio, Tennessee, and Utah) have all been faced with roadblocks 
in their implementation issues due to problems with sourcing (Collins and Iafrate, 2005; Swain 
and Hellerstein, 2005). When treating these three associate members as non-adopters, the 
coefficient for “origin” is no longer statistically significant. Still, this result suggests that despite 
the lack of progress made in large states with origin-based sourcing (e.g., California or Texas), 
the existence of origin-based sourcing was not an across-the-board deterrent to adoption.   
 Overall, results show the importance of governmental interest groups to the adoption of 
the SSUTA, particularly that of state government as proxied by the state SUT rate. However, this 
macro-level analysis does not consider the challenges faced in individual states or in how 
competing interest groups used political strategies to achieve desired policy results. 
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Research Question 2: Research Methods and Results  
Research Methods  
 
 Research Question 2 is investigated using a case study approach to analyze the political 
strategy formulation of interest groups in three states: a fully conforming state (Kansas), an 
“associate member” state (Tennessee), and a non-adopter (Texas). The case study approach is 
particularly applicable for examining contemporary phenomenon and provides a richer portrait 
of the real-life context than could be provided through an empirical model (Yin, 1993). Case 
studies are also appropriate for investigating actual practices, as well as “how” and “why” 
questions; “storytelling” is central in presenting the findings from such studies (Cooper and 
Morgan, 2008). Thus, this case study approach is appropriate for its ability to provide details of 
the specific challenges faced by each state, as well as richer information on how interest groups 
influence state taxation policies. 
 Case Selection  
 
While researchers may have a variety of reasons for selecting individual cases within a 
case study, one rationale for this selection concerns “maximum variance” cases. According to 
Cooper and Morgan (2008, p. 165), “Maximum variance cases provide valuable insight into a 
specific problem or theory by selecting cases that are different with respect to some 
dimension…” The examination of differing outcomes in state SSUTA adoption is an important 
dimension. Thus, to determine whether interest groups‟ political strategy formulation varied in 
states that conformed or did not conform to the SSUTA provisions, this case study focuses on an 
in-depth analysis of three states: Kansas, Texas, and Tennessee. All three states have faced 
substantial controversy in their move toward SSUTA conformance (Swain and Hellerstein, 
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2005), particularly with political pressure by opposing interest groups due to changes in sourcing 
requirements. However, this political pressure has led to different outcomes in these states. The 
case study selection of three maximum variance cases therefore enables an understanding of the 
reasons behind the success or failure of different interest groups within individual states, as well 
as how the tactics used by these interest groups were executed.  
 Appendix C contains a summary of the legislative changes seen in each state beginning 
with the time in which the model legislation of the SSUTA was formally adopted in November 
2002, and continuing through early 2009. The first state, Kansas, is chosen as an example of a 
state that is a fully conforming member of the SSTP, having successfully implemented the 
provisions of the SSUTA, despite business outcry over the change in sourcing requirements that 
threatened to derail the state‟s progress toward adoption (Swain and Hellerstein, 2005). The 
second state, Texas, is chosen as a state that has also faced political pressure in its movement 
toward adopting the SSUTA‟s provisions (Texas House Research Organization, 2004), and that 
as of 2009, has been unable to successfully implement these changes. The third state, Tennessee, 
represents a state that initially passed conforming SSUTA legislation, but has continued to delay 
its implementation due to pressure from local governments and small businesses (see Hubbard 
and Young, 2005) and is currently an associate member. These different states provide a setting 
to examine the forces behind these differing outcomes.  
Data Sources  
 
 One of the facets of a case study is the use of multiple pieces of evidence (Yin, 1993). 
This case study examines primary and secondary archived documents regarding responses in 
Kansas, Texas, and Tennessee to the states‟ attempts at adopting the provisions of the SSUTA. 
 153 
 
This examination begins when the model legislation of the SSUTA was first formally proposed 
in November 2002 and continues through 2008. Multiple electronic sources are used to develop a 
comprehensive set of data sources for the analysis. As shown in Table 25, the data sources for 
these three states pertain to the legislative histories of SSUTA-related legislation, pertinent 
legislative committee meeting minutes, a wide array of secondary sources, and when applicable, 
campaign finance data.
17
 All data sources are publicly available.  
Results 
 
 Data obtained for the case study are analyzed in several steps. First, information from 
these data sources is assembled to form a summary of the legislative history of each state‟s 
process toward achieving SSUTA conformance; see Appendix D for highlights of the legislative 
history for each state. Next, the information gathered is analyzed separately for each state by first 
identifying the interest group involved in the policy formulation process, indicating whether 
these interest groups‟ actions favored or opposed state adoption of the SSUTA, and analyzing the 
arguments used by interest groups within each state. Then, the information gathered about each 
interest group is categorized by using the HH framework as an organizing taxonomy through 
which to interpret the information gathered (Roberts et al., 2003). For each category of interest 
group (state governments, local governments, small businesses, and large businesses) within 
each state (Kansas, Texas, or Tennessee), the results qualitatively identify the general political 
approach (transactional or relational), level of participation (individual or collective), and the 
                                                 
17
 State revenue departments and governmental representatives from local jurisdictions were some of the most active 
interest groups in terms of support or opposition to this adoption; however, such interest groups do not make 
financial campaign contributions. Thus, the campaign contributions of eligible interest groups identified in the 
document search were obtained.  
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specific types of political strategies used (informative, constituency-building, and/or financial 
incentive).  
The classification of these characteristics was made based on the definitions of the 
elements of the framework developed in the original HH model, and in the summary of the HH 
model discussed by Roberts et al., (2003). Interest groups in which the majority of involved 
entities possessed an ongoing legislative agenda or extensive participation in other policy issues 
(e.g., committee hearing testimony) were described as possessing a relational political approach; 
a transactional political approach described interest groups in which most participating entities 
lacked these elements. Likewise, an individual level of participation was used for interest groups 
in which most involved entities were individual firms or municipalities; interest groups with a 
collective level of participation were dominated by associations of firms or municipalities (e.g., 
chambers of commerce or municipal leagues). Activity aimed directly at legislatures, such as 
lobbying and testimony at committee hearings, was classified as evidence of informative political 
strategies. Tactics aimed directly at the general public (i.e., not at legislatures), such as press 
conferences, advocacy advertising, or articles in trade publications, were treated as constituency-
building strategies. Financial campaign or PAC contributions, along with evidence of paid 
lobbyists or lobbying expenditures, were classified as financial incentive strategies. Taken 
together, these results show the importance of the executive branch (i.e., involvement of the 
governor) and municipalities, and provide evidence that a relational, collective strategy had the 
greatest influence on outcomes. 
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Kansas 
 
Table 26 provides an overview of the primary interest groups involved in Kansas and 
their position toward adoption. In Kansas, the state government (both the department of revenue 
as well as the Governor‟s office), large businesses, and local governments all supported the 
state‟s adoption of the SSUTA. This support was primarily driven by financial considerations – 
state and local governments saw the SSUTA as a way to increase revenues (through the 
collection of additional SUT revenues and the creation of a local use tax
18
), while large 
businesses perceived the simplification requirements as a way to minimize complexity across 
taxing jurisdictions. Small businesses initially viewed the SSUTA as a way to maximize fairness 
between “brick and mortar” and online retailers, but later opposed the move due to the costs of 
making the changes. Thus, the move toward adoption of the SSUTA can be characterized as a 
battle pitting small businesses against the other interest groups.    
The state of Kansas was one of the original states participating in the SSTP; it was one of 
four states chosen to engage as a “pilot” for assessing the tax collection software necessary to 
collect SUT from the SSTP project (Bauman et al., 2001). Thus, when legislation was introduced 
by the Kansas legislature in the 2003 session, it was greeted very favorably. The Kansas 
governor supported the project, as did nearly all parties testifying at the public hearings 
surrounding this act. Indeed, at the initial House and Senate legislative testimony in spring 2003, 
representatives from the state government, local governments, and business interests all 
overwhelmingly supported that Kansas amend its state laws to be in conformance with the 
                                                 
18
 Kansas was one of the few pre-SSUTA states that did not impose a local use tax. SSUTA-conforming legislation 
required both sales and use taxes to apply to local option taxes to create consistency in the tax treatment of 
transactions. Thus, local governments in Kansas were particularly enthusiastic about adopting the SSUTA.  
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SSUTA. However, most discussion centered on the benefits of the SSUTA, and ignored the 
legislative changes that would be necessary to make adoption a success (in particular, a change 
from origin-based sourcing to destination-based sourcing).  
With the focus on the long-term outcomes of SSUTA, all pertinent interest groups 
initially supported this move. Joan Wagnon, Secretary of Revenue at the Kansas Department of 
Revenue (KDOR), described that adoption would help collect additional (i.e., lost) SUT revenue, 
as the act responded to “concerns about the loss of tax revenue on remote sales” and would help 
“eliminate the advantage” of remote retailers.19 Similarly, Lewis Ebert, the head of the Kansas 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KCCI), stated that the organization supported the adoption 
of the SSUTA for simplification purposes, as “the current system for collecting and remitting 
sales tax is very burdensome and complex…” and adoption would aid “companies large and 
small.”20 KCCI also appealed to reasons of fairness, arguing that if the SSUTA was adopted, 
“Kansas retailers will be on a level playing field with vendors that do not have nexus in the state 
and are not required to collect sales tax.”21 Local governments were in favor of these changes, 
particularly due the new local use tax established as a result of the SSUTA adoption. The Kansas 
League of Municipalities stated that the SSUTA “…[met] the League‟s objectives because it 
establishes a compensating use tax for cities and counties…”22  
The unified support of all interest groups led to a joint conference committee report 
recommending the adoption of these changes, shifting the effective date up a year to July 1, 
                                                 
19
 Kansas Senate Committee on Assessment and Taxation Meeting Minutes, January 22, 2003 
 
20
 Kansas House Committee on Taxation Meeting Minutes, March 25, 2003 
 
21
 Kansas Senate Committee on Assessment and Taxation Meeting Minutes, February 17, 2003 
 
22
 Kansas Senate Committee on Assessment and Taxation Meeting Minutes, February 18, 2003 
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2003, so that Kansas could be one of the earliest adopters of the SSUTA with a guaranteed seat 
on the SSTP‟s Governing Board (Rothschild, 2003). HB 2005, including the shift to destination-
based sourcing, was passed by both legislative chambers and signed into law by Governor 
Kathleen Sebelius in May 2003.  
In June 2003, KDOR notified retailers that they would need to begin using destination-
based sourcing for SUT purposes within the next month. The resulting outcry from small 
businesses making deliveries was in sharp contrast to the lack of attention paid to this issue in the 
initial discussion of the SSUTA adoption. Hundreds of retailers flooded KDOR in opposition of 
this new requirement, citing the cost of the sourcing change as their major contention (Lawhorn, 
2003). So strong was the opposition that KDOR soon notified all retailers of an informal six-
month grace period, supported by Governor Sebelius. Even with this delay, the Governor‟s office 
continued to stress the importance of SSUTA adoption, appealing not only to the collection of 
additional revenue, but “more importantly”, issues of fairness. Adopting the SSUTA was 
portrayed as “a way of leveling the playing field between our retailers on Main Street and those 
who market by catalogue or internet sales” (Kansas Governor‟s Office News Release, 2003). 
Thus, actions by small businesses resulted in an implementation delay, but state governmental 
interest groups remained committed to conforming to the SSUTA.  
Over the next two years, small businesses in Kansas continued to fight to keep Kansas 
from continuing in the SSTP movement, while the state executive branch (i.e., the offices of the 
Governor and the Department of Revenue) and local governments continued to press for the 
implementation of changes. Dominated by small businesses, the KCCI and other local chambers 
of commerce targeted both legislators and constituents alike, arguing for a repeal of the SSUTA. 
Ken Daniel of the National Federation of Independent Businesses (NFIB) highlighted the cost of 
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sourcing change, as “…84% of NFIB members requested the destination sourcing provisions of 
the SSTP be changed,” and stating that “destination sourcing will harm 30,000 small 
businesses.”23 Appeals to the cost of the sourcing change by small businesses dominated 
discussion throughout the remainder of 2003 and 2004. Such entities also argued that Kansas‟s 
move toward SSUTA conformity might not result in the collection of lost SUT revenue because 
the agreement by itself did not guarantee Congressional action that would allow states to collect 
sales taxes on sales by remote vendors
24
 – instead, the agreement centered on voluntary 
compliance (using amnesty as an incentive).  
While the overwhelming majority of interest groups testifying during this period were 
small businesses opposing the change, the state executive branch and local governments 
continued to support adoption. Most appeals by these groups were revenue-centered – 
concerning collecting additional SUT and local use tax revenue – but references to fairness and 
the common rhetoric of “leveling the playing field” emerged as well.25 Thus, while the Kansas 
House passed a bill in March 2004 that delayed adoption of the SSUTA until Congressional 
action, the bill did not make it through the Senate. Instead, the chambers ultimately both passed 
SB 147 in May 2004, which delayed SSUTA implementation until January 1, 2005.  
The push by Kansas‟s small businesses to halt adoption of the SSUTA continued into 
2005. With the full implementation of destination-based sourcing at the beginning of 2005, 
Kansas petitioned for membership to the SSTP as a fully conforming state. However, in February 
                                                 
23
 Kansas Joint Committee on Assessment and Taxation Meeting Minutes, October 9, 2003 
 
24
 E.g., Kansas Chamber of Commerce and Industry testimony by Lew Ebert, Kansas Joint Committee on 
Assessment and Taxation, October 9, 2003  
 
25
 E.g., Kansas League of Municipalities testimony by Larry Baer, Kansas Senate Committee on Assessment and 
Taxation, February 18, 2004 
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2005, the Kansas House narrowly rejected a resolution aimed at jeopardizing participation with 
the SSTP. Even with the defeat, the Kansas House Taxation Committee continued to hold 
hearings on delaying adoption of the SSUTA, with small businesses citing the increased software 
and compliance costs as a reason for the delay.
26
 Meanwhile, KDOR and municipalities appealed 
to additional revenue, as “SSTP is the future and would provide the sales tax base needed to fund 
Kansas education, health care, as well as other future needs”.27  
Small businesses were ultimately defeated in this battle, and Kansas‟s adoption of the 
SSUTA remained in force. The positive influence of the SSUTA on many local, rural 
governments‟ finances (e.g., Courtwright, 2004) may have drowned out the concerns of small 
businesses. Instead, when the SSUTA went into effect in October 2005, Kansas was a fully-
conforming Governing Board state. The state continued to make required technical changes to 
remain in compliance (e.g., HB 2171), and was re-certified in 2008 by the SSTP as still being 
firmly in compliance.  
The story of Kansas‟s move toward SSUTA adoption and compliance was a product of 
competition between small businesses and representatives of governments at both the state and 
local level. The role of large businesses in this struggle is somewhat muted. While large 
businesses in Kansas were supportive of the SSUTA conformity due to its simplification and 
enhanced uniformity across taxing jurisdictions,
28
 their position was not in the limelight in 
Kansas‟s road to adoption.  
                                                 
26
 E.g., William Brannan, Schendel Pest Control, Inc., Kansas House Committee on Taxation Meeting Minutes, 
March 2, 2005 
 
27
 Joan Wagnon, Kansas Department of Revenue, Kansas House Committee on Taxation Meeting Minutes, March 3, 
2005 
 
28
 E.g., Kansas House Committee on Taxation Meeting Minutes, March 22, 2007 
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Tables 27 and 28 detailed information on the political strategies of these interest groups 
in Kansas‟s adoption of the SSUTA. Several findings emerge to explain why governmental 
interest groups were successful in Kansas. First, interest groups with a relational (long-term) 
presence were more successful. As shown in Table 27, state and local governments (as well as 
larger businesses) that were involved in the SSUTA adoption process all had a relational 
presence, as characterized by their legislative involvement on multiple issues during the time in 
which the SSUTA was enacted. Small businesses were the lone group with a predominantly 
transactional (issue-specific) presence, and they were a relatively late entry into the debate. 
Many of the small businesses that were the most affected by the cost of the sourcing change were 
those that had not previously been involved in the legislative process (Malashock, 2004; 
Montaque, 2004). Not surprisingly, Hillman and Hitt (1999) predict that entities with a relational 
presence are typically more successful in influencing the legislative process. Secondly, 
governmental entities primarily participated with a collective strategy. At the state level, KDOR 
and the Kansas Governor‟s Office presented a united front, while the Kansas League of 
Municipalities and Kansas Association of Counties represented the interests of cities and 
counties. While this type of collective action still existed via some of the business associations 
that represented small business interests, the vast majority of these small businesses fought a 
lone battle, such as through contacting KDOR (Lawhorn, 2003), meeting with legislators at 
forums (Malashock, 2004), and testifying at public hearings (Kansas House and Senate 
committee meeting minutes). Thus, collective action may have been more influential in the 
policy-making process.  
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Finally, while large businesses had little involvement in committee hearings and made 
little appeal to the public at large about the SSUTA, state governments, local governments, and 
small businesses were all extensively involved in this regard. As detailed in Table 28, these three 
interest groups used extensive informative tactics through their ongoing testimony regarding the 
adoption of SSUTA at legislative committee hearings throughout 2003 through 2007; all also 
used constituency-building tactics via communication with the public at large regarding their 
position toward the SSUTA via publications, newspaper columns, interviews, and policy 
statements. While governmental entities were unable to make financial contributions toward 
legislators, local governmental associations had a number of paid lobbyists registered with the 
State of Kansas, as did many municipalities and counties that listed adoption of the SSUTA as 
part of their “legislative agenda.” In contrast, not a single individual small business that testified 
in opposition of the SSUTA made financial contributions and none had paid lobbyists.
29
 Overall, 
the concerns of small business owners over the cost of the sourcing change from this agreement 
were likely drowned out by those that had stronger political connections, presented a united 
front, and had greater resources, despite the fact that small businesses used similar tactics as did 
other groups. Thus, while the opposition from small business owners was strong enough to delay 
the initial implementation of the SSUTA, the unified support of representatives of state and local 
governments ultimately prevailed.  
                                                 
29
 The largest campaign contributions from an opposing entity for the period of 2003-2007 were from KCCI; these 
totaled slightly under $160,000. The next largest campaign contributions from an opposing entity during this time 
period were from the NFIB, which totaled slightly over $13,000. Other opposing associations (e.g., Wichita 
Independent Business Association) were substantially lower, and none of the individual small businesses made any 
type of campaign contribution. By comparison, Boeing and Sprint were two of the few large organizations that 
supported the SSUTA in committee hearing meetings; Boeing‟s total contributions were around $138,000, whereas 
Sprint totaled slightly under $80,000.  
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Texas  
 
Table 29 summarizes the Texas interest groups involved in the struggle over SSUTA 
adoption. Initially, the Texas Comptroller‟s Office and large businesses favored adoption due to 
the hope of additional SUT revenue and simplification, respectively. However, many local 
governments opposed SSUTA adoption due to intrastate shifting of revenue that could occur 
with the change to destination-based sourcing, while small businesses opposed the sourcing 
change due to the increased cost of compliance. The Texas Comptroller‟s Office later opposed 
adoption due to concerns over the sourcing change, particularly due to the potential redistribution 
of revenue. Unlike Kansas, the Texas Governor‟s office had little formal involvement or 
communication in the move toward adoption of the SSUTA. Overall, the concerns of 
municipalities came to dominate Texas‟s stagnation in the process of SSUTA adoption.  
 Texas was one of the strongest early supporters of the SSTP movement. Texas was 
“involved from the very beginning” and was “very interested in being a part of this [streamlining 
movement]”.30 Indeed, the model legislation developed in the SSUTA was primarily based off 
Texas‟s existing SUT code. State Senator Troy Fraser reported that the SSTP “adopted the Texas 
model” by using the Texas SUT system as a “blueprint,” and that there was only “one minor 
change” required for Texas to be in compliance with the SSUTA.31 This “minor change” was the 
change from origin-based sourcing to destination-based sourcing, which ultimately proved to be 
the Achilles heel of Texas‟s conformance efforts.  
                                                 
30
 Joan Wagnon, President of the Streamlined Sales Tax Governing Board, U.S. House Subcommittee on 
Commercial and Administrative Law Meeting Minutes, December 10, 2007 
 
31
 Transcript of Senate Finance Committee, April 23, 2003 
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 Legislators in Texas introduced conforming legislation to the House and Senate in the 
2003 session. Bill sponsors were aware that the shift to destination-based sourcing would have 
some consequences, but initially only focused on a specific municipality: Round Rock, Texas, 
home to the headquarters of Dell Computers. Under existing origin-based sourcing rules, Round 
Rock was allocated all of the sales tax revenue on Dell sales made within Texas. Revenue from 
the local-option sales tax comprised around 60% of the city‟s overall operating budget, with  
sales attributable to Dell accounting for the majority of this amount (Texas House Research 
Organization, 2004). Moreover, in 1993, Round Rock had negotiated a tax incentive package 
with Dell in which the city refunded a portion of the sales tax to Dell; the city had also leveraged 
a portion of its bonds on future sales tax revenues attributable to Dell sales (Texas House 
Research Organization, 2004). Round Rock reported that the adoption of destination-based 
sourcing would devastate the city; if the sourcing requirements were to occur, the town would 
lose $20 million in revenue a year.
32
 Consequently, State Senator Fraser referred to the problems 
with the intrastate shift in revenue resulting from the destination-based sourcing change as the 
“Dell problem”.33  
 The problems of the intrastate revenue shift were not limited to Round Rock, but 
extended to rural communities with a high proportion of distribution centers (Matthews, 2005). 
In hearings regarding Texas‟s adoption of the SSUTA conforming legislation, nearly a dozen 
cities spoke in opposition of the plan due to a decrease in SUT collections, all due to the 
detrimental effects of the shift in intrastate revenue.
34
 For example, the city of Carrollton 
                                                 
32
 Transcript of Senate Finance Committee, April 23, 2003 
 
33
 Id. 
 
34
 Transcripts of House Ways & Means Committee, April 9, 2003, and Senate Finance Committee, April 23, 2003 
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reported that adoption of the SSUTA would result in a reduction of over 40% of their SUT 
revenue, whereas the mayor of the City of Farmers Branch reported that the change could lead to 
at decrease of around 20%. Within the Comptroller‟s Office, Eleanor Kim, the Assistant Director 
of Tax Administration, reported that the state had attempted to study the magnitude of the 
sourcing change across the state, but the data did not exist.
35
  
 In contrast to Kansas, in Texas, large (multistate) businesses had a heavier role in the 
initial debate over the role of the SSUTA, while small businesses were not in the limelight. Large 
businesses supported the adoption of the SSUTA for reasons of simplification and fairness. 
Chuck Courtney of the Texas Retailers Association stated that they “whole-heartedly support the 
bill” for reasons of fairness between online and bricks and mortar retailers.36 Representing 
JCPenney and Eckerd Drugstore, Wayne Zakrzewski argued that even with the lack of 
Congressional action, the simplification benefits for inter-state retailers would greatly decrease 
their cost of compliance.
37
 Interestingly, Dell Corporation itself was not involved in the debate.  
 Due to the concerns raised by local governments, in May 2003, the Texas legislature 
unanimously passed HB 2425, changing the sourcing of taxable services to destination-based. 
The sourcing of sales of tangible personal property remained unchanged. The change to 
destination-based sourcing for taxable services was to be effective July 1, 2004 (Kidd, 2003). 
The hope expressed by Texas legislators was that Texas would have greater latitude in adopting 
the provisions of the SSUTA because it was a “key state” in the agreement (Kidd, 2003).   
                                                                                                                                                             
 
35
 Transcript of the Senate Finance Committee, April 23, 2003 
 
36
 Transcript of House Ways & Means Committee, April 9, 2003 
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 Id. 
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 Even the change in the sourcing of services would prove difficult. Immediately prior to 
when these changes were scheduled to go into effect, the Texas Comptroller‟s Office posted a 
report stating that this sourcing change was being delayed indefinitely due to concerns over the 
effects on local governments and small businesses. Specifically, the Comptroller‟s Office 
reported, “several members of the Texas legislature as well as many business owners around the 
state have raised concerns about the significant and far-reaching effects of these changes” (Kidd, 
2004, p. 6). The implications of these changes on local SUT was still unknown; therefore, “at the 
request of key legislative leaders,” Texas decided to delay the implementation of the SSUTA 
changes indefinitely (Kidd, 2004, p. 6). In other words, concerns over the cost of the sourcing 
change and the intrastate allocation of SUT revenue pushed Texas to indefinitely delay SSUTA 
adoption.  
Local governments in particular were in favor of the delay. The Texas Municipal League 
(TML) reported that most cities within Texas were opposed to the adoption of the SSUTA now 
that they understood that conformance required changes to intrastate sales. The TML viewed the 
sourcing change as leading to “long-term budgetary chaos, dramatic revenue losses for larger 
cities, and overall net losses from shipping taxable goods into unincorporated areas where no 
municipal sales taxes would be collected” (House Research Organization, 2004, p. 9). These 
concerns were echoed in a 2005 study by the Comptroller‟s Revenue Analysis Section indicating 
that destination-based sourcing would redistribute approximately $160 million in local sales tax 
(Texas Comptroller‟s Office, 2006). Thus, Texas cities and the TML withdrew their support of 
the SSUTA.  
 This delay was never reversed. Supporting interest groups within Texas made little 
attempt at persuading opposing groups, but instead worked to change the structure of the overall 
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SSUTA. One of the original selling points of the bill was that nearly 90% of the SSUTA was 
based on existing Texas law, with little change necessary to achieve conformance.
38
 This attitude 
may have been a function of Texas‟s size – groups in favor of the change thought it unfair that 
Texas should change its SUT system to accommodate the will of smaller states and that a 
compromise was necessary for the SSTP to continue (see Texas Comptroller‟s Office, 2006). In 
April 2006, the state of Utah proposed a compromise to the sourcing agreement to the SST 
Governing Board, but the measure was defeated. Thus, in May 2007, both chambers of the Texas 
legislature unanimously moved to return to origin-based sourcing for taxable services (HB 
3319). Texas never implemented destination-based sourcing for intrastate sales.  
 In large part due to the problems faced by Texas, in December 2007, the SST Governing 
Board approved a compromise in sourcing requirements, permitting the use of origin-based 
sourcing for intra-state sales beginning in 2010 when at least five other states under SSUTA used 
this method. Local governments in Texas were supportive of this change. Round Rock Assistant 
City Manager David Kautz announced, “„Round Rock believes that the approved amendment 
provides a compromise that we have long sought and enables our intrastate origin-based sourcing 
rules to remain intact‟” (Texas Comptroller‟s Office, 2007). While conforming legislation has 
not yet been written as of mid-2009, the removal of the destination-based sourcing requirement 
effectively eliminated the criticisms of small businesses and local governments (Kidd, 2007).  
 Tables 30 and 31 provide detailed information on the political strategies of Texas interest 
groups in the move over the adoption of the SSUTA. Several patterns emerge. First, the 
Comptroller‟s Office in Texas used an individual approach in working toward (and later against) 
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adoption, as little evidence suggests that the Governor‟s office was actively involved; see Table 
30. Second, most business interests groups in Texas also utilized an individual approach; 
chambers of commerce were not formally involved in the initial hearings. Third, as with Kansas, 
local governments strongly influenced the political process, changing the tone of the debate over 
the adoption process to whether the SSTP project would be able to accommodate concern from 
Texas‟s cities (Texas Comptroller‟s Office, 2006). Local government interests were particularly 
strong due to their relational presence and the fact that both individual and collective entities 
were involved in the process.  
 Finally, Table 31 illustrates the types of political strategies used by each of these interest 
groups. First, local governments used extensive informative tactics such as lobbying the 
legislators and providing testimony at public hearings, highlighting problems with the shift of the 
intrastate revenue. Local government representatives also testified at the national SSTP meetings 
(Kidd, 2007), a strategy unseen in other states. Large businesses relied on informative tactics, but 
used more distant tactics (e.g., sending written statements rather than testifying in person). Small 
businesses and the state Comptroller‟s office had a limited role in their use of informative tactics. 
Second, governmental interest groups used constituency tactics via constituent publications, 
research publications, and statements of policy in appealing to the public at large regarding their 
position over the SSUTA adoption; such communication has continued through 2008 (e.g., 
Texas Comptroller‟s Office, 2008). Business interest groups made few direct appeals to the 
public.  
Third, like Kansas, both large businesses and local governments had a strong lobbying 
presence; in particular, nearly all opposing cities employed paid lobbyists. While large 
businesses that supported the simplification provisions of the SSUTA had a strong financial 
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presence,
39
 the fact that their informative and constituency tactics were limited compared to 
those of local governments suggests that concerns over the shifting in intrastate revenue drowned 
out the potential benefits of simplification. The opposition from local governments ultimately 
prevailed in the battle over Texas‟s adoption process, and in some respects, over the direction of 
the SSTP as well.
40
  
Tennessee  
 
 Table 32 presents an overview of the primary interest groups involved in Tennessee‟s 
move toward adopting the SSUTA. The positions of Tennessee‟s competing interest groups were 
similar to that seen in Texas – large businesses supported the move as a means to achieve 
simplification and fairness, whereas local governments and small businesses were opposed to the 
consequences of the sourcing change (e.g., shifting intrastate revenues and the monetary and 
temporal costs of sourcing changes). Unlike Texas, however, representatives from the Tennessee 
Department of Revenue (TDOR) were heavily involved in the project and were its primary 
supporters, while the Tennessee Governor was actively opposed to some of the changes of the 
initiative. The push from TDOR ultimately resulted in Tennessee‟s status as an associate 
member, despite active interest group opposition.  
 Like Kansas and Texas, Tennessee was an active early supporter of the SSTP. 
Representative Matthew Kisber from Tennessee was elected as one of the co-chairs of the SST 
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Implementing States Committee that helped mold the model legislation of the SSUTA,
41
 while 
Commissioner Loren Chumley later served as a co-chair of the SST Conforming States 
Committee that carried out the administrative functions of the SSUTA.
42
 Thus, when legislation 
to conform to the SSUTA was introduced in the 2003 session, some legislators viewed 
Tennessee as a leader in the streamlining process. Representative Claybough commented in the 
2003 session that “we do not want to lose the bill this year” because it was important that “[we] 
don‟t stop the national momentum in Tennessee”.43  
 Unlike Texas (and to a lesser extent, Kansas), Tennessee faced extensive changes in 
conforming its SUT statutes to the SSUTA. Beyond the change in sourcing requirements, 
Tennessee was required to remove caps on local taxes paid for goods and services, change its 
telecommunication tax structure, and make all goods and services have identical treatment in the 
state and local tax bases (Fox et al., 2005). The removal of “single article caps” that limited the 
amount of local taxes charged on single-item purchases was particularly controversial (Sharp, 
2003). Thus, TDOR strongly emphasized the role of simplification that would be achieved by the 
SSUTA. As stated by Commissioner Chumley, “We have one of the most complex SUT laws in 
the country. Truly.”44 In helping to draft legislation resulting in these base changes and removal 
of caps, TDOR met with industry groups affected by the simplification provisions; 
Commissioner Chumley approached such groups by asking “how can we protect your interests 
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and at the same time achieve streamlining?”45 The role of TDOR was therefore instrumental in 
moving toward SSUTA adoption.  
 While specific industries that were affected by the removal of exemptions and similar 
simplification provisions were involved in the initial debate over the SSUTA, general small and 
large business interests did not have a prominent role. Charles Garrison of the Tennessee 
Chamber of Commerce stated in April 2003, “…there has been limited business involvement in 
drafting proposals and legislation” regarding conformance to the SSUTA.46 Local governments 
also had no formal involvement in the policy formulation process. Instead, some legislators 
perceived that the collection of lost SUT revenue would benefit local governments as well. 
Representative McDaniel perceived that the potential benefits to local governments was so 
strong that, “…they ought to be up here in line”.47 With the push from the TDOR and legislators 
that adopting the SSUTA would benefit the state, both chambers adopted provisions to change 
Tennessee‟s SUT laws to be in conformance with the SSUTA (Public Chapter 357).  
 After conforming legislation was passed, most Tennessee interest groups viewed the 
measure favorably. However, some pangs of discontent emerged. One of the most ardent critics 
of the nationwide streamlined movement, the Direct Marketing Association (DMA), lobbied the 
Tennessee Tax Structure Commission in June 2003, arguing numerous reasons for opposing the 
SSUTA, including that the agreement did nothing to simplify the tax system and would not result 
in additional revenue for the state.
48
 Still, other interest groups did not follow suit.  
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In the 2004 session, both chambers unanimously passed technical changes to the bill and 
specified that the effective date of implementation would be July 1, 2005 (Public Chapter 959).
 The turning point in interest groups‟ attitudes toward SSUTA conformance occurred in 
January 2005, when, in his “state of the state” address, Tennessee Governor Phil Bredesen 
proposed delaying the implementation of the SSUTA conformance laws due to their potential 
adverse effect on local governments and small businesses.
49
 The position is noteworthy for its 
distinction from the earlier advocacy role of the TDOR – indeed, Commissioner Chumley had 
been appointed by Bredesen (Humphrey, 2005b). This concern was heightened the following 
month, when a municipality-funded study was released estimating that conforming to the 
SSUTA would result in a net inflow to local governments overall, but that 12 counties (in larger, 
metropolitan areas such as capital city of Nashville) would experience combined new outflows 
of nearly $15 million (Fox et al., 2005). The report touched off concerns among local 
governments, all citing the shifting of local revenues as a strong reason for opposition. The 
Deputy Director of the Tennessee Municipal League (TML) stated, “This is probably our biggest 
legislative priority this year because many of our cities have incurred debt and made investments 
based upon sales tax revenues that could be lost with these changes” (Flessner, 2005, p. 1). Local 
municipalities echoed this sentiment.  
 Small businesses also began voicing their concerns about sourcing changes to 
constituents and legislators alike. One more vocal opponent of this change was the Tennessee 
branch of the National Federation of Independent Businesses (NFIB), which heavily lobbied 
against implementing the SSUTA changes, citing the cost of the sourcing change, the lack of 
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thought on the change, and the lack of a Congressional guarantee. Rob Ikard, Tennessee 
Director of the NFIB, stated that a recent survey had shown that “more than 81%” of members 
“had not heard about the upcoming changes” and that the additional burden on small business 
did not justify the benefits (Memphis Business Journal, 2005). After lobbying from small 
business and local government entities, Governor Bredesen announced in April 2005 that he 
recommended the state delay implementation of the streamlining changes (Nashville Business 
Journal, 2005). With the governor‟s support, a measure further delaying implementation to July 
1, 2007 quickly passed both chambers with near unanimous support (Public Chapter 311).  
 Tennessee‟s move toward SSUTA conformance continued to stall after 2005. However, 
while Texas ultimately decided to return to origin-based sourcing, Tennessee continued to study 
the issue and investigate means of mitigation for entities affected by the delay. A commissioned 
report, released in January 2007 as a collaborative effort between TDOR, representatives from 
local government, and representatives from industry, recommended various mitigation strategies 
for local governments and small businesses.
50
 This recommendation suggested that the state as a 
whole would continue moving forward in attempting to achieve SSUTA conformance. Still, the 
Governor‟s Office continued to oppose adoption. A member of the governor‟s office stated in 
spring 2007, “The governor wants it postponed until Congress takes up the issue,” but that the 
office instead was “proposing to delay SSUTA for two years” (NFIB, 2007). Public Chapter 602 
further delayed implementation to July 1, 2009. Despite opposition from the Governor‟s office, 
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TDOR has continued to work toward adoption of the SSUTA, applying as an associate member 
of the SSTP and citing the benefits of simplification and modernization of the tax system.
51
  
 Overall, the shift in intrastate revenues for local governments in Tennessee was one of 
primary reasons for Tennessee‟s delay in SSUTA implementation, as, “The sourcing 
complications of the local jurisdictions have been a hard bite for both chambers in Tennessee to 
embrace”.52 Tennessee may continue to further delay the implementation of conforming 
legislation, but the December 2007 compromise by the SST Governing Board will likely shift the 
future course of the SSUTA conformance process. This change has satisfied the concerns of the 
TML and other local governments (e.g., TML, 2008), suggesting that Tennessee‟s path toward 
becoming a fully conforming member of the SSUTA may ultimately be successful.   
  Tables 33 and 34 provide details on the political strategies and tactics of Tennessee 
interest groups during the battle toward SSUTA adoption. First, most of the interest groups 
within Tennessee involved with the SSUTA used a relational approach and were involved with 
multiple issues. This suggests that the success or failure of different interest groups was not due 
to discrepancies in approaches to political strategy. Next, TDOR and the Governor‟s office 
remained divided in their level of support for this issue. Unlike Kansas, where the elements of 
state government presented a unified front, TDOR was the driving force behind SSUTA adoption 
in Tennessee. It was likely the work of TDOR that kept Tennessee active in the streamlining 
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process despite a governor that advocated an indefinite moratorium on involvement.
53
 Part of the 
reason for this perseverance could be the strong influence of Commissioner Loren Chumley, who 
at least one representative saw as doing “an excellent job in representing Tennessee in multi-state 
discussions of the SSUTA” (Rep. Briley, Hubbard and Young, 2005, p. 8) and was extensively 
involved in developing the Tennessee legislative agenda. Third, similar to Texas, local 
governments were heavily involved in the process, as evidenced by both individual and 
collective interests.  
 Finally, Table 34 describes the types of political strategies used by each of these interest 
groups. Several interesting findings emerged. Like Texas, local government interest groups (both 
associations and individual municipalities) had a strong lobbying presence, suggesting financial 
support; the lobbying arm of small businesses appears restricted to the NFIB and was hence 
more limited.
54
 However, while local government interests had a significant influence on the 
outcome of Tennessee‟s adoption, their interests did not railroad the state‟s move toward 
adoption. This is largely because of the role of TDOR within the state government. TDOR used 
extensive informative and constituency-building tactics, repeatedly testifying at legislative 
hearings and conducting extensive outreach and educational campaigns regarding the issue. This 
level of involvement is much stronger than what was seen in Texas, suggesting why TDOR was 
able to keep momentum alive for the movement. Moreover, many of the informative and 
                                                 
53
 Governor Bredesen continued to rely upon Commissioner Chumley‟s input in formulating his position toward the 
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constituency-based appeals by the TDOR focused on issues of simplification and fairness, rather 
than collecting additional SUT revenue; indeed, Commissioner Chumley repeatedly pressed the 
issue of simplification as the paramount goal of the SSUTA.
55
 This suggests that the presence of 
a strong entity in advocating policy can compensate for lack of executive support and opposing 
interest groups.  
Discussion 
Summary of Findings 
 
 Overall, the study‟s results suggest that governmental interest groups are important to 
adoption of state taxation policies. Research Question 1 examined whether the strength of 
opposing and/or supporting interest groups affected states‟ adoption of provisions of the SSUTA. 
Results show that states with a higher SUT rate are more likely to adopt provisions of the 
SSUTA, reinforcing Cameron‟s (2004) finding that a higher SUT rate led to higher participation 
in the SSTP. Moreover, states with a larger number of taxing jurisdictions were marginally less 
likely to adopt these provisions. Higher Republican support among voters increased the odds of 
adoption, while (surprisingly) the use of pre-SSUTA origin-based sourcing was not a deterrent to 
adoption.  
  Research Question 2 investigated how interest groups used political strategies in states‟ 
battles toward adoption. Based on a case study of Kansas (a fully conforming state), Texas (a 
non-adopter), and Tennessee (an associate member), business interests were not as important as 
those of local governments and state revenue departments. While both small businesses and local 
governments opposed the change in sourcing requirements necessitated by SSUTA adoption, 
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local government concerns over the change in sourcing requirements were ultimately more 
influential than small business concerns over the cost of the sourcing change. Kansas‟s success 
as a fully conforming adopter is likely due to local government support of the measure resulting 
from the imposition of a new local use tax. The lack of support by the local governments in other 
states created much greater political pressure against adoption. Similarly, the strong role played 
by the state revenue department in Kansas and Tennessee ultimately led to the states‟ 
involvement as governing board members, while this role was muted in Texas. These results 
complement the empirical model and suggest that the strength and involvement of governmental 
interest groups is particularly important in taxation policy adoption.     
Limitations 
 
The results of the study should be interpreted in light of its limitations. First, the 
empirical model uses cross-sectional data of 45 observations (states that impose SUT), limiting 
the statistical power of the tests. However, the use of logistic models is particularly applicable 
for smaller sample sizes and partially assuages this concern (see Maddala, 1991). Second, the 
empirical proxies used within the empirical model may not properly represent the underlying 
constructs; to mitigate this potential limitation, alternative analysis using alternative variable 
definitions is provided. Third, the investigation of political strategies used is limited to a case 
study of three states; caution should be used in interpreting beyond these cases. The examination 
of three different settings provides some assurance as to the general pattern of results (Cooper 
and Morgan, 2008). Fourth, the case study results are descriptive and qualitative. While it could 
be argued that the trends in the adoption process in these states are anecdotal, this develops a 
richer picture of states‟ cooperative endeavors beyond an empirical model. 
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Discussion  
 
The results of this study add to the literature on the factors leading to state conformance 
of taxation policies outside of federal preemption. This study adds to the body of work 
suggesting that interest groups influence state taxation policies (e.g., Anderson et al., 1989), and 
affect intrastate collaboration as well (e.g., Cameron, 2004). Second, despite the inability to 
make financial contributions, governmental interest groups are particularly important in state 
policy adoption, in contrast to the oft-ascribed role of the importance of businesses (e.g., Quinn 
and Shapiro, 1991; Suarez, 1998). Thus, models of state policy adoption should consider how 
measures would affect state or local governmental groups (e.g., Omer and Shelley, 2004).  
Finally, this study has significant practical importance, as it sheds light on why and how 
states have been able to implement the changes required to comply with the SSUTA. While the 
SSUTA has achieved tremendous progress, it has been unable to move forward in many states 
(Fox and Swain, 2007). The results of this study suggest that strong advocacy on the part of a 
state‟s revenue department is critical. Moreover, active involvement from the governor‟s office is 
important, but lack of such involvement is not insurmountable. States wishing to adopt the 
provisions of the SSUTA could be successful in bringing these changes about if representatives 
within the state government are strongly involved; furthermore, making appeals to issues outside 
of the collection of additional revenue (such as fairness or simplification) may be a more 
successful strategy. Understanding the role of governmental interest groups has significant 
practical implications beyond the SSUTA itself and could be extended to proposed inter-
jurisdictional tax policy changes. Indeed, the tax policy group of one of the Big 4 accounting 
firms recently predicted that a federally-levied consumption tax might be proposed by the new 
administration (Deloitte, 2008); this study suggests that the support of other jurisdictions for such 
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a tax would be critical. Overall, governmental interest groups are particularly important in 
achieving successful cooperative state action.  
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GENERAL CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation examined the antecedents and consequences of SUT policy through the 
performance of a comprehensive literature review and the development and execution of three 
separate, but interrelated, empirical studies. The literature review of recent SUT studies 
demonstrated an array of opportunities for studies on the consequences of SUT policy for 
businesses and individuals alike, as well as the for the consideration of the influence of non-
economic factors. Thus, this dissertation advances the SUT literature by addressing these gaps, 
offering important implications for academic researchers and policymakers alike.   
The first study investigated whether SUT rates and/or bases influenced capital 
expenditures and employment within the manufacturing industry. Using state-aggregated panel 
data from 1983-2006, results demonstrated that SUT exemptions (i.e., elements of the SUT base) 
are more important than SUT rates in encouraging these indicators of economic development. 
This general pattern was robust for controls of state and year fixed-effects. Despite the 
robustness of the results, however, the practical effect of SUT exemptions on economic 
development remains small. The study‟s results demonstrate that the elements of the tax base are 
more important than the tax rate itself, suggesting that future taxation researchers should seek to 
investigate the effect of the SUT base on business activity within other industries. These results 
may be of interest to policymakers in their attempt to balance economic development with the 
collection of tax revenue.  
The second study examined taxpayer compliance across tax settings (i.e., the state use tax 
compared to the federal income tax) and examined whether differences in detection mechanisms, 
social norms, or ignorance could explain these differences in compliance. Using an experimental 
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methodology with 148 experienced taxpayers, results indicated that taxpayer compliance 
intentions differed across settings, as did social norms regarding tax compliance itself. Taxpayers 
in the study had social norms that were more favorable toward tax compliance in a federal 
income tax setting than in a state use tax setting. Taxpayers also displayed higher compliance 
intentions for federal income tax than for state use tax; differences in compliance intentions were 
at least partially due to differences in social norms across different tax settings. Overall, the 
results indicate that the tax setting has an important influence on the social norms of tax 
compliance and on tax compliance behavior itself. This study contributes to the SUT literature 
by examining how this tax affects individual behavior, and is one of the first to use an 
experimental methodology investigating the influence of non-economic factors. The study‟s 
results regarding the importance of the tax setting demonstrate the necessity of precision in tax 
compliance researchers‟ examination of tax compliance and the associated explanatory variables. 
Policymakers seeking to improve state use tax compliance rates may need to first address 
taxpayers‟ social norms of compliance regarding the use tax.  
The third study investigated the antecedents of the adoption of the SSUTA using both a 
cross-sectional empirical model and a qualitative case study of three states. Results indicated that 
governmental interest groups played an important role in states‟ adoption of these SUT policies. 
Across the board, states with higher tax rates were more likely to adopt, as were those with fewer 
local taxing jurisdictions. A qualitative case study of three states with differing adoption 
outcomes corroborates these results, as local government and state revenue departments played a 
stronger role in the legislative process than did businesses. Future SUT researchers should 
therefore consider the role of governmental interest groups in influencing tax policy adoption. 
This study also contributes to the SUT field through the examination of a non-economic theory 
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(interest group theory) and the triangulation of alternative research methods (qualitative case 
study). Finally, the study‟s results offer practical implications regarding understanding the 
adoption of the SSUTA and other inter-jurisdictional tax policy changes.  
Overall, the three studies within this dissertation all advance the SUT literature by using 
various theoretical perspectives and methodological approaches to study the roots of SUT policy 
(antecedents) and the influence of SUT provisions on business and individual decisions 
(consequences). The empirical results all offer important public policy implications regarding the 
role of SUT.  
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Figure 1: Experimental Model of Hypothesized Relationships 
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Table 1: Evaluations of Existing SUT Structures 
 
Author/Year 
Sales & Use Tax 
(SUT) Component  Basis of Evaluation Key Conclusions 
Cordes et al., 
(2000) 
Telecommunications 
taxes (a specific sector 
tax) Efficiency, equity, and simplicity  
Taxes on telecommunications have 
failed to satisfy the typical criteria of an 
effective tax. 
Hausman 
(2000) 
Taxes on wireless 
communication (a 
specific sector tax) Economic efficiency effects  
Wireless communication taxes have a 
greater economic burden than revenue 
benefit, and reduce demand for certain 
types of services.  
Mikesell (2001) 
SUT treatment of 
production input 
purchases 
Principles of effective SUT systems, 
barriers to production input exemptions 
States that do not offer broad-based 
production input exemptions do not 
operate with sound SUT principles.  
Leskowicz 
(2001) 
Streamlined Sales and 
Use Tax Agreement 
Arguments by proponents and 
supporters 
Simplification of SUT must be weighed 
against the feasibility of state reforms. 
Hawkins (2002)  General SUT structures Economic efficiency 
High SUT rates coupled with retail 
exemptions lead to inefficiency, but 
results in reduced SUT paid for a 
majority of households. 
Cornia et al., 
(2004) 
Adoption of reforms of 
Streamlined Sales and 
Use Tax Agreement 
Administrative feasibility, compliance 
costs, political constraints, current SUT 
systems 
Many challenges may obstruct 
successful streamlining, but successful 
implementation may lead many vendors 
to voluntarily comply.  
Haas (2004) 
Streamlined Sales and 
Use Tax Agreement 
Arguments by proponents and 
supporters 
The SSUTA is likely to lead to pressure 
on Congress to act on state SUT issues. 
Dye (2004)  
Cyclicality of SUT 
revenues 
Long-run growth of revenue; short-run 
stability of revenue 
Business cycle fluctuations have 
different influences on states based on 
states' SUT rates and bases.  
McClure (2005) General SUT structure Distortive outcomes 
SUT systems are illogical, due to their 
differential treatment of goods/services, 
use tax collection rules, complexity, etc.  
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Table 2: Evaluations of Proposed SUT Structures 
 
Author/Year 
Proposed Sales & 
Use Tax (SUT) 
Component  Basis of Evaluation Key Conclusions 
Fox and Murray 
(1997)  
Optimal SUT treatment 
of e-commerce 
Equivalent taxation of all consumption; 
horizontal equity and neutrality  
An ideal SUT structure that would 
address e-commerce issues would 
include destination-based taxes, 
Congressional "nexus," exempt 
business purchases, and specificity of 
non-taxable transactions. 
Murray (1997) National retail SUT 
Tax evasion and tax avoidance in an 
"underground" economy 
Tax evasion and erosion in the tax base 
are likely if a national retail SUT is 
implemented; retailers may have greater 
evasion opportunities than with the 
income tax. 
Houghton and 
Cornia (2000) 
Review of the National 
Tax Association's 
project on e-commerce 
and 
telecommunications 
New ground broken in the National Tax 
Association's SUT project (e-commerce 
and telecommunications); political 
consequences  
The Project identified issues such as a 
single-rate, destination-based sourcing, 
and pure state-level sourcing. Political 
issues may impede progress in the long 
term. 
Cornia et el. 
(2000) 
Simplification of SUT 
(single state-wide rate) 
Evaluates administrative feasibility in 
five states (i.e., combined rate, political 
issues, allocation of proceeds) 
Implementing a single sales tax rate 
would be administratively feasible.  
Mikesell (2000) 
SUT revenue and 
administration  
Compliance burdens compared to 
uniform SUT systems 
Remote vendors also need to collect 
SUT for SUT to continue to be an 
effective source of revenue.  
Hellerstein 
(2000) 
Nationwide state SUT 
of e-commerce Constitutional and judicial limitations 
Despite concerns, Congress does have 
the power to legislate issues affecting 
state taxation.  
Grubert and 
Mackie (2000) 
Optimal SUT treatment 
of taxing financial 
services 
Efficiency-based argument (examining 
"consumption goods") 
A consumption tax should only tax 
consumption, and some financial 
services do not meet this definition (e.g., 
investment, insurance, and loan 
services). 
192 
 
Author/Year 
Proposed Sales & 
Use Tax (SUT) 
Component  Basis of Evaluation Key Conclusions 
Jack (2000) 
Optimal SUT treatment 
of taxing financial 
services, under a 
broad-based 
consumption tax.  
Relative prices, distortion, 
administrative feasibility  
If a tax on financial services is imposed, 
certain expenditures should not be taxed 
to avoid distortions.  
Lee (2002) 
Optimal 
telecommunication tax 
treatment (capital tax 
and SUT) 
Optimal tax theory (efficiency costs), 
pre-existing market distortions 
Property (capital) tax on 
telecommunications is more efficient 
than an SUT on telecommunications 
due to the existing tax on 
telecommunications services (labor).   
Rousslang 
(2002) 
Optimal SUT treatment 
of taxing financial 
services 
Revenue generated from tax, price for 
consumers, distortion 
The SUT rate on consumer goods and 
on financial services should generally be 
equivalent.  
Russo (2005) 
Proposed SUT reforms 
to broaden bases Efficiency, equity, and simplicity 
Base-broadening reforms have many 
potentially positive consequences, 
particularly via improved efficiency.  
Slemrod (2006) National retail SUT Individual attitudes toward taxation  
Individuals are much more likely to 
support a national retail SUT if they 
(mistakenly) believe the existing income 
tax structure is regressive. 
Zodrow (2006) 
Optimal SUT imposition 
on e-commerce  
Administrative and compliance costs, 
"optimal" commodity tax transactions, 
equity concerns  
Equal SUT treatment of traditional 
transactions and e-commerce is closer 
to “optimal” tax treatment than tax-
exemption of e-commerce. 
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Table 3: Empirical Studies on the Antecedents of SUT Policy  
 
Author/Year Sector Time Period Type of Data 
Sales & Use 
Tax (SUT) 
Component  
Independent 
Variables 
(Antecedents) Key Findings 
Murray 
(1995) Businesses 1986-1988 
Tennessee 
Department of 
Revenue 
business 
accounts 
SUT audit 
selection and 
compliance by 
businesses 
Taxpayer 
information (e.g., 
auditors, reported 
gross sales); 
opportunities for 
non-compliance, 
including SUT 
ambiguities  
Opportunities to cheat 
influence firm compliance 
with the SUT.  
 Ring (1999) General 1989 
State-level 
aggregated 
data 
Consumers' 
share of the 
general sales 
tax (incidence 
of sales tax) 
Household 
spending, SUT 
base, consumer 
expenditures 
On average, consumers 
directly incur approximately 
59% of the general SUT; the 
SUT on business purchases 
likely accounts for the 
remainder. 
Bruce and 
Fox (2000) 
General 
(focuses on 
retail) 
1999-2003 
forecasts 
National and 
state 
aggregated and 
forecasted data 
Estimated 
SUT revenue 
losses and 
base declines E-commerce sales 
E-commerce sales are 
estimated to result in billions 
of dollars of lost SUT 
revenue. 
Christensen 
et al., (2001) General 1999 
State- and 
national-level 
aggregated 
data 
SUT 
collections and 
payments by 
businesses 
Tax policy, 
administration, 
planning, and 
compliance  
"Indirect" (non-income based 
taxes) are the largest tax 
burden for corporations, of 
which sales taxes are a 
significant component. 
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Author/Year Sector Time Period Type of Data 
Sales & Use 
Tax (SUT) 
Component  
Independent 
Variables 
(Antecedents) Key Findings 
Tannenwald 
(2002) General 
Various data 
sources used 
discrete and 
continuous 
periods, 
1960-1999  
National 
aggregated 
data SUT revenues 
Mix of production 
and consumption, 
intangible assets, e-
commerce, and 
interjurisdictional 
competition 
Selective sales taxes have 
declined in importance due to 
decreased consumption of 
those areas. Consumption 
shifts have resulted in 
declines in SUT bases, but 
are not the sole cause of 
decline, as other factors have 
also played a role. 
Sjoquist and 
Wallace 
(2003) General 1972-2001 
County-
aggregated 
data from 159 
Georgia 
counties 
Local-option 
sales taxes 
Neighbor effect, 
exporting of sales 
and property tax, 
demographic 
variables 
Mimicking behavior drives 
Georgia counties to adopt a 
local-option sales tax 
Rork (2003) 
General, 
Cigarette, 
Gasoline 1967-1996 
State-
aggregated 
financial data 
Sales tax rates 
of neighboring 
states, SUT 
revenue Tax competition 
The general sales tax has an 
immobile base (compared to 
mobile areas such as tobacco 
or motor fuel). Mobile 
(immobile) SUT bases have 
positive (negative) reactions 
to changes in neighbors’ tax 
systems.  
Alm et al., 
(2004) Businesses 1994-1996 
Firm-level data 
from the State 
of New Mexico 
SUT audit 
likelihood, 
SUT 
compliance 
Deductions, firm 
size, corporate 
status, past 
reporting behavior, 
opportunities for 
non-compliance 
SUT auditors generally 
employ a systematic audit 
selection (e.g., target those 
with more deductions and 
variability). Firms are more 
likely to comply when there 
are fewer opportunities for 
cheating available. 
195 
 
 
Author/Year Sector Time Period Type of Data 
Sales & Use 
Tax (SUT) 
Component  
Independent 
Variables 
(Antecedents) Key Findings 
Cameron 
(2004) General 
2001 (cross-
sectional; 
used some 
data from 
1999) 
State-
aggregated 
data 
Participation in 
the 
Streamlined 
Sales & Use 
Tax Project 
Negative business 
vitality, negative 
innovation capacity, 
SUT rates 
States were more likely to 
voluntarily participate in the 
Streamlined Sales & Use Tax 
Project if they had higher 
SUT rates. 
Luna (2004) General 
Monthly from 
1977-1993 
County-level 
data on 
Tennessee's 95 
counties and 
those in the 8 
bordering states 
Local sales tax 
rates and 
bases in the 
short- and 
long-run 
Interjurisdictional tax 
competition 
In both the short- and long-
run, the rates of other 
jurisdictions influence a 
county's SUT rates. In the 
long-run, an increased sales 
tax rate is associated with a 
reduced sales tax base. 
Chernick 
(2005) General 
1977, 1985, 
1991 
National, 
regional and 
state 
aggregated 
data 
Progressivity 
of state and 
local tax 
systems, 
including SUT 
Neighbor effect, 
political variables, 
welfare spending 
States with progressive tax 
systems are likely to border 
states with regressive tax 
systems, and are NOT likely 
to be controlled by 
Republicans. 
Swain and 
Hellerstein 
(2005) General 1997-2005 
Historical 
analysis of 
events 
Streamlined 
Sales & Use 
Tax 
Agreement 
Advent of e-
commerce; political 
and economic forces 
Despite the lack of clear-cut 
economic benefits, 
streamlining represents a 
collective move toward 
simplicity and reform.  
Luna et al., 
(2007) General 1975-1999 
County-level 
data on 
Tennessee's 95 
counties and 
those in the 8 
bordering states 
Local option 
sales tax rate 
increases 
Lower sales tax 
capacity (1975-
1984), lower 
property tax capacity 
(1985-1999), 
proportion of 
Republican voters 
(1985-1999) 
Political and economic forces 
have influenced counties' 
adoption of the legal 
maximum sales tax rate; the 
relative importance of such 
factors (such as the relative 
ability to generate additional 
SUT revenue) has changed 
over time. 
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Author/Year Sector Time Period Type of Data 
Sales & Use 
Tax (SUT) 
Component  
Independent 
Variables 
(Antecedents) Key Findings 
Cline et al., 
(2007) General 
Fiscal Year 
2006 
State- and 
national-level 
aggregated 
data 
SUT payments 
on operating 
inputs and 
capital 
expenditures 
Economic structure, 
business tax 
features 
After property taxes, SUT 
payments by businesses are 
the largest portion of 
businesses' state and local 
tax burdens.  
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Table 4: Empirical Studies on the Consequences of SUT Policy  
Author/Year Sector Time Period Type of Data 
Sales & Use 
Tax (SUT) 
Component  
Dependent 
Variables 
(Consequences) Key Findings 
Petroni and 
Shackelford 
(1995) Insurance 1991 
Firm-level data 
from annual 
statements 
(tests at the 
state, group, 
and company 
level) 
State premium 
taxes on the 
insurance 
industry (a 
type of 
selective SUT) 
Organizational 
structure of insurers 
(subsidiary or 
license) 
Organizational structure is 
driven by the desire to 
minimize both tax and 
regulatory costs.  
Poterba 
(1996) Retail 
1925-1939; 
1947-1977 
Local-level 
aggregated 
data for select 
cities 
State and local 
retail sales 
taxes 
Prices of consumer 
goods (used to 
reflect the incidence 
of sales tax) 
Retail sales taxes shifted into 
retail prices in the post-war 
period, but did not fully shift 
during the Depression.  
Besley and 
Rosen 
(1999) Retail 
Quarterly 
data from 
1982-1990 
Local-level 
aggregated 
data for select 
cities 
State and local 
retail sales 
taxes 
Prices of consumer 
goods (used to 
reflect the incidence 
of sales tax) 
The incidence of the SUT 
differs based on the specific 
commodities; some are fully 
shifted (i.e., the after-tax price 
of goods increases by the 
amount of the sales tax), 
whereas others are over-
shifted (i.e., the after-tax price 
of goods rises by more than 
the sales tax). 
Petroni and 
Shackelford 
(1999) Insurance 1993 
Firm-level data 
from annual 
statements 
State premium 
taxes on the 
insurance 
industry (a 
type of 
selective SUT) 
Insurers' reported 
premiums 
Multi-state insurance 
companies manage the 
amount of reported premiums 
in a state to avoid premium 
tax liabilities. 
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Author/Year Sector Time Period Type of Data 
Sales & Use 
Tax (SUT) 
Component  
Dependent 
Variables 
(Consequences) Key Findings 
Ke et al., 
(2000) Insurance 1993-1995 
Firm-level data 
from annual 
statements, 
aggregated on 
to a state level 
State premium 
taxes on the 
insurance 
industry (a 
type of 
selective SUT) 
Property-casualty 
insured losses 
Higher state premium taxes 
lead to less insurance 
coverage in a state. 
Goolsbee 
(2000) Retail 
December 
1997 
Proprietary 
survey of 
110,000 
households 
SUT rates in 
effect for 
individual 
purchasers 
Online purchases by 
consumers 
Consumers that live in areas 
with high SUT rates are more 
likely to make purchases 
online (where they avoid 
paying use taxes). 
Merriman 
and 
Skidmore 
(2000) 
Service, 
Retail 
1982, 1987, 
1992 
State-level 
aggregated 
data 
SUT 
rates/bases 
Receipts (as a 
percentage of 
personal income) by 
sector, by state 
Differential SUT treatment of 
the retail and service sector 
may have contributed to the 
decline of receipts in the retail 
sector and the rise of receipts 
in the service sector.  
Angelini and 
Shaw (2004) Retail Unknown 
Survey of 
college alumni 
Imposition of 
SUT on 
Internet 
purchases 
Online purchases by 
consumers 
Most individuals would be 
unlikely to discontinue online 
purchases if required to pay 
SUT; this finding was the 
strongest among those with 
the greatest amount of online 
purchases.  
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Table 5: Summary of Variables  
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign Definition Data Source 
Dependent Variables     
SICCAPX N/A 
The natural log of new capital expenditures for 
businesses in the manufacturing sector (SIC 
code) for a state in a given year for 1983-1996 
Annual Survey of Manufacturers, available hardcopy 
1983-1992 and online 1993-1996 
NAICSCAPX N/A 
The natural log of new and used capital 
expenditures for businesses in the 
manufacturing sector (NAICS code) for a state in 
a given year for 1997-2006 
Annual Survey of Manufacturers, available online 
1997-2006 
SICEMPL N/A 
The natural log of total manufacturing 
employment (SIC code) for a state in a given 
year for 1983-2006 BEA's State Personal Income Database, 1983-1996 
NAICSEMPL N/A 
The natural log of total manufacturing 
employment (NAICS code) for a state in a given 
year for 1997-2006 BEA's State Personal Income Database, 1997-2006 
Test Variables - Sales and Use Tax (SUT) Factors – Lagged One Year   
SUTRATE - 
A state's SUT rate in effect on January 1 of a 
given year  
Council on State's Government's Book of the States, 
1982-2005; CCH's State Tax Handbook, various years 
MACHINE + 
Variable taking the value of 2 if fully exempted, 1 
if partially exempted, and 0 if fully taxed Site Selection magazine, 1982-2005 
MATERIALS + 
Variable taking the value of 2 if fully exempted, 1 
if partially exempted, and 0 if fully taxed Site Selection magazine, 1982-2005 
Tax System Factors – Lagged One Year   
CORPRATE - Highest state corporate income tax rate in effect  
Council on State's Government's Book of the States, 
1982-2005; CCH State Tax Handbook, various years 
COMBINE - 
Indicated by a dummy variable taking the value 
of 1 if combined reporting (unitary), 0 otherwise 
CCH's State Tax Handbook, 1993-2006;  for earlier 
years, used classification of Gupta and Hofmann 
(2003), based on CCH’s Multistate Corporate Income 
Tax Guide (various years) 
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Variable 
Predicted 
Sign Definition Data Source 
THROW - 
Indicated by a dummy variable taking the value 
of 1 if a throwback rule, 0 otherwise 
CCH's State Tax Handbook, 1993-2006; RIA’s All 
States’ Tax Handbook, 1982-1992 
PROPFAC - 
The property factor weight used in the state's 
apportionment formula for its corporate income 
tax (used only for the model estimating capital 
expenditures) 
CCH's State Tax Handbook, 1993-2006; RIA’s All 
States’ Tax Handbook, 1982-1992 
PAYFAC - 
The payroll factor weight used in the state's 
apportionment formula for its corporate income 
tax (used only for the model estimating 
employment) 
CCH's State Tax Handbook, 1993-2006; RIA’s All 
States’ Tax Handbook, 1982-1992 
PERRATE - 
Highest state individual (personal) income tax 
rate 
Council on State's Government's Book of the States, 
1982-2005 CCH State Tax Handbook, various years 
INCENT + 
The number of incentives available for the 
manufacturing sector Site Selection Magazine, 1982-2005 
BONUS + 
Adoption of federal bonus depreciation rules for 
qualifying years (used only for the model 
estimating capital expenditures for 1997-2006). CCH's State Tax Handbook, 2001-2004. 
Non-Tax Controls – Lagged One Year    
VALUE + 
The dollar amount, in millions, of value added by 
the state's manufacturing industry (measure of 
the size of a state’s manufacturing sector); 
calculated as the cost of manufacturing 
shipments less the costs of materials, supplies, 
containers, fuel, electricity, and contract work, 
adjusted by the change in inventories. 
Annual Survey of Manufacturers, available hardcopy 
1982-1992 and online 1993-2005 
GROWTH + 
Percentage change in total statewide personal 
income   BEA's State Personal Income Database, 1982-2005 
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Variable 
Predicted 
Sign Definition Data Source 
Controls for Capital Expenditures – Lagged One Year  
ENERGY - 
A state's average energy costs for the industrial 
sector (nominal dollars per million Btu) 
U.S. Department of Energy's Energy Information 
Administration's State Energy Data, available online, 
1982-2005 
PUBLIC + 
Total state direct general expenditures (in 
millions) 
U.S. Census Bureau's State and Local Government 
Finances, 1982-2005 (hard-copy 1982-1991; online 
1992-2005) 
    
Controls for Employment – Lagged One Year   
STAUNEMP - State unemployment rate 
U.S. Department of Labor's Local Area Unemployment 
Statistics, available online 1982-2005 
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Table 6: Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix, Capital Expenditures 
 (Pooled Sample, 1983 to 2006) 
 
 
Variable
a
 Mean S.D. SICCAPX NAICSCAPX SUTRATE MACHINE MATERIALS CORPRATE 
 SICCAPX
b
 13.80 1.31 1 
      NAICSCAPX
b
 14.23 1.22 N/A 1 
     SUTRATE 4.45 1.80 0.370 0.386 1 
    MACHINE 1.63 0.65 0.219 0.121 -0.076 1 
   MATERIALS 1.85 0.43 0.219 0.244 -0.107 0.103 1 
  CORPRATE 6.69 3.04 0.103 0.034 -0.036 0.275 0.135 1 
 COMBINE 0.27 0.45 -0.273 -0.288 -0.225 -0.010 -0.024 0.245 
 THROW 0.510 0.500 -0.158 -0.116 -0.220 0.206 0.130 0.022 
 PROPFAC 24.930 12.200 0.024 -0.131 -0.260 0.313 0.066 0.371 
 BONUS 0.110 0.435 N/A -0.119 -0.078 0.026 0.062 0.024 
 PERRATE 5.780 3.548 -0.058 -0.022 -0.093 0.209 0.049 0.514 
 INCENT 8.300 2.368 0.261 0.273 0.250 0.147 0.166 0.199 
 VALUE 30482 34402 0.786 0.799 0.310 0.149 0.132 0.040 
 ENERGY 6.550 2.560 -0.073 -0.207 0.091 0.070 -0.197 0.097 
 PUBLIC 10436 13264 0.647 0.637 0.276 0.105 0.149 0.046 
 GROWTH 5.890 2.627 0.041 0.001 -0.033 -0.024 -0.126 -0.083 
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        Variable COMBINE THROW PROPFAC BONUS PERRATE INCENT VALUE ENERGY PUBLIC 
COMBINE 1 
        THROW 0.425 1 
       PROPFAC 0.138 0.270 1 
      BONUS 0.047 0.050 0.038 1 
     PERRATE -0.078 0.201 0.334 -0.017 1 
    INCENT 0.218 -0.140 -0.060 0.108 0.126 1 
   VALUE -0.077 -0.064 -0.149 -0.018 -0.042 0.217 1 
  ENERGY 0.089 0.005 -0.038 0.045 0.058 0.095 0.041 1 
 PUBLIC -0.012 -0.065 -0.129 0.059 -0.017 0.254 0.887 0.133 1 
GROWTH -0.004 -0.033 0.032 -0.177 -0.061 -0.235 -0.084 -0.017 -0.125 
          aSee Table 5 for variable definitions. The dependent variables SICCAPX and NAICSCAPX use the natural log  
  of their measured values and are measured in the current year; all independent variables are lagged one year.  
  
          bCorrelations between SICCAPX and independent variables are based on 700 state-year observations;  
  correlations greater than .075 (absolute value) are statistically significant at p=.05 (two-tailed). 
   
          Correlations between NAICSCAPX and independent variables are based on 500 observations; correlations 
  greater than .088 (absolute value) are statistically significant at p=.05 (two-tailed).  
    
          Correlations between independent variables are based on 1,200 state-year observations; correlations greater 
  than .057 (absolute value) are statistically significant at p=.05 (two-tailed). 
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Table 7: New Capital Expenditures for All States, 1983-1996 
 
Variable  
Predicted 
Sign Pooled Model  
 
Model with State Dummies 
 
Model with State and 
Year Dummies 
  
Coefficient T-Statistic
b
 
 
Coefficient T-Statistic
b
 
 
Coefficient T-Statistic
b
 
Test Variables 
        SUTRATE - 0.110 6.42** 
 
0.114 4.05** 
 
0.010 0.43 
MACHINE + 0.127 2.69** 
 
0.021 0.67 
 
0.051 2.83* 
MATERIALS + 0.408 8.48** 
 
0.130 3.30** 
 
0.059 1.65# 
Control Variables 
        Constant N/A 10.995 57.51** 
 
N/A N/A 
 
N/A N/A 
CORPRATE - 0.014 1.39 
 
0.001 0.04 
 
1.39x10
-4
 -0.01 
COMBINE - -0.450 -6.71** 
 
0.204 1.40 
 
0.163 1.94# 
THROW - -0.127 -2.30* 
 
-0.204 -3.79** 
 
-0.079 -1.38 
PROPFAC - 0.009 4.41** 
 
-0.004 -1.00 
 
1.38x10
-4
 0.05 
PERRATE - -0.006 -0.77 
 
-0.008 -1.15 
 
0.005 0.85 
INCENT + 0.058 5.40** 
 
0.052 5.99** 
 
-0.005 -0.71 
VALUE + 5.41x10
-5
 23.73** 
 
1.87x10
-5
 5.49** 
 
8.73x10
-6
 2.75** 
ENERGY - -0.040 -2.68** 
 
-0.045 -2.70** 
 
-0.005 -0.31 
PUBLIC +/- -5.45x10
-5
 -9.40** 
 
-1.34x10
-5
 -3.11** 
 
-1.85x10
-5
 -5.55** 
GROWTH + 0.039 3.47** 
 
0.012 2.25* 
 
0.030 4.53** 
          
Overall Model Adjusted R
2
 0.78 
  
0.96 
  
0.97 
          aSee Table 5 for variable definitions. The dependent variable (SICCAPX) is the natural log of new capital 
 expenditures in the manufacturing industry (SIC) for the current year. All 
independent variables are lagged 1 year. 
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b
All t-statistics are corrected for heteroskedasticity using robust standard errors.  
   
          #, p < .10; *, p < .05; **, p < .01 (two-tailed tests) 
       
Model Tested: SICCAPXi = ά + B1SUTRATEi + B2MACHINEi + B3MATERIALSi + B4CORPRATEi+ B5COMBINEi+ B6THROWi + B6PROPFACi + 
B7PERRATEi + B8INCENTi + B9BONUSi + B10VALUEi + B11ENERGYi + B12PUBLICi + B13GROWTHi + έi   
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Table 8: New and Used Capital Expenditures for All States, 1997-2006 
 
Variable  
Predicted 
Sign Pooled Model  
 
Model with State 
Dummies 
 
Model with State and 
Year Dummies 
  
Coefficient T-Statistic
b
 
 
Coefficient T-Statistic
b
 
 
Coefficient T-Statistic
b
 
Test Variables 
        SUTRATE - 0.091 3.91** 
 
0.009 0.19 
 
-0.319 -0.63 
MACHINE + -0.009 -0.11 
 
0.081 1.36 
 
0.067 1.19 
MATERIALS + 0.326 3.29** 
 
0.065 0.51 
 
0.084 0.61 
Control Variables 
        Constant N/A 11.878 28.40** 
 
N/A N/A 
 
N/A N/A 
CORPRATE - 0.025 1.88# 
 
-0.008 -0.59 
 
-0.019 -1.25 
COMBINE - -0.401 -5.27** 
 
0.255 1.86# 
 
0.238 1.66# 
THROW - 0.027 0.49 
 
0.026 0.006 
 
0.025 0.46 
PROPFAC - 0.004 1.48 
 
0.008 4.37** 
 
0.005 2.36* 
PERRATE - -0.007 -0.53 
 
-0.007 -0.45 
 
-0.010 -0.67 
INCENT + 0.065 4.06** 
 
-0.073 -3.88** 
 
-0.074 -3.71** 
BONUS + -0.018 -0.22 
 
-0.112 -3.40** 
 
0.011 0.26 
VALUE + 2.67x10
-5
 18.37** 
 
6.85x10
-6
 4.77** 
 
4.03x10
-6
 2.62** 
ENERGY - -0.051 -5.50** 
 
0.002 0.25 
 
0.010 0.78 
PUBLIC +/- -1.01x10
-5
 -5.22** 
 
-4.17x10
-6
 -3.02** 
 
-1.62x10
-6
 -1.05 
GROWTH + 0.030 2.22* 
 
0.027 5.22** 
 
0.018 2.81** 
          
Overall Model Adjusted R
2
 0.75 
  
0.97 
  
0.97 
          aSee Table 5 for variable definitions. The dependent variable (NAICSCAPX) is the natural log of total capital 
expenditures in the manufacturing industry (NAICS) for the current year. 
    All independent variables are lagged 1 year.  
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          bAll t-statistics are corrected for heteroskedasticity using robust standard errors.  
   
          #, p < .10; *, p < .05; **, p < .01 (two-tailed tests) 
       
Model Tested: NAICSCAPXi = ά + B1SUTRATEi + B2MACHINEi + B3MATERIALSi + B4CORPRATEi+ B5COMBINEi+ B6THROWi + B7PROPFACi + 
B8PERRATEi + B9INCENTi + B10BONUSi + B11VALUEi + B12ENERGYi + B13PUBLICi + B14GROWTHi + έi  
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Table 9: Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix for Employment   
 (Pooled Sample, 1983 to 2006) 
  
 
 
Variable
a
 Mean S.D. SICEMPL NAICSEMPL SUTRATE MACHINE MATERIALS CORPRATE 
SICEMPL
b
 12.25 1.26 1 
     
NAICSEMPL
b
 12.11 1.20 N/A 1 
    SUTRATE 4.45 1.80 0.360 0.411 1 
   MACHINE 1.63 0.65 0.229 0.140 -0.076 1 
  MATERIALS 1.85 0.43 0.175 0.223 -0.107 0.103 1 
 CORPRATE 6.69 3.04 0.116 0.019 -0.036 0.275 0.135 1 
COMBINE 0.27 0.45 -0.274 -0.279 -0.225 -0.010 -0.024 0.245 
THROW 0.51 0.50 -0.151 -0.134 -0.220 0.206 0.130 0.022 
PAYFAC 23.93 12.20 0.044 -0.155 -0.194 0.356 0.062 0.416 
PERRATE 5.78 3.55 -0.060 -0.052 -0.093 0.209 0.049 0.514 
INCENT 8.30 2.37 0.218 0.293 0.250 0.147 0.166 0.199 
STAUNEMP 5.79 2.03 0.121 0.127 -0.034 0.026 -0.022 -0.071 
VALUE 30,482 34,402 0.777 0.808 0.310 0.149 0.132 0.040 
GROWTH 5.89  2.63  0.077 -0.025 -0.033 -0.024 -0.126 -0.083 
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Variable COMBINE THROW PAYFAC PERRATE INCENT STAUNEMP VALUE 
 COMBINE 1 
       THROW 0.425 1 
      PAYFAC 0.189 0.231 1 
     PERRATE -0.078 0.201 0.338 1 
    INCENT 0.218 -0.140 -0.005 0.126 1 
   STAUNEMP -0.118 0.106 0.165 -0.010 -0.239 1 
  VALUE -0.054 -0.068 -0.086 -0.067 0.173 0.120 1 
 GROWTH -0.004 -0.033 0.032 -0.061 -0.235 -0.092 -0.084 
 
         aSee Table 5 for variable definitions. The dependent variables SICEMPL and NAICSEMPL use the natural log  
 of their measured values and are measured in the current year; all independent variables are lagged one year.  
 
         bCorrelations between SICEMPL and independent variables are based on 700 state-year observations;  
  correlations greater than .075 (absolute value) are statistically significant at p=.05 (two-tailed). 
  
         Correlations between NAICSEMPL and independent variables are based on 500 observations; correlations 
 greater than .088 (absolute value) are statistically significant at p=.05 (two-tailed).  
   
         Correlations between independent variables are based on 1,200 state-year observations; correlations greater 
 than .057 (absolute value) are statistically significant at p=.05 (two-tailed). 
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Table 10: Manufacturing Employment for All States, 1983-1996 
 
Variable  
Predicted 
Sign Pooled Model  
 
Model with State 
Dummies 
 
Model with State and 
Year Dummies 
  
Coefficient T-Statistic
b
 
 
Coefficient T-Statistic
b
 
 
Coefficient T-Statistic
b
 
Test Variables 
        SUTRATE - 0.096 5.61** 
 
0.055 6.39** 
 
0.052 5.74** 
MACHINE + 0.199 4.66** 
 
0.022 2.34* 
 
0.025 2.86** 
MATERIALS + 0.258 5.02** 
 
0.002 0.14 
 
-0.008 -0.61 
Control Variables 
        Constant N/A 9.338 41.55** 
 
N/A N/A 
 
N/A N/A 
CORPRATE - 0.032 2.91** 
 
-0.011 -1.69# 
 
-0.006 -0.92 
COMBINE - -0.542 -6.80** 
 
0.036 1.01 
 
0.035 1.39 
THROW - -0.272 -0.46 
 
-0.030 -1.95# 
 
-0.010 -0.41 
PAYFAC - 0.003 1.23 
 
0.001 0.49 
 
0.002 1.40 
PERRATE - -0.015 -1.69# 
 
0.007 2.43* 
 
0.007 2.22* 
INCENT + 0.031 2.68** 
 
-0.006 -1.82# 
 
-0.008 -2.31* 
STAUNEMP - 0.043 3.24** 
 
-0.020 -7.01** 
 
-0.026 -5.79** 
VALUE + 3.13x10
-5
 20.31** 
 
-3.05x10
-6
 -6.10** 
 
-3.88x10
-6
 -5.94** 
GROWTH + 0.062 5.26** 
 
0.003 1.21 
 
0.007 1.94# 
          
Overall Model Adjusted R
2
 0.72 
  
0.99 
  
0.99 
          aSee Table 1 for variable definitions. The dependent variable (SICEMPL) is the natural log  
  of employment in the manufacturing industry (SIC) for the current year. 
    All independent variables are lagged 1 year.  
      
          bAll t-statistics are corrected for heteroskedasticity using robust standard errors.  
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#, p < .10; *, p < .05; **, p < .01 (two-tailed tests) 
       
 
Model Tested: SICEMPLi = ά + B1SUTRATEi + B2MACHINEi + B3MATERIALSi + B4CORPRATEi+ B5COMBINEi+ B6THROWi + B7PAYFACi + 
B8PERRATEi + B9INCENTi + B10VALUEi + B11STAUNEMPi + B12GROWTHi+ έi 
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Table 11: Manufacturing Employment for All States, 1997-2006 
 
Variable  
Predicted 
Sign Pooled Model  
 
Model with State 
Dummies 
 
Model with State and 
Time Dummies 
  
Coefficient T-Statistic
b
 
 
Coefficient T-Statistic
b
 
 
Coefficient T-Statistic
b
 
Test Variables 
        SUTRATE - 0.103 4.77** 
 
-0.036 -2.82** 
 
-0.004 -0.045 
MACHINE + 0.151 2.04* 
 
0.044 2.21* 
 
0.043 3.40** 
MATERIALS + 0.502 4.96** 
 
0.104 2.98** 
 
0.200 4.26** 
Control Variables 
        Constant N/A 9.272 24.39** 
 
N/A N/A 
 
N/A N/A 
CORPRATE - 0.020 1.65# 
 
0.005 0.75 
 
-0.004 -1.28 
COMBINE - -0.335 -4.30** 
 
0.059 2.46* 
 
-0.006 -0.26 
THROW - 0.008 0.01 
 
-0.001 -0.07 
 
0.010 0.98 
PAYFAC - -0.003 -1.18 
 
0.005 7.93** 
 
0.001 2.47* 
PERRATE - -0.027 -2.16* 
 
0.001 0.22 
 
-0.019 -3.11** 
INCENT + 0.073 4.26** 
 
-0.032 -6.54** 
 
-0.011 -3.03** 
STAUNEMP - -0.048 -1.65# 
 
-0.011 -2.35* 
 
-0.013 -3.27** 
VALUE + 1.02x10
-4
 17.49** 
 
-2.58x10
-6
 -3.43** 
 
2.26x10
-7
 0.59 
GROWTH + 0.013 0.89 
 
0.010 5.51** 
 
0.004 2.36* 
          
Overall Model Adjusted R
2
 0.73 
  
0.99 
  
0.99 
          aSee Table 5 for variable definitions. The dependent variable (NAICSEMPL) is the natural log of employment 
 in the manufacturing industry (SIC) for the current 
year. All independent variables are lagged 1 year. 
      
       bAll t-statistics are corrected for heteroskedasticity using robust standard errors.  
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#, p < .10; *, p < .05; **, p < .01 (two-tailed tests) 
       
Model Tested: NAICSEMPLi = ά + B1SUTRATEi + B2MACHINEi + B3MATERIALSi + B4CORPRATEi+ B5COMBINEi+ B6THROWi + B7PAYFACi + 
B8PERRATEi + B9INCENTi + B10VALUEi + B11STAUNEMPi + B12GROWTHi+ έi
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Table 12: Sample Demographics 
Sample
a 
2007 National Population
b 
Age 
Under 25       = 0% 
25-44 = 30% 
45-64 = 68% 
65+               =   2% 
Age 
20-24 = 10% 
25-44 = 38.5% 
45-64 = 34.5% 
65+            = 17% 
Family Income 
Under $25,000        = 5% 
$25,000 - $49,999   = 25.5% 
$50,000 - $74,999   = 18.5% 
$75,000 - $99,999   = 22% 
Over $100,000        = 29% 
Family Income 
Under $25,000         = 17% 
$25,000 - $49,999    = 24% 
$50,000 - $74,999    = 20.5% 
$75,000 - $99,999    = 14.5% 
Over $100,000         = 24% 
Sex 
Male        = 35% 
Female    =  65% 
Sex 
Male       = 49% 
Female    = 51% 
Education 
Did not Complete  
High School                      = 2% 
High School Graduate      =14% 
Some College                   = 35.5% 
Bachelor‟s Degree            = 30% 
Post-Graduate Degree      = 18.5% 
Education 
Did not Complete  
High School                     =16% 
High School Graduate     =30% 
Some College                   =27% 
College Graduate             =17% 
Post-Graduate Degree      = 10% 
Who Usually Prepares Tax Return? 
Myself and/or Spouse               =  41% 
Friend/Other Family Member   = 7.5% 
Paid Preparer                             = 51.5% 
 
a
Numbers are expressed as a percentage of the total sample of respondents providing information for each 
demographic question.   
b
U.S. Census Bureau: Age in each category is based on the proportion of adults age 20 and older; Family 
Income numbers represent the percentage of families for each category; Education numbers represents 
percentage of persons over 25 for each category. 
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Table 13: Experimental Manipulations  
 
Panel A: Manipulation of Tax Setting (Scenario)    
 
Federal Income Tax (Gain) 
The Smiths sold a personal painting for more than they had originally paid for it when they 
bought it, and therefore sold it for a gain. Based on federal income tax laws (of which the 
Smiths are aware), taxpayers are required to pay federal income tax on these gains. Thus, 
gains of this type are included in taxable income just like income from other sources. The 
gain should be reported on the Smiths‟ federal income tax return. The amount of income tax 
due as a result of this gain is $500. The Smiths sold the painting through an online 
marketplace website. 
Federal Income Tax (Cash Receipts) 
The Smiths received payment in cash for some of the services their business provided. Based 
on federal income tax laws (of which the Smiths are aware), taxpayers who receive cash 
payments for services are required to pay federal income tax on these receipts. Thus, cash 
receipts are included in taxable income just like income from other sources. The cash receipts 
should be reported on the Smiths‟ federal income tax return. The amount of income tax due 
as a result of these cash receipts is $500. The Smiths were contracted for these services 
through an online marketplace website. 
State Use Tax (Out-of-State Purchase)  
The Smiths purchased some jewelry from an out-of-state seller, but the seller did not charge 
the Smiths sales tax on their purchase. Based on state tax laws (of which the Smiths are 
aware), taxpayers who do not pay sales tax on their out-of-state purchases must instead pay 
state use tax. The use tax is equal to the amount of sales tax that would have been charged if 
the purchase had been made in-state. The use tax should be reported by filing a tax return 
with the Smiths‟ state sales and use tax department. The amount of use tax due as a result of 
this purchase is $500. The Smiths purchased the jewelry through an online marketplace 
website. 
 
Panel B: Manipulation of Detection Mechanism  
 
Absent 
No information provided.  
 
Present – Gain 
The Smiths are aware that the website automatically notifies the Internal Revenue Service of 
any sales of this magnitude. 
Present – Cash Receipts 
The Smiths are aware that the website automatically notifies the Internal Revenue Service of 
any contracts of this magnitude. 
Present – Use Tax 
The Smiths are aware that the website automatically notifies the buyer‟s state sales and use 
tax department of any purchases of this magnitude. 
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Table 14: Factor Analysis of Social Norm Questions  
          
Item 
Factor 1 
Loading 
Factor 2 
Loading 
Factor 3 
Loading 
Factor 4 
Loading 
Most people you know [would 
disapprove].... .749       
Your family [would 
disapprove].... .781       
Your friends [would 
disapprove].... .803       
Your co-workers [would 
disapprove]..... .790       
          
Would you feel guilty...   .762     
Would you feel ashamed....   .758     
How much of a moral 
obligation...do you feel to fully 
disclose and pay....   .802     
I think I should pay...taxes on 
all taxable...   .789     
          
....What percentage of U.S. 
taxpayers would.....     .854   
...What percentage of U.S. 
taxpayers at your income 
level....     .864   
          
Would most people feel 
justified...       .865 
Would most people feel 
pleased....       .687 
          
Description 
Subjective 
Norms 
Personal 
Norms 
Descriptive 
Norms 
Injunctive 
Norms 
          
Percentage of Variance 
Explained 49% 12% 9% 8% 
 
 
Note: Factor loadings are a result of Varimax rotation. Items are coded so that higher scores 
indicate more favorable social norms toward tax compliance.   
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Table 15: Tests of Social Norm Differences 
 
Panel A: MANOVA of Social Norms 
 
Variable Wilks' Lambda F-Statistic P-Value (two-tailed) 
Constant 1.000 0.001 1.000 
Tax Setting (Scenario) 0.824 3.288 0.001 
        
Dependent Variable = Social Norm Factor Scores (all tested simultaneously)  
  
  
 
 
Panel B: Separate ANOVAs of Social Norms 
 
Mean Factor Score by Tax Setting 
  
Use Tax 
Scenario 
Gain 
Scenario 
Cash Receipts 
Scenario F-Score 
P-Value 
(two-
tailed) 
Subjective Norms Factor .126 –.086 –.034 0.544 0.582 
Personal Norms Factor  –.225* –.007 .232* 2.351 0.099 
Descriptive Norms Factor  –.247** –.224** .486** 8.571 <.001 
Injunctive Norms Factor .137 .062 –.203 1.423 0.245 
 
Dependent Variable = Social Norm Factor Scores (each tested separately)  
 
*Use tax and cash receipts scenarios are significantly different at p < .05 (two-tailed) 
 
**Cash receipts scenario is significantly different from both the use tax and gain scenarios at 
p < .001 (two-tailed). 
 
Note: The Social Norm scale is explained in Table 14. 
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Table 16: Test of Tax Compliance Intentions Differences 
 
Panel A: Means (Standard Deviation) of Tax Compliance Intentions by Condition  
 
 
 
Use Tax 
Scenario 
 
Gain Scenario 
 
Cash Receipts 
Scenario 
 
Row Means 
(Detection) 
 
No Detection 
Mechanism 
 
3.73 (2.334) 
n = 22 
 
3.83 (2.297) 
n = 24 
 
5.72 (1.926)* 
n = 25 
 
4.46  (2.347) 
 
Detection 
Mechanism 
Present 
 
4.27 (2.376)** 
n = 26 
 
4.92 (1.917)*** 
n = 26 
 
5.60 (2.062) 
n = 25 
 
4.92 (2.169) 
 
Column Means 
(Tax Setting 
Scenario) 
 
 
4.02 (2.347) 
 
 
 
4.40 (2.157) 
 
 
5.66 (1.975)* 
 
 
 
4.70 (2.260) 
 
*Cash receipts scenario is significantly different from the other two scenarios at p < .01 (two-tailed). 
**Use tax scenario is significantly different from the cash receipts scenario at p < .05 (two-tailed). 
***Gain scenario with detection mechanism present is significantly different from the “no detection 
mechanism” gain scenario at p < .08 (two-tailed).  
 
Panel B: ANOVA of Tax Compliance Intentions  
 
  
F-Statistic 
 
Significance Level 
(Two-Tailed) 
 
Tax Setting (Scenario)* 
Detection Mechanism 
Tax Setting x Detection Interaction 
 
 
8.040 
2.016 
0.987 
 
 
<.001 
.158 
.375 
 
 
Model Statistics: 
F-Statistic = 3.927 
Significance Level = .002 
Adjusted R
2
 = .091 
  
 
Tax Compliance Intentions are measured on a 7-point Likert-type scale, with 1 = “very unlikely” and 7 = “very 
likely” that participants would comply and pay the taxes. Tax Setting (Scenario) and Detection Mechanism 
represent the two manipulations.   
 
*Tukey HSD post-hoc analysis indicates a statistically significant difference between the cash receipts scenario 
and both other scenarios (the gain and the use tax scenario; both p < .01, two-tailed).  
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Table 17: ANCOVA of Tax Compliance Intentions  
 
  
F-Statistic 
 
Significance Level 
(Two-Tailed) 
 
Manipulated Variables and Interactions 
Tax Setting (Scenario) 
Detection Mechanism 
Type of Tax x Detection Interaction 
Measured Variables (Covariates) 
Subjective Norms Factor 
Personal Norms Factor 
Descriptive Norms Factor 
Injunctive Norms Factors 
Widespread Ignorance 
Familiarity  
Interaction Terms (Covariates)  
Tax Setting x Subjective Norms Factor Interaction 
Tax Setting x Personal Norms Factor Interaction 
Tax Setting x Descriptive Norms Factor Interaction 
Tax Setting x Injunctive Norms Factor Interaction 
Tax Setting x Widespread Ignorance Interaction 
Tax Setting x Familiarity Interaction 
 
 
0.846 
1.502 
0.505 
 
15.899 
47.882 
27.750 
0.783 
.007 
2.550 
 
0.339 
0.010 
4.936 
0.096 
.291 
1.284 
 
 
.432 
.223 
.605 
 
<.001 
<.001 
<.001 
.378 
.932 
.113 
 
.562 
.922 
.028 
.758 
.591 
.259 
 
Model Statistics: 
F-Statistic = 13.750 
Significance Level <.001 
Adjusted R
2
 = .622 
  
 
 
Tax Compliance Intentions are measured on a 7-point Likert-type scale, with 1 = “very unlikely” and 7 = “very 
likely” that participants would comply and pay the taxes. Tax Setting (Scenario) and Detection Mechanism 
represent the two manipulations. Social Norms Factors are the factor scores obtained from the factor analysis 
described in Table 2. Widespread ignorance measures participants‟ response to “most people do not know they 
are responsible for paying [type of tax]….” and is measured on a 7-point Likert-type scale, with 1 = “strongly 
disagree” and 7 = “strongly agree.” Familiarity measures participants‟ response to “how familiar are you with 
the …tax laws concerning [type of tax]” and is measured on a 7-point Likert-type scale, with 1 = “not at all” 
and 7= “very”.  
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Table 18: Separate Regressions of Tax Compliance Intentions  
 
Variable
a
  Use Tax Scenario
b
 Gain Scenario
b
 
Cash Receipts 
Scenario
b
 
  Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Constant 3.074 (1.247)** 4.281 (1.048)*** 5.666 (1.105)*** 
Detection Mechanism 0.429 (.395) 0.398 (.453) -0.093 (.498) 
Subjective Norms Factor 0.719 (.172)*** 0.795 (.232)*** 0.919 (0.307)** 
Personal Norms Factor 1.253 (.174)*** 1.379 (.267)*** 1.165 (.269)*** 
Descriptive Norms Factor 1.278 (.263)*** 1.024 (.239)*** 0.516 (.239)* 
Injunctive Norms Factor -0.224 (.172) -0.041 (.256) -0.122 (.265) 
Widespread Ignorance -0.086 (.156) -0.029 (.121) -.154 (.137) 
Familiarity 0.315 (.140)* -0.024 (.168) 0.054 (.123) 
        
  Adjusted R
2
 Adjusted R
2
 Adjusted R
2
 
Overall Model  0.733 0.553 0.382 
 
 
***Statistically significant at p <.001 (two-tailed)  
**Statistically significant at p < .01 (two-tailed)  
*Statistically significant at p <.05 (two-tailed)  
 
a
Regression model tested separately for each tax setting (scenario), Tax Compliance Intentions = ß0 + 
ß1Detection Mechanism + ß2Subjective Norms Factor + ß3Personal Norms Factor + ß4Descriptive Norms Factor 
+ ß5Injunctive Norms Factor + ß6Widespread Ignorance + ß7Familiarity  
 
b
Coefficients (Standard Errors) for OLS Regression Models for each Tax Setting (Scenario)   
 
Tax Compliance Intentions are measured on a 7-point Likert-type scale, with 1 = “very unlikely” and 7 = “very 
likely” that participants would comply and pay the taxes. Tax Setting (Scenario) and Detection Mechanism 
represent the two manipulations. Social Norms Factors are the factor scores obtained from the factor analysis 
described in Table 2. Ignorance measures participants‟ response to “most people do not know they are 
responsible for paying [type of tax]….” and is measured on a 7-point Likert-type scale, with 1 = “strongly 
disagree” and 7 = “strongly agree.” Familiarity measures participants‟ response to “how familiar are you with 
the …tax laws concerning [type of tax]” and is measured on a 7-point Likert-type scale, with 1 = “not at all” 
and 7= “very”.  
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Table 19: Supplemental Regression Analysis  
 
Variable
a
  
Use Tax 
Scenario
b
 Gain Scenario
b
 
Cash Receipts 
Scenario
b
 Overall
b
 
  Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Constant 2.939(1.402)* 4.879 (1.031)*** 3.916 (1.032)*** 4.392 (1.043)*** 
Perceived Detection Risk 0.238 (.151) 0.015(.149) 0.327 (.146)* 0.106 (.120) 
Subjective Norms Factor  0.613 (.184)** 0.797 (.250)** 0.807 (.292)** 0.699 (.130)*** 
Personal Norms Factor 1.043 (.225)*** 1.372 (.285)*** 1.117(.246)*** 1.181 (.137)*** 
Descriptive Norms Factor 1.035 (.279)*** 1.045 (.257)*** 0.361(.233) 1.214 (.261)*** 
Injunctive Norms Factor -0.228 (.169) 0.002(.253) -0.090 (.247) -0.099 (.119) 
Widespread Ignorance -0.003 (.167) -0.032 (.123) -0.165 (.128) -0.061 (.070) 
Familiarity 0.289 (.151)* -0.041(.174) 0.142(.121) 0.131 (0.76) 
Tax Setting (Scenario) N/A N/A N/A -0.236 (.420) 
Tax Setting x Perceived 
Detection Risk Interaction N/A 
 
N/A 
 
N/A 0.084 (0.089) 
Tax Setting x Descriptive 
Norms Interaction   
 
N/A 
 
N/A 
 
N/A -0.366 (.175)*  
    
 
  Adjusted R
2
 Adjusted R
2
 Adjusted R
2
 Adjusted R
2
 
Overall Model  0.742 0.544 0.457 0.647 
 
 
***Statistically significant at p <.001 (two-tailed)  
**Statistically significant at p < .01 (two-tailed)  
*Statistically significant at p <.05 (two-tailed)  
 
a
 Regression model tested separately for each tax setting (scenario), Tax Compliance Intentions = ß0 + 
ß1Perceived Detection Risk + ß2Subjective Norms Factor + ß3Personal Norms Factor + ß4Descriptive Norms 
Factor + ß5Injunctive Norms Factor + ß6Widespread Ignorance + ß7Familiarity. Overall regression model tested 
(all participants), Tax Compliance Intentions = ß0 + ß1Perceived Detection Risk + ß2Subjective Norms Factor + 
ß3Personal Norms Factor + ß4Descriptive Norms Factor + ß5Injunctive Norms Factor + ß6Widespread Ignorance 
+ ß7Familiarity + ß8Tax Setting + ß9Tax Setting x Perceived Detection Risk Interaction + ß109Tax Setting x 
Descriptive Norms Interaction  
 
b
Coefficients (Standard Errors) for OLS Regression Models.  
 
Tax Compliance Intentions are measured on a 7-point Likert-type scale, with 1 = “very unlikely” and 7 = “very 
likely” that participants would comply and pay the taxes. Perceived Detection Risk measures participants‟ 
response to “placed in a similar situation, if you failed to report…what do you think is the likelihood that you 
would be audited?” and is measured on a 7-point Likert-type scale, with 1 = “very unlikely” and 7 = “very 
likely.” Social Norms Factors are the factor scores obtained from the factor analysis described in Table 2. 
Ignorance measures participants‟ response to “most people do not know they are responsible for paying [type of 
tax]….” and is measured on a 7-point Likert-type scale, with 1 = “strongly disagree” and 7 = “strongly agree.” 
Familiarity measures participants‟ response to “how familiar are you with the …tax laws concerning [type of 
tax]” and is measured on a 7-point Likert-type scale, with 1 = “not at all” and 7= “very”. Tax Setting (Scenario) 
is manipulated. 
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Table 20: Supplemental ANCOVA Analysis 
 
  
F-Statistic 
 
Significance Level 
(Two-Tailed) 
 
Manipulated Variables and Interactions 
Tax Setting (Scenario) 
Detection Mechanism 
Type of Tax x Detection Interaction 
Significant Covariates (from Table 6) 
Subjective Norms Factor  
Personal Norms Factor 
Descriptive Norms Factor 
Type of Tax x Descriptive Norms Factor Interaction 
Significant Demographic/Control Variables 
Household Income 
Fairness 
 
 
1.491 
1.395 
0.268 
 
29.676 
69.927 
25.102 
4.041 
 
3.609 
5.699 
 
 
.230 
.240 
.765 
 
<.001 
<.001 
<.001 
.047 
 
.060 
.019 
 
Model Statistics: 
F-Statistic = 22.543 
Significance Level <.001 
Adjusted R
2
 = .653 
  
 
Tax Compliance Intentions are measured on a 7-point Likert-type scale, with 1 = “very unlikely” and 7 = “very 
likely” that participants would comply and pay the taxes. Tax Setting (Scenario) and Detection Mechanism 
represent the two manipulations. Social Norms Factors are the factor scores obtained from the factor analysis 
described in Table 2. Household Income consists of five self-reported quintiles for 2008 household income, 
ranging from 1 = under $25,000 to 5 = over $100,000; analysis only consists of those participants that provided 
this information. Fairness measures participants‟ responses to “….[type of tax] laws are fair to most people” 
and is measured on a 7-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 = “strongly disagree” and 7 = “strongly agree.”   
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Table 21: Summary of Variables 
    
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign Definition Data Source 
Dependent Variable     
SSUTA N/A 
The adoption of the SSUTA provisions, 
represented by a dummy variable taking a value 
of 1 for adopting states (Governing Board 
members) and 0 for non-adopting states. 
Meeting minutes of the Streamlined Sales Tax 
Governing Board and committees (2005-2007); National 
Conference of State Legislatures' SSUTA Compliance 
Chart (2007) 
Test Variables - Political Interest Group Theory Factors   
BUSRATIO + 
The percentage of state employment by 
businesses with 500 or more employees, divided 
by the percentage of state employment by 
businesses with 20 or fewer employees. 
U.S. Census Bureau's Economic Census (2002); U.S. 
Office of Small Business Administration's Office of 
Advocacy Firm Size Data (2002)* 
STATESUT + The 2007 general state SUT rate. CCH's Multistate Sales Tax Guide (2007) 
LOCALJUR - 
The total number of jurisdictions within a state 
imposing an additional local general SUT. 
Tax Policy Center, Number and Type of State 
Jurisdictions with Local General Sales Tax (2006) 
Tax System Control     
ORIGIN - 
Origin-based SUT sourcing (measured prior to 
states' adoption of the SSUTA). 
Report by Kansas Department of Revenue, in the 
Washington Department of Revenue, Streamlined Sales 
and Use Tax Agreement Sourcing Study (2003); CCH 
Sales Tax News (2007).  
Fiscal Control        
SUTLOSS + 
Low estimate of 2008 state revenue losses from 
e-commerce as a proportion (percentage) of 2003 
total state taxes.  
Bruce and Fox (2004), State and local tax estimated 
revenue losses from e-commerce: Estimates as of July 
2004 
Political Control      
REPUBLIC +/- 
Percentage of Republican voters in the 2004 
Presidential election.  
The Federal Election Commission's Election Results for 
the U.S. President (2004) 
    *The Economic Census is conducted once every 5 years; data from the 2007 Economic Census is not yet released.  
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Table 22: Summary Statistics for Adoptions 
 
Panel A: Means and Standard Deviations 
 
Adopting States (n=22) 
  
 
Non-Adopting States (n=23)     
 Mean Std. Dev. Median Mean Std. Dev. Median     
Interest Group               
BUSRATIO 2.472 0.672 2.574 2.6357 0.450 2.751     
STATESUT 5.650 0.949 6.000 5.151 1.088 5.000     
LOCALJUR 114.230 148.891 89.000 363.830 675.155 86.000     
Fiscal Control               
SUTLOSS 3.414 0.837 3.100 3.417 0.511 3.000     
Political Control               
REPUBLIC 55.240 9.114 56.040 51.291 7.897 51.694     
                  
Panel B: Proportion of Occurrence*            
                  
  Adopting States (n=22)   Non-Adopting States (n=23)     
    Proportion     Proportion       
Tax System Control               
ORIGIN   54.5%     34.8%       
                  
*Proportion of states in which the measured variable was assigned a "1."     
                  
where:                 
BUSRATIO = % of state employment by business with 500 or more employees/20 or fewer 
employees; 
  STATESUT = general state SUT rate;         
LOCALJUR = total number of jurisdictions imposing additional local SUT;     
ORIGIN = SUT sourcing was origin-based prior to streamlining movement;     
SUTLOSS = % of state revenue lost due to e-commerce; and   
  REPUBLIC =%  of Republican voters in Presidential election.    
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Table 23: Spearman Correlation Matrix 
Independent Variables in Logit Analysis 
                
Variable BUSRATIO STATESUT LOCALJUR ORIGIN SUTLOSS     
 
              
STATESUT 0.226              
 
(0.135)             
LOCALJUR 0.117  -0.243   
 
      
 
(0.419) (0.107)           
ORIGIN 0.238  0.265  0.443          
 
(0.116) (0.079) (0.002)         
SUTLOSS 0.149  0.279  0.056  0.045        
 
(0.328) (0.063) (0.713) (0.770)       
REPUBLIC -0.011 -0.248 0.340  -0.083 0.345      
  (0.942) (0.101) (0.022) (0.589) (0.020)     
                
Note: Due to the small sample size (45 states that impose SUT), non-parametric correlations  
are presented.             
 
              
where:             
 BUSRATIO = % of state employment by business with 500 or more employees/20 or fewer employees; 
STATESUT = general state SUT rate;           
LOCALJUR = total number of jurisdictions imposing additional local SUT;     
ORIGIN = SUT sourcing was origin-based prior to streamlining movement; 
SUTLOSS = % of state revenue lost due to e-commerce; and       
REPUBLIC =% of Republican voters in Presidential election.        
P-values are reported in (parentheses). 
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Table 24: Model Results for Adoptions 
Logit Estimation Model 
Variable Coefficient 
Standard 
Error Wald p>Wald
a
 
% 
Change 
in 
Odds   
Constant -9.052 4.622 3.835 0.050     
Interest Group Theory Factors           
BUSRATIO -0.982 0.742 1.752 0.186 -37.5   
STATESUT 1.086 0.521 4.350 0.037 296.4   
LOCALJUR -0.003 0.002 2.734 0.098 -99.7   
Tax System Control           
ORIGIN 1.794 0.852 4.437 0.035 601.6   
Fiscal Control             
SUTLOSS -0.509 0.511 0.992 0.319 -60.1   
Political Control           
REPUBLIC 0.133 0.058 5.260 0.022 114.2   
              
 
Prediction Statistics and Model Fit 
   
Overall Model (45 states)   
Correct Model 
Predictions     
χ2 20.174   
No 
Adoption 73.9%     
Prob. > χ2 0.003   Adoption 86.4%     
Log Likelihood -42.187   All States
b
 80.0%     
Nagelkerke R
2
 0.482           
              
a
All p-values are for two-tailed tests. 
 
       
b
Overall predictive accuracy of the model.   
 where: 
ADOPT (Dependent Variable) = 1 if adopted SSUTA (Governing Board Members); 0 otherwise 
BUSRATIO = % of state employment by business with 500 or more employees/20 or fewer employees; 
STATESUT = general state SUT rate;         
LOCALJUR = total number of jurisdictions imposing additional local SUT;     
ORIGIN = SUT sourcing was origin-based prior to streamlining movement;   
SUTLOSS = % of state revenue lost due to e-commerce; and       
REPUBLIC =% of Republican voters in Presidential election.        
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Table 25: Summary of Case Study Data Sources 
 
 
Type of Archived Data Data Source 
Legislative History  
National Council of State Legislatures website; Kansas 
Legislature website; Texas Legislature website; Tennessee 
Legislature website 
Committee Meeting Minutes 
Kansas House, Senate, and Joint Committee archived 
committee meeting minutes; Texas House and Senate archived 
video broadcasts of committee meetings; Tennessee House and 
Senate archived audio broadcasts of committee meetings 
Streamlined Sales Tax 
Governing Board Committee 
Meeting Minutes Streamlined Sales Tax Project website  
Secondary sources, including 
trade articles, popular press 
articles, newspaper columns, 
and department of revenue and 
jurisdictional publications  
Obtained for each state via numerous searches on electronic 
databases, including via ProQuest, Business Index, the Wall 
Street Journal index, and multiple web search engines; 
furthermore, obtained additional publications for involved 
interest groups identified in the above source. 
Financial contribution and 
lobbying information (for 
entities identified via analysis of 
the above data) 
Kansas Governmental Ethics Commission website, Texas 
Ethics Commission website, Tennessee Ethics Commission 
website, Tennessee Online Campaign Finance database, 
National Institute on Money in State Politics website 
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Table 26: Overview of Kansas Interest Groups 
   
Interest Group 
Status toward 
changes Primary Argument 
State Government 
Supported (including 
Governor) 
Collection of lost sales tax revenue 
Large Business 
Supported (but not 
extensively involved) 
Simplification 
Local Government Supported 
Collection of lost sales tax revenue; addition 
of local use tax 
Small Business Opposed 
Originally supported (simplification and 
fairness); once aware of the sourcing 
changes, opposed due to the cost of the 
sourcing change 
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Table 27: Political Strategy Formulation of Kansas Interest Groups 
   Interest Group Approach Level of Participation 
State Government 
Relational - involved 
with multiple issues 
Collective - entities united within the 
government (e.g., department of 
revenue, governor's office, etc.) 
Large Business 
Relational - involved 
with multiple issues 
(although little 
involvement with this 
issue) 
Individual - most collective associations 
appeared dominated by small business 
concerns.  
Local Government 
Relational - involved 
with multiple issues 
Collective (Kansas Municipal League 
and Kansas Association of Counties) 
and individual (specific cities/counties) 
Small Business 
Associations involved 
with multiple issues; 
most individual 
businesses were limited 
to this issue.  
Some collective associations (KS 
Chamber of Commerce, other local 
chambers, National Federation of 
Independent Businesses); majority were 
individual businesses. 
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Table 28: Political Strategies used by Kansas Interest Groups 
 
Interest Group Informative Tactics Constituency Tactics Financial Tactics 
State Government 
Extensive testimony 
at legislative 
committee hearings. 
Appealed to 
collecting lost SUT, 
improving uniformity, 
and the need for 
Congressional action. 
Publications, training 
sessions and newspaper 
interviews. Appealed to 
collecting additional tax 
and improving SUT 
uniformity.  
None 
Large Business 
Little involvement in 
committee hearings. 
Solely appealed to 
simplification.  
Little appeal to 
constituents.  
Extensive financial 
contributions; multiple 
paid lobbyists.  
Local 
Government 
Extensive testimony 
at legislative 
committee hearings. 
Appealed to 
collecting additional 
tax and issues of 
fairness.  
Publications and 
statements of policy to 
constituents. Appealed 
to collecting lost SUT 
and the increase in tax 
revenue from local use 
tax.  
No financial 
contributions. All 
collective entities had 
multiple paid lobbyists; 
nearly all supporting 
cities/counties had 
lobbyists present.  
Small Business 
Extensive testimony 
at legislative 
committee hearings. 
Appealed to the cost 
of the sourcing 
change.  
Publications for 
constituent, newspaper 
interviews and editorial 
pieces. Appealed to the 
cost of the sourcing 
change.  
Minimal financial 
contributions from 
associations; none from 
individual businesses. 
Collective entities had 
multiple paid lobbyists; 
individual businesses 
did not.  
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Table 29: Overview of Texas Interest Groups 
   
Interest Group 
Status toward 
changes Primary Argument 
State Government 
Originally supported; 
later opposed 
Supported due to collection of lost SUT 
revenue; later opposed due to shift in 
intrastate SUT revenue 
Large Business Supported Simplification 
Local Government Opposed 
SUT revenue would shift away from some 
municipalities due to the sourcing change 
Small Business Opposed Cost of sourcing change  
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Table 30: Political Strategy Formulation of Texas Interest Groups 
   Interest Group Approach Level of Participation 
State Government 
Relational - involved 
with multiple issues 
Individual – Comptroller‟s Office 
involved; was not a pressing issue for 
the Governor's office 
Large Business 
Relational - involved 
with multiple issues 
Individual  
Local Government 
Relational - involved 
with multiple issues 
Collective associations (Texas 
Municipal League) and individual 
municipalities (especially Round Rock, 
TX) 
Small Business Transactional Primarily individual businesses 
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Table 31: Political Strategies used by Texas Interest Groups  
    Interest Group Informative Tactics Constituency Tactics Financial Tactics 
State Government 
Limited testimony at 
legislative committee 
hearings. Appealed to 
collecting lost SUT.  
Departmental and 
research publications. 
Wanted to be involved 
with SSTP to collect 
lost SUT and simplify 
the SUT system, but 
opposed due to lack of 
guarantees in collecting 
additional revenue and 
intrastate revenue shift.  
None 
Large Business 
Some involvement in 
committee hearings, 
but primarily sent 
written statements. 
Primarily argued 
simplification; also 
raised the issue of 
fairness.  
Little appeal to 
constituents.  
Evidence of financial 
contributions; multiple 
paid lobbyists.  
Local 
Government 
Extensive testimony at 
legislative committee 
hearings. Argued the 
shift in SUT revenue 
due to the sourcing 
change would 
devastate many 
municipalities.  
Publications and 
statements of policy to 
constituents. Again, 
argued the shift in SUT 
revenue due to the 
sourcing change would 
devastate many 
municipalities.  
No financial 
contributions. 
Collective entity had 
multiple paid lobbyists; 
nearly all opposing 
cities also had paid 
lobbyists.  
Small Business 
Little involvement at 
legislative committee 
hearings; informal 
lobbying of legislative 
leaders. Appealed to 
the cost of the sourcing 
change.  
Little communication to 
constituents regarding 
the issue.  
Minimal financial 
contributions and no 
paid lobbyists from 
businesses identified as 
involved with the issue.  
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Table 32: Overview of Tennessee Interest Groups 
   
Interest Group 
Status toward 
changes Primary Argument 
State Government 
Revenue Department 
Supported; Governor 
later Opposed 
Revenue Department: Simplification and 
collection of lost tax revenue; Governor: shift 
in intrastate revenue allocation 
Large Business Supported Simplification and fairness 
Local Government Opposed 
SUT revenue would shift away from some 
municipalities due to the sourcing change 
Small Business Opposed Cost of sourcing change  
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Table 33: Political Strategy Formulation of Tennessee Interest Groups 
   Interest Group Approach Level of Participation 
State Government 
Relational - involved 
with multiple issues 
Individual - TN Department of Revenue 
was the driving force behind adoption 
Large Business 
Relational - involved 
with multiple issues 
Collective associations (e.g., TN Retail 
Association, E-Fairness Coalition) and 
individual businesses 
Local Government 
Relational - most parties 
are involved with 
multiple issues 
Collective associations (Tennessee 
Municipal League) and individual 
municipalities (larger metropolitan 
areas) 
Small Business 
Relational - collective 
association involved 
with multiple issues 
Primarily collective associations (esp. 
National Federation of Independent 
Businesses) 
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Table 34: Political Strategies used by Tennessee Interest Groups  
  Interest Group Informative Tactics Constituency Tactics Financial Tactics 
State 
Government 
Extensive testimony 
at legislative 
committee hearings. 
Appealed to 
simplification and 
the ability to collect 
lost SUT revenue. 
Departmental 
publications, research 
publications, and 
newspaper interviews. 
Appealed to 
simplification, 
collecting lost SUT 
revenues, and fairness 
issues. 
None 
Large Business 
Some involvement 
with Department of 
Revenue meetings 
and task force; 
concerned with 
simplification. 
In 
newspaper/secondary 
publications, appeals 
to simplification and 
fairness. 
Evidence of financial 
contributions; many 
paid lobbyists.  
Local 
Government 
Involvement with 
Department of 
Revenue meetings 
and task force; 
lobbied legislators. 
Concerned with the 
shift in SUT revenue. 
Publications, 
statements of policy 
to constituents, 
newspaper and other 
secondary 
publications. Again, 
argued the shift in 
SUT revenue due to 
the sourcing change 
would devastate many 
municipalities.  
No financial 
contributions. 
Collective entities had 
multiple paid 
lobbyists; nearly all 
opposing 
municipalities also 
had paid lobbyists.  
Small Business 
Involvement with 
Department of 
Revenue meetings 
and task force; much 
informal lobbying of 
legislative leaders. 
Appealed to the cost 
of the sourcing 
change.  
In press releases, 
trade publications, 
and newspaper 
articles, appealed to 
the cost of the 
sourcing change and 
the lack of a 
Congressional 
guarantee.  
Minimal financial 
contributions; paid 
lobbyists present.  
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APPENDIX B: EXAMPLE OF ONLINE QUESTIONNAIRE 
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Part 1  
 
You are being invited to participate in a research project conducted by Amy Hageman, CPA and 
Donna Bobek, PhD, CPA of the University of Central Florida‟s Dixon School of Accounting. 
You will be asked to answer questions that will take about 15 minutes of your time. There are no 
anticipated potential risks associated with this study.  
 
This questionnaire includes a description of a scenario that a taxpayer may encounter. After 
reading the scenario, you will be asked several questions regarding what you would do if you 
were in that situation as well as your opinions about different factors related to taxation.  
 
Please note that this is an academic study conducted at a university to gain insight into U.S. 
taxpayer attitudes. As the results of this study could be helpful to tax policymakers, tax 
professionals and taxpayers, it is important that you answer each question in a serious and 
thoughtful manner. Your responses will be completely anonymous. Your name will not be 
collected or associated in any way with your responses, and only aggregated data will be 
included in any resulting publication or presentations.  
 
You must be at least 25 years of age to participate in this study. If you have decided to 
participate in this project, please understand that your participation is voluntary and that you 
have the right to withdraw your consent or discontinue participation at any time without penalty. 
If you have any questions regarding this project, you may contact Amy Hageman at (407)-823-
4420 or by email at ahageman@bus.ucf.edu, or Dr. Bobek at (407) 823-3082 or by email at 
dbobek@bus.ucf.edu. Questions or concerns about research participants' rights may be directed 
to the UCFIRB office, University of Central Florida, Office of Research & Commercialization, 
12201 Research Parkway, Suite 501, Orlando, FL 32826-3246. The phone number is (407)-823-
2901.  
 
By clicking “continue” below, you are indicating that you understand the above and voluntarily 
consent to participate in the research. Thank you very much for agreeing to participate.  
 
Part 2  
 
First, please tell us a little about yourself.   
 
1. What is your age?     Years 
 
2. What is your gender? 
 
 Male 
 Female 
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3. Have you ever filed a federal income tax return in the U.S.? 
 
 Yes 
 No 
 Not Sure 
 
4. Have you ever paid use tax (to any state in the U.S.)? 
 
 Yes 
 No 
 Not Sure  
 
5. Who usually prepares your tax return (please select one)?  
 
 You  
 Your spouse 
 Friend or other family member  
 Paid preparer 
 Other (please specify        ) 
 N/A 
 
6. What is your highest level of education attained (please select one)?  
 
 Did not complete high school  
 High school diploma 
 Some college coursework  
 Bachelor‟s degree 
 Post-graduate degree or certificate 
 
7. For 2008, what was your approximate household income (before taxes)? 
 
 Under $25,000 
 $25,000 to $49,999 
 $50,000 to $74,999  
 $75,000 to $99,999  
 Over $100,000 
 Prefer not to respond  
 
8. Which of the following describes your current employment status? Please check all that 
apply. 
 
 Employed full-time 
 Employed part-time 
 Self-employed  
 Full-time student   
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 Retired 
 Stay-at-home parent or homemaker  
 Unemployed (and looking for employment)  
 Other (please specify        ) 
 
9. If you are currently employed or self-employed, what is your field of employment (for 
example, education, health care, manufacturing, etc.)?      
 
10. What is your current state of residence?       
 
11. Have you ever been audited by the IRS or a state or local revenue department? 
 
 Yes 
 No 
 Unsure 
 
Part 3 
 
For the following questions, please select a number corresponding to how frequently you have 
experienced the situation.  
 
1. How often have you sold a piece of personal property (for example, a painting or antique) 
for more than you had originally paid for it (a gain)?  
 
1 2    3         4        5         6  7 
    Never     Occasionally          Frequently 
       
2. How often have you received cash payments for services (for example, tips, 
housecleaning, babysitting, or lawn care)?  
 
1 2    3         4        5         6  7 
    Never     Occasionally          Frequently 
      
3. How often have you purchased items online (at Amazon.com, Ebay.com, or a similar 
Internet retailer)? 
 
1 2    3         4        5         6  7 
    Never     Occasionally          Frequently 
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4. How often have you sold items online (at Amazon.com, Ebay.com, or a similar Internet 
retailer)?  
 
1 2    3         4        5         6  7 
    Never     Occasionally          Frequently 
          
For the following questions, please select a number corresponding to your level of familiarity.   
           
5. How familiar are you with the income tax laws concerning gains on the sale of assets 
used for personal use?  
  
1 2    3         4        5         6  7 
Not at      Somewhat     Very 
    All       Familiar 
 
6. How familiar are you with the income tax laws concerning cash payments received for 
services?  
 
1 2    3         4        5         6  7 
Not at      Somewhat     Very 
    All       Familiar 
 
 
7. How familiar are you with the use tax laws in your state concerning goods purchased 
online?  
 
1 2    3         4        5         6  7 
Not at      Somewhat     Very 
    All       Familiar 
 
Part 4 
 
INSTRUCTIONS 
 
The following scenario represents a taxpaying decision that an individual could face. Please read 
the scenario and keep the facts of the scenario in your mind when answering the questions on the 
following pages. It is important that you think about the scenario and answer all the questions to 
the best of your ability.   
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SCENARIO 
 
David and Mary Smith have been married for 15 years and have two girls. David owns his own 
small business and Mary works part-time in his business. In addition to their work, the Smiths 
help manage their daughters‟ soccer teams.  
 
The Smiths purchased some jewelry from an out-of-state seller, but the seller did not charge the 
Smiths sales tax on their purchase. Based on state tax laws (of which the Smiths are aware), 
taxpayers who do not pay sales tax on their out-of-state purchases must instead pay state use tax. 
The use tax is equal to the amount of sales tax that would have been charged if the purchase had 
been made in-state. The use tax should be reported by filing a tax return with the Smiths‟ state 
sales and use tax department. The amount of use tax due as a result of this purchase is $500.  
 
The Smiths purchased the jewelry through an online marketplace website. The Smiths are aware 
that the website automatically notifies the buyer‟s state sales and use tax department of any 
purchases of this magnitude.  
 
Part 5 
 
Based on the previous information, please answer the following questions.  
1. Which type of tax does the Smiths‟ scenario concern? 
 
 Federal income taxes 
 State use taxes 
 
2. What do you think is the likelihood that the Smiths would report the purchase and pay the 
$500 in taxes? 
 
Very Somewhat    Slightly       Neutral Slightly      Somewhat Very 
Likely Likely        Likely  Unlikely      Unlikely      Unlikely 
 
3. Placed in a similar situation, do you think the average U.S. taxpayer would report the 
purchase and pay the $500 in taxes? 
 
Very Somewhat    Slightly       Neutral Slightly      Somewhat Very 
Likely Likely        Likely  Unlikely      Unlikely      Unlikely 
 
4. Placed in a similar situation, do you think you would report the purchase and pay the $500 in 
taxes? 
Very Somewhat    Slightly       Neutral Slightly      Somewhat Very 
Likely Likely        Likely  Unlikely      Unlikely      Unlikely 
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5. Placed in a similar situation, if you failed to report the purchase of the jewelry, what do you 
think is the likelihood that you would be audited? 
 
Very Somewhat    Slightly       Neutral Slightly      Somewhat Very 
Likely Likely        Likely  Unlikely      Unlikely      Unlikely 
 
6. Placed in a similar situation, if you failed to report the purchase of the jewelry and were 
audited, what do you think is the likelihood that the taxing authority would assess tax on the 
purchase? 
 
Very Somewhat    Slightly       Neutral Slightly      Somewhat Very 
Likely Likely        Likely  Unlikely      Unlikely      Unlikely 
 
Part 6 
 
Please indicate how likely you believe that either YOU or MOST PEOPLE would feel the 
emotions described below if either you or most people did NOT report the purchase and pay 
the $500 in use taxes. Please circle a selection.  
 
1.  Would most people feel guilty if they did not report the purchase and pay the $500 in 
taxes? 
 
Very Somewhat    Slightly       Neutral Slightly      Somewhat Very 
Likely Likely        Likely  Unlikely      Unlikely      Unlikely 
 
2. Would you feel guilty if you did not report the purchase and pay the $500 in taxes? 
 
Very Somewhat    Slightly       Neutral Slightly      Somewhat Very 
Likely Likely        Likely  Unlikely      Unlikely      Unlikely 
 
3. Would most people feel ashamed if they did not report the purchase and pay the $500 in 
taxes? 
 
Very Somewhat    Slightly       Neutral Slightly      Somewhat Very 
Likely Likely        Likely  Unlikely      Unlikely      Unlikely 
 
4. Would you feel ashamed if you did not report the purchase and pay the $500 in taxes? 
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Very Somewhat    Slightly       Neutral Slightly      Somewhat Very 
Likely Likely        Likely  Unlikely      Unlikely      Unlikely 
 
5. Would most people feel justified if they did not report the purchase and pay the $500 in 
taxes? 
 
Very Somewhat    Slightly       Neutral Slightly      Somewhat Very 
Likely Likely        Likely  Unlikely      Unlikely      Unlikely 
 
6. Would you feel justified if you did not report the purchase and pay the $500 in taxes? 
 
Very Somewhat    Slightly       Neutral Slightly      Somewhat Very 
Likely Likely        Likely  Unlikely      Unlikely      Unlikely 
 
7. Would most people feel pleased if they did not report the purchase and pay the $500 in 
taxes? 
 
Very Somewhat    Slightly       Neutral Slightly      Somewhat Very 
Likely Likely        Likely  Unlikely      Unlikely      Unlikely 
 
8. Would you feel pleased if you did not did not report the purchase and pay the $500 in 
taxes? 
 
Very Somewhat    Slightly       Neutral Slightly      Somewhat Very 
Likely Likely        Likely  Unlikely      Unlikely      Unlikely 
 
9. Would most people be afraid they would get caught if they did not report the purchase 
and pay the $500 in taxes? 
 
Very Somewhat    Slightly       Neutral Slightly      Somewhat Very 
Likely Likely        Likely  Unlikely      Unlikely      Unlikely 
 
10. Would you be afraid you would get caught if you did not report the purchase and pay the 
$500 in taxes? 
 
Very Somewhat    Slightly       Neutral Slightly      Somewhat Very 
Likely Likely        Likely  Unlikely      Unlikely      Unlikely 
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Part 7 
 
Assuming you chose NOT to report the purchase and pay the $500 in use taxes, indicate your 
opinion of whether the following groups would approve or disapprove of your decision. Use a 
scale from 1-7 with 1=”definitely approve” and 7=”definitely disapprove.” Select “8” if the 
question is not applicable. 
 
Definitely            Definitely 
Approve                 Disapprove 
      
1. Most people you know 1    2     3      4       5       6        7  
   
2. Your family   1    2     3      4       5       6        7  
  
3. Your friends   1    2     3      4       5       6        7 
 
4. Your co-workers  1    2     3      4       5       6        7        8 
 
Please answer the following questions by circling the applicable percentage.  
 
5. Placed in a situation similar to the Smiths, approximately what percentage of U.S. 
taxpayers do you think would report the purchase and pay the $500 in taxes? 
 
100%     90%     80%     70%     60%     50%     40%     30%     20%     10%     0% 
 
6. Placed in a situation similar to the Smiths, approximately what percentage of U.S. 
taxpayers at your income level do you think would report the purchase and pay the $500 
in taxes? 
 
100%     90%     80%     70%     60%     50%     40%     30%     20%     10%     0% 
 
Part 8 
 
Now we would like to move away from the scenario about the Smiths and ask you some more 
general questions about taxation, the government, society and yourself.  Please just respond to 
each question to the best of your ability.  
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1. Do you get the general impression from people you work with that they think it is 
acceptable for people to pay less use taxes than they legally owe? Please circle a number.  
 
VERY ACCEPTABLE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7      VERY UNACCEPTABLE 
 
2. How much of a moral obligation – that is, an obligation based on your own personal 
feelings of what is right and wrong – do you feel to fully disclose and pay your use tax? 
Please circle a number.  
 
A GREAT DEAL  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 NO OBLIGATION 
OF OBLIGATION                AT ALL 
 
3. In your opinion, approximately what percentage of taxpayers deliberately pay less use 
taxes than they legally owe? 
 
100%     90%     80%     70%     60%     50%     40%     30%     20%     10%     0% 
 
4. In your opinion, approximately what percentage of taxpayers carelessly, but 
unknowingly pay less use taxes than they legally owe? 
 
100%     90%     80%     70%     60%     50%     40%     30%     20%     10%     0% 
 
5. In your opinion, approximately what percentage of the taxpayers who do underpay on 
their state use taxes get caught by the state taxing authority? 
 
100%     90%     80%     70%     60%     50%     40%     30%     20%     10%     0% 
 
6. Using the scale below, please identify your political philosophy (circle a number). 
 
        1  2    3         4         5        6          7  8 
       Very                Moderate                   Very  Prefer not 
 Conservative            Liberal to respond 
 
7. Which of the following describes your fear of being audited? Please select a number. 
1 2    3         4        5         6    7 
    Very   Moderate             Very 
    Low                       High 
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Part 9 
 
Please indicate your level of agreement/disagreement with the following statements.  
 
1. Most people in the U.S. think they should pay use taxes on all taxable out-of-state 
purchases.  
 
Strongly   Somewhat     Slightly    Neither Agree     Slightly Somewhat      Strongly 
Agree   Agree          Agree        or Disagree        Disagree Disagree        Disagree 
 
2.  I think I should pay use taxes on all taxable out-of-state purchases.  
 
Strongly   Somewhat     Slightly    Neither Agree     Slightly Somewhat      Strongly 
Agree   Agree          Agree        or Disagree        Disagree Disagree        Disagree 
 
3. Most people think it is morally wrong to evade use taxes even when they know they will 
not be caught. 
 
Strongly   Somewhat     Slightly    Neither Agree     Slightly Somewhat      Strongly 
Agree   Agree          Agree        or Disagree        Disagree Disagree        Disagree 
 
4. Most people do not know they are responsible for paying use tax on out-of-state 
purchases.  
 
Strongly   Somewhat     Slightly    Neither Agree     Slightly Somewhat      Strongly 
Agree   Agree          Agree        or Disagree        Disagree Disagree        Disagree 
 
5. The people closest to me (for example, my family and/or my friends) think they should 
pay use taxes on all taxable out-of-state purchases.  
 
Strongly   Somewhat     Slightly    Neither Agree     Slightly Somewhat      Strongly 
Agree   Agree          Agree        or Disagree        Disagree Disagree        Disagree 
 
6. I really enjoy reducing my overall tax bill, regardless of whether it is legal or not. 
 
Strongly   Somewhat     Slightly    Neither Agree     Slightly Somewhat      Strongly 
Agree   Agree          Agree        or Disagree        Disagree Disagree        Disagree 
 
7. I think the state use tax system benefits the rich and is unfair to the working man and 
woman. 
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Strongly   Somewhat     Slightly    Neither Agree     Slightly Somewhat      Strongly 
Agree   Agree          Agree        or Disagree        Disagree Disagree        Disagree 
 
8. People who underpay their use taxes do so because they think the tax laws are unfair to 
them. 
 
Strongly   Somewhat     Slightly    Neither Agree     Slightly Somewhat      Strongly 
Agree   Agree          Agree        or Disagree        Disagree Disagree        Disagree 
 
9. State use tax laws are fair to most people. 
 
Strongly   Somewhat     Slightly    Neither Agree     Slightly Somewhat      Strongly 
Agree   Agree          Agree        or Disagree        Disagree Disagree        Disagree 
 
10. State use tax laws are necessary to keep our society running.  
 
Strongly   Somewhat     Slightly    Neither Agree     Slightly Somewhat      Strongly 
Agree   Agree          Agree        or Disagree        Disagree Disagree        Disagree 
 
 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION! 
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APPENDIX C: KEY COMPONENTS OF THE SSUTA 
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Given that the changes brought about by the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement 
(SSUTA) are relatively recent, this appendix discusses several of the key components of the 
SSUTA as identified by Hellerstein and Swain (2004, p. 3-2) and Healy (2005, pp. 2-3).  
 
 State-level administration of SUT collections –Vendors will only file one SUT return 
for each adopting state, rather than a separate return for each local jurisdiction. This 
return will include both state and local SUT collections. States are then responsible for 
distributing local SUT revenue to the local jurisdiction.  
 
 Uniformity in state and local tax bases – State and local jurisdictions within a particular 
state must provide for equal tax treatment for sales of tangible personal property and 
taxable services.  
 
 Uniformity in major tax base definitions – Adopting states must agree on common 
definitions for tangible personal property and taxable service items. However, individual 
states still retain the authority to deem which transactions are taxable and non-taxable.  
 
 Central electronic registration systems for all member states – All adopting states 
offer a centralized location for vendors to register for SUT, rather than requiring separate 
vendor registration with each state.  
 
 Simplified state and local tax rates – Adopting states are generally permitted one state-
level rate; local jurisdictions within the state are permitted one local-level rate. Taxable 
transactions may not be taxed at different rates.  
 
  Uniform sourcing rules – The SSUTA “provides a hierarchical set of sourcing rules for 
all sales” (Hellerstein and Swain, 2004, p. 3-7). Specifically, sales of tangible personal 
property (TPP) at the place of a vendor‟s business will continue to be sourced to that 
location; however, sales of taxable TPP that are delivered to the consumer‟s location will 
be sourced to the consumer (destination-based sourcing). Thus, a pizza delivery company 
will tax sales of pizza at the SUT rate in effect at the customer‟s address, rather than at 
the pizza company‟s place of business.  
 
 Simplified administration of exemptions – Adopting states will have a uniform 
exemption certificate for vendors. Vendors will also not be held to the current “good 
faith” standards governing the receipt of an exemption certificate.  
 
 Amnesty – Adopting states will offer amnesty for uncollected or unpaid SUT for vendors 
that voluntarily register to collect and remit SUT for taxable transactions made within the 
state.  
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APPENDIX D: HIGHLIGHTS OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY BY STATE 
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KANSAS 
 
Time Period Event 
Spring 2003 
Kansas legislators hold hearings on adoption of the SSUTA (including destination-
based sourcing), effective 2004; testimony from all interest groups is overwhelmingly 
positive (but contains little discussion of sourcing changes). 
May 2003 
House (98-24) and Senate (32-7) adopt a conference committee report supporting 
the adoption of the SSUTA (HB 2005), changing the effective date of adoption to July 
1, 2003; signed by the Governor.  
June 2003 
Secretary of Revenue Joan Wagnon notifies retailers they will not be penalized for 6 
months as long as retailers are making a "good faith" effort after massive outcry 
among small retailers regarding destination-based sourcing change. The Governor’s 
Office soon releases a similar statement in support of this change, promising ongoing 
assistance.  
Fall 2003 
Special Joint Committee on Assessment hears testimony on the adoption of the 
SSUTA provisions. 
Spring 2004 
Kansas legislators hold hearings on delaying the adoption of the SSUTA until U.S. 
Congressional action is taken; numerous businesses support the delay, while 
municipal associations do not. (Thus, movement to delay implementation originated 
after the state’s official adoption date.) 
March 2004 
House (95-29) passes a bill delaying adoption for Congressional action (HB 2599); 
referred to Senate Assessment & Taxation Committee.  
May 2004 
Senate (40-0) and House (109-11) delay the implementation to January 1, 2005 (H. 
Sub for SB 147); approved by the governor, although the Governor and Senate 
leaders are still in support of the SSUTA. 
January 2005 Kansas petitions for membership to the SSTP as a fully conforming state 
February 
2005 
House (62-55) narrowly rejects a resolution notifying the SSTP of Kansas's 
compliance issues (attempting to jeopardize participation).  
March 2005 
Kansas legislators hold hearings on delaying the adoption of the SSUTA until U.S. 
Congressional action is taken; numerous businesses support the delay, while 
municipal associations do not. Approved by the Kansas House Taxation Committee 
(12-11), but does not reach the full House.  
October 2005 SSUTA goes into effect; Kansas is a fully conforming Governing Board state member. 
2006/2007 Kansas enacts various technical change bills to remain in SSUTA compliance.  
2008 Kansas is re-certified by the SSTP as still in compliance.  
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TEXAS 
 
 
Time Period Event 
Spring 2003 
Texas legislators hold hearings on adoption of the SSUTA (including destination-
based sourcing); testimony from larger businesses favors this change, but numerous 
municipalities testify in opposition (particularly Round Rock, TX).  
May/June 
2003 
House (132-0) and Senate (31-0) adopt provisions of the SSUTA (HB 2425), which is 
signed by the governor; most changes are effective October 1, 2003, while 
destination-based sourcing changes for taxable services are effective July 1, 2004. 
Origin-based sourcing continues for local sales tax for tangible personal property. 
July 2004  
Texas Comptroller's Office announces that the origin-based sourcing changes for 
taxable services have been indefinitely delayed. The office states that this delay was 
requested by key legislative leaders, citing concerns from local governments and 
business owners.  
2005 
The Comptroller's Revenue Analysis Section, with input from state and local 
governments, releases a study estimating that destination-based sourcing would 
redistribute $160 million in local sales tax.  
November 
2005 
Texas Comptroller's Office states that Texas is not a member state of the SSTP since 
the sourcing portion of the agreement did not simplify sales tax collection for Texas 
businesses.  
April 2006 
On behalf of Texas, Utah submits a proposal to the SST Governing Board requesting 
that destination-based sourcing be optional for intra-state sales; the proposal is 
rejected 17-7.  
May/June 
2007 
House (143-0) and Senate (30-0) return to origin-sourcing for taxable services (HB 
3319); signed by the governor. Thus, destination-based sourcing on intrastate sales 
was never implemented.  
December 
2007 
In response to problems faced by states such as Texas, the SST Governing Board 
changes its sourcing policy, permitting the use of intrastate origin-based sourcing 
(effective the later of January 1, 2010, or when five states under SSUTA use origin-
based sourcing). 
March 2008 
Texas Comptroller's Office announces that the Texas legislature may begin drafting 
SSUTA-conforming legislation in the 2009 legislative session.  
2009 
As of mid-2009, no SSUTA-conforming legislation has been introduced in the Texas 
legislature.  
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TENNESSEE 
 
Time Period Event 
Spring 2003 
Tennessee Department of Revenue meets with government and business interests 
around the state to draft legislation conforming to SSUTA; develops privilege tax 
recommendations for industries with special SUT exemptions.  
Spring 2003 
Tennessee Tax Structure Commission hears testimony from supporters and opponents 
of the SSTP.  
May/June 2003 
Senate (29-2) and House (71-15) adopt provisions to be uniform with the SSUTA (Pub. 
Chp. 357), with implementation no earlier than July 1, 2004 (i.e., two quarters after the 
SSTP is effective nationwide); signed by the Governor.  
May/June 2004 
Senate (31-0) and House (97-0) implement technical corrections in line with SSUTA 
and change the effective date to July 1, 2005 (Pub. Chp. 959); signed by the Governor.  
January 2005 
Tennessee Governor Phil Bredesen proposes delaying the implementation of laws 
conforming to the SSUTA during his state of the state address.  
February 2005 
Report on the Revenue Implications of the SSTP in TN released by the Center for 
Business and Economic Research (in consultation with state and local governments), 
estimating an overall net inflow to local governments of $29.8 million, but net outflows 
to 12 counties of $14.9 million. 
April 2005 SSTP creates "associate member" category for states.  
May/June 2005 
Senate (31-0) and House (89-3) delay implementation of the provisions conforming to 
the SSUTA to July 1, 2007 (Pub. Chp. 311); signed by the Governor.  
October 2005 SSUTA goes into effect; Tennessee is an associate member. 
January 2007 
Commissioned Report on Streamlined Sales Tax Law Changes released, 
recommending mitigation strategies for local governments and small businesses 
(developed with input from the state, local government, and business interests).  
June/July 2007 
Senate (26-2) and House (82-8) further delay implementations of the provisions 
conforming to the SSUTA to July 1, 2009 (Pub. Chp. 602). 
August 2007 Tennessee petitions for associate membership under the amended SSUTA. 
December 2007 
In response to problems faced by states such as Tennessee, the SST Governing Board 
changes its sourcing policy, permitting the use of origin-based sourcing (effective the 
later of January 1, 2010, or when five states under SSUTA use origin-based sourcing). 
May/June 2008 
Senate (25-5) and House (62-29) pass technical corrections in line with the SSUTA, 
which is signed by the governor (included as part of a bill on the tax treatment of family-
owned non-corporate entities). 
June/July 2009 
Tennessee House (HB 2275) and Senate (SB 2318) pass legislation delaying the 
effective date of SSUTA conformance to July 1, 2011 (Pub. Chp. 530): signed by the 
Governor.   
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APPENDIX E: IRB APPROVAL 
 
  
 
  
 
Notice of Exempt Review Status 
 
From:            UCF Institutional Review Board 
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To:                 Amy Hageman  
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Dear Researcher: 
 
Your research protocol was reviewed by the IRB Chair on 10/29/2008.  Per federal regulations, 45 CFR 46.101, 
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the IRB office to discuss the changes.  A change which incorporates the use of identifiers may mean the study is 
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